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A Treatise OF NATURE AND GRACE.

To which is Added,

The AUTHOR's Idæa of Providence;

AND

His Answers to several Objections against the foregoing Discourse.

By the Author of, *The Search after Truth.*

Translated from the Last Edition, Enlarged by many Explications.

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Advertiſement.

I Intreat thoſe, into whoſe hands this writing ſhall fall, to believe that I chiefly undertook it to ſatisfie the difficulties of ſome Philoſophers, who had not, as I thought, all thoſe Sentiments, which Religion teaches to have of God's goodneſs; and were not ſufficiently acquainted with the obligations which we have to Jeſus Chriſt. I deſire, it may be lookt upon only as an Eſſay; that none will judge of it, before they have examined it without prejudice, and that they will not ſuffer themſelves to be ſurprized by thoſe motions of fear and ſuſpition, which every thing which ſeems to be new, is apt naturally to excite in us. Seeing I wrote for ſuch Philoſophers, as pretend to be very juſt and exact in their Reaſonings, I was obliged to avoid thoſe general terms which are ordinarily uſed: for I could not content them but by uſing ſuch terms as raiſe in their minds diſtinct and particular Ideas, as far as the ſubject will permit it. I preſume that all Candid Readers will judge, that I have no other deſign, but to prove (all ways poſſible) thoſe truths which Faith teaches; and that I am

not ſo raſh as to doubt of that which is look't upon as certain in the Church, and which Religion obliges us to believe. But it has always been allowed, to give new proofs of old truths, to repreſent God Amiable to Men, and to make it plain that there is nothing hard or unjuſt, in the order which he obſerves for the eſtabliſhment of his Church.

This Work is divided into Three Diſcourſes; In the Firſt, I repreſent God, as doing all the good to his Creatures, which his Wiſdom permits. In the Second, I ſhew, how the Son of God, as incarnate Wiſdom, and Head of the Church, communicates to his Members thoſe Graces, which he could not grant unto them, as Eternal Wiſdom: And thus I do endeavour, to repreſent the obligations and relations which we have to Jeſus Chriſt. Laſtly, In the Third, I explain, what is Liberty, and how Grace acts in us without hurting it. Seeing there are ſome Perſons, of ſo little Candour, as to draw invidious Conſequences, even from Principles, the moſt advantageous to Religion; I beg that I may not be condemned upon their word, and that before I be Judged, Men will do me ſo much Juſtice, as to underſtand me. Certainly I ought not to be neceſſitated to make this requeſt.

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CORRECTIONS.

Page	Line	
5	4	After Image, ad — of.
ib.	7	For there, *Lege* their.
10	13	For Creation, *L.* Incarnation.
14	12	After *abſit*, add — the Period ſtop. [.]
16	7	For *capit*, L. *cupit.*
17	28	For they, *L.* men.
23	17	For form, *L.* forms.
26	15	*Dele* not.
33	26	For principle, *L.* principal.
38	10	The Comma after — it, [,]
43	3	*D.* to after obliges.
45	31	For, all thoſe, *L.* any.
ib.	18	After proceedings, this Punctation. [;]
81	13	*D.* of, after think.
85	19	After wiſdom, a Comma. [,]
87	11	For real manner, *L.* ſure way.
89	23	*D.* the, before order.
93	33	After God, add — they.
95	4	*L.* men's, for men.
ib.	ult.	*L.* efface, for effuſe.
97	4	*L.* motions, for motion.
104	32	*L.* ſpeak, for ſpeaking.
106	ult.	After and, add — another.
108	16,17	For God is juſt, and would by a particular, *&c.*
ib.		*L.* this Man is juſt, & God would by a particular,
131	ult.	For whilſt we love, *L.* when we enjoy, *&c.* [*&c.*
134	4	After carries, add — him.
138	6	For unuſual, *L.* unuſeful.
143	20,21	For pleaſures, *L.* pleaſures.
153	3,4,	After and, add — it. After ſweetneſs and de-
ib.	5	ſolation, this Punctation. [:]
158	10	After beſides, add — that.
ib.	12	After infinite, only a Comma. [,]
162	19	Only a Comma, [,] after others. For but *L.*
ib.	20	This Punctation, [:] after them. [that.
192	16	For but, *L.* that.
202	28	*D.* not.
215	6	For *præviſiones*, L. *præviſione.*
ib.	16	After *fidei*, add — *regula.* In the Margin, in-
		ſtead of Cap. 23. *L.* c. 13.
223	22	For Manada, *L.* Mandata.

The First Discourse.

Of the Necessity of the General Laws of Nature and Grace.

First Part.

The Necessity of the General Laws of Nature.

Advertisement.

I Think I ought to Advertise, That they who are well acquainted with the Principle which I have proved, in *the Search after Truth*, and elsewhere, need not to read the following Additions, nor even the Explications which are at the end of this Treatise; without which my Meaning may be very well understood: But they may perhaps be usefull unto those whom I had chiefly in my mind, when I wrote the *Treatise of Nature and Grace*, and whom I should extreamly desire to content, as well as others.

Additions.

The Will of God can be nothing else, but the Love which he bears to himself. Now he cannot will and act but by his own Will: Therefore he cannot act but for himself. But the World is not worthy of God: It has no Proportion to God; for there is no relation betwixt finite and infinite: God therefore cannot form the Design of producing it. God cannot act with a design of doing nothing for himself, since he cannot act but for himself. Now the World with respect to God, is nothing; for the relation of finite to infinite is a Cypher: God therefore cannot resolve to make any thing, if a Divine Person does not joyn himself to his Work to render it Divine, and thereby worthy of his Complacency, or answerable to the infinite Action of his Will. Thus,

I.

Since God cannot act but for his own Glory, nor finding it but in himself, he could have no other design in the Creation of the World, but the Establishment of his Church.

Additions.

But what Divine Person shall sanctify the Work of God? It must be the Eternal Word. For it is the Word, or the Wisdom of God, which ought to be, as I may so say, first consulted to regulate the Divine Operation, and in some sort make way for God's Action. A Prophane World being unworthy of God, the Wisdom of God rendred God impotent; or hindred him from acting. Thus, supposing that God would procure to himself an Honour worthy of him, (which nevertheless is every way indifferent to him, since he is altogether sufficient to himself) his Wisdom would fail him in some sence, if it did not in the first place

offer its ſelf to him to be united to his Work, ſince otherwiſe his Work would not be worthy of him. The Word is univerſal Reaſon : 'Tis he therefore who was to come and enlighten Men, who could not be reaſonable, but by Reaſon. 'Tis according to him, and by him that we are form'd : 'Tis therefore by him, or according to him, we muſt be perfected, or reformed. Thus, ſince a Divine Perſon muſt render the Work of God Divine, make Gods of us, or the Adopted Children of the Eternal Father; it was neceſſary that his only Son ſhould be the Firſt-born amongſt many Brethren, and that we all ſhould receive of his Abundance, or of that Fulneſs of Divinity which dwells in him. I might therefore ſay according to theſe Principles, ſpeaking of the Church, that it is the great Work which the Son built to the Glory of the Father. Eph. 1. 21. 22, 23. c. 2. 21, 22. c. 4. 13. 16. Col. 1. 15. 16. 17, 18. 19. Eccl. 24. 14. 1 Pet. 1. 20.

II.

Jeſus Chriſt, who is the Head thereof, is the Beginning of the Wayes of the Lord; He is the First-born of all Creatures: And though he was born amongſt men in the fulneſs of time, yet he is their model in the Eternal deſigns of his Father. It is according to his Image that all men were made, they who were before his Temporal birth as well as we. In a word, it is in Him that all things ſubſiſt; for it is he alone who could render the work of God perfectly worthy of its Author. Eph. 1. 4. Joan. 17. 5, 24. Apoc. 13. 8. Pſal. 72. 17. Eph. 2. 10 Rom. 8. 29.

Additions.

Jeſus Chriſt, who is the Head of the Church, is the beginning of the Wayes of the Lord. *I uſe theſe Expreſſions, becauſe Scripture uſes them. The Title of Head plainly ſhews, that Jeſus Chriſt*

as Man, is not only the Meritorious cauſe of Grace, but alſo the Occaſional, Phyſical, Diſtributive; ſince He gives his Spirit to his Members which compoſe the Church, as I ſhall explain more largely in the Second Diſcourſe. And it may be ſaid, That Jeſus Chriſt is the Beginning of the Ways of the Lord: *Becauſe God, by the Creation of the World, goes out, as I may ſay, of himſelf, ſince the term of his Operation is not his own ſubſtance, as in immanent Operations, by which the Son is continually begotten, and the Holy Ghoſt proceeds. It is upon this account that the Wiſe man after theſe words in the Eighth Chap. of the* Proverbs; The Lord poſſeſſed me in the beginning of his Wayes, *adds for Explication**, Antequam quidquam faceret a principio. *That Jeſus Chriſt is the Head of the Church is without diſpute: But that he is the beginning of the Ways of the Lord, in this ſence, is that which may be doubted. I have followed the common opinion of the Fathers upon the* 22. ver. *of the* 8th. ch. *of the* Prov. *for almoſt all of them underſtand this paſſage, which the* Arrians *abuſed,* Dominus poſſedit; or *(as they then read according to the* 70.) Creavit me in initio viarum ſuarum, *of the incarnate Wiſdom. It is uſeleſs here to tranſcribe all the Quotations of* Salazar *upon this place of the* Proverbs. *Jeſus Chriſt is the* firſt-born of every Creature, primogenitus omnis creaturæ, Col. 1. 15. *He is our model, ſince St.* Paul *exhorts us to put Him on, or to become like unto Him:* Therefore, as we have born the Image of the Earthly, let us alſo bear the Image of the Heavenly. It is according to his Image, that all men were made in the purpoſe of God. *For the* Word *is univerſal Reaſon, and*

* Before his *works* of Old.

and immutable Order; and God has made us to conform us to Reaſon and Order. There are none but the Elect, whom God has efficaciouſly predeſtinated to become conformable to the Image his Son: Quos præſcivit & predeſtinavit conformes fieri imagini Filii ſui, *Rom.* 8. 29. *I confeſs it. But God would Save all men, He wills there Sanctification;* This is the will of God, your Sanctification, 1. *Theſ.* 4. 3. *The Wiſdom incarnate is moreover our* model *after a ſenſible manner, and ſuitable to men who only harken to their ſenſes. God foreſeeing ſin, reſolved to give unto Jeſus Chriſt a body that it might be a victim, which He might offer unto Him; for every Prieſt muſt have ſomething to offer.* Neceſſe eſt & hunc habere aliquid quod offerat, *Heb.* 8. 3. *Now God thought on the body of his Son when he form'd that of* Adam, *and hath given unto us all a body, by which we may Merit, or which we ought to ſacrifice as Prieſts, and according to the Example of our Sovereign Prieſt:* Obſecra vos ut exhibeatis corpora veſtra hoſtiam viventem, ſanctam, Deo placentem, *Rom.* 12. 1. *To conclude, all things ſubſiſt in Jeſus Chriſt,* Omnia in ipſo conſtant, *Col.* 1. 19. *Every thing was created in J. C. and by J. C.* Omnia per ipſum & in ipſo creata ſunt, *Col.* 1. 16. Omnia & in omnibus Chriſtus, *Col.* 3. 11.

III.

There ought to be ſome relation betwixt the World and the Action by which it is produced. Now the Action by which the World was drawn out of nothing is the Action of God, which is of infinite value; and the World how perfect ſoever it might be, is not infinitely amiable, and cannot render unto God an Honour worthy of him.

him. Thus, ſeparate Jeſus Chriſt from the reſt of the creatures, and ſee if he who cannot act but for his own glory, and whoſe Wiſdom has no bounds, cou'd reſolve to produce any thing from without. But if you joyn J. C. to his Church, and the Church to the reſt of the World, out of which it was taken; then you will raiſe to the Glory of God a Temple ſo auguſt and ſo holy, that you'l perhaps be ſurprized, that the foundations of it were laid ſo late.

Additions.

See then the order of things! All is for men, men for J. C. and J. C. for God; Whether things preſent, or things to come, all are yours; and you are Chriſts, and Chriſt is Gods. 1. *Cor.* 3. 22. *God hath Subjected all things to J. C.* All Power is given to me both in Heaven and Earth; *St. Mat.* 28. 18. *Heb.* 2. 9. That J. C. might ſubject all things to God, and give up his Kingdom at the end of the World, having deſtroyed all Principalities and all Powers, 1. *Cor.* 15. 24. That the Son himſelf may be for ever ſubject to him that put all things under him, and that thus God may be all in all. *Ver.* 28. *This is the Spiritual Temple which muſt be altogether filled with the Majeſty of God, and remain eternally, becauſe its immovable foundations are laid on J. C. before thoſe of this world, which muſt Periſh:* * Ab æterno ordinata ſum, & ex antiquis antequam terra fieret, *Prov.* 8. 23. *God has elected us in J. C. before the Creation of the World: Eph.* 1. 4. *His grace is given to us before the world began.* 2. *Tim.* 1. 9. *And J. C. himſelf in his Prayer after the celebration of the holy Supper, beggs of his Father, that*

* I was ſet up from everlaſting, from the begining, or ever the earth was. *Fundavit me,* Ἐθεμελίωσε με. apud Sept.

that glory which he poſſeſſed in him before the world was, i. e. *before he reſolved to form the World* St. John 17. 5. *To conclude, J. C. being the firſt of the predeſtinated, ſince we are not predeſtinated but in J. C. God who has made the world only for the prediſtinated* (Omnia propter electos) *muſt, as I may ſo ſay, have thought of J. C. before all things. For if theſe paſſages, and ſuch like, be interpreted only of the Eternal preſcience, it alſo may be truly ſaid, that the motion of a ſtraw is in God before all ages, as well as the Incarnation of his beloved Son, who renders all the Work of God Amiable to him. If the different manner after which the H. Spirit ſpeaks of the works of God in the H. Scripture be obſerved, it cannot be doubted, in my opinion, that J. C. and his Church is truly the deſign of God. See wherefore it is evident by reaſon, and certain by* Faith, *that God never repents, or changes his deſign.* God is not as the Son of man that he ſhould repent, *Numb* 23. 19. *Yet nevertheleſs the H. Scripture ſays, that God repented he had made man,* Gen. 6. 6. *And that the Jewiſh Prieſthood, their Ceremonies, their whole Burnt-offerings were not at all pleaſing to him.* Iſa. 1. Pſalm 50. *Why did God make a World which he was obliged to deſtroy? Why has he eſtabliſhed a worſhip which he is bound to reject,* he who is conſtant *in all his purpoſes. It is becauſe he would thereby ſignify, that the preſent world is not properly his work, or his true deſign; nor the Jewiſh worſhip a true worſhip, or worthy of him. But what then is his immutable deſign?* The Lord ſware, and will not repent; thou art a Prieſt for ever after the order of Melchiſedec. *God will never repent of having made J. C. Sove-*

reign Prieſt: He thereby receives Divine Honours. His Prieſthood ſhall continue for ever, having been confirmed by an Oath, Heb. ch. 7. &c. *God repented that he had made* Saul *King over the people.* Saul, *I ſay, the figure of* Herods, *and the Image of Politick Kings, who only ſeek their own greatneſs. But* David *the figure and Father of Jeſus Chriſt, is after Gods own heart. God never repented that he had made him King over his People.* I have Sworn once by my Holineſs, that I will not fail *David.* His Seed ſhall endure for ever, and his Seat is like as the Sun before me, *Pſal.* 89. 34, 35. Behold thou ſhalt conceive and bear a Son —— and of his Kingdom there ſhall be no end.

When Abraham *by the ſacrifice of his only Son, had repreſented Jeſus Chriſt raiſed from the Dead, God aſſures him, and that alſo with an Oath to render this promiſe irrevocable, that in the Antitpye of* Iſaac *delivered from the Dead, (that is to ſay in J. C. raiſed from the Dead, ſet at his right hand, made a Prieſt according to the order of* Melchiſedec, *and a King over his People) all the Nations ſhould be abundantly bleſſed.* By my ſelf have I Sworn ſaith the Lord —— in thy ſeed ſhall all the Nations of the Earth be Bleſſed. *Thus we ſee, when God ſpeaks of the Incarnation of his Son and of his Prieſthood, he thereunto adds an Oath, to ſhew that this is his irrevocable purpoſe, or rather his purpoſe; for ſince God never repents, all his deſigns are irrevocable. But I think I ought to adviſe, that what I have hitherto ſaid, is not eſſential to my purpoſe, which is principally to juſtify the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, notwithſtanding Monſters, Sinners, and all the irregularities found in the World. If I place J. C.*

at

at the Head of all things, if I make him the principal deſign of God; it is becauſe I hope by this means to juſtifie the thought, or deſire, which God had to go out of himſelf by communicating himſelf to his Creatures; and by the regular order of Meditation, it ſeems to me I ought to begin there.

IV.

In the mean time, if you obſerve that the glory which redounds to God from his work, is not eſſential to him; if you grant that the World cannot be a neceſſary Emanation of the Divinity; you'll plainly ſee that it was not to have been eternal, tho' it never ſhould have an end. Eternity is the Character of Independence; it muſt needs be therefore that the World had a begining. The annihilation of ſubſtances is a mark of inconſtancy in him that made them; they therefore ſhall never have an end.

Additions.

I mean that Eternity does not imply independence. But independence implys Eternity; for nothing can be independent that is not Eternal. Eternal exiſtence therefore is the manner whereby that thing which is independent exiſts. GOD could not give Eternal exiſtence to Creatures. To conſider only the Power of God, he was able to have created the World from all Eternity; for he never was without his Power. But if his Wiſdom, which is his inviolable, be conſulted, he ought not to have done it; and conſequently in one ſence he could not; for it is not in the power of God to belie himſelf, or to deſpiſe the Laws which his wiſdom preſcribes to him. The ſame thing muſt be ſaid concerning the annihilation of ſubſtances. If you conſider only the power of God, he may annihilate them.

them. But if you consult his wisdom, it appears that he will do no such thing: for God acts always after the wisest manner that he can, or which best comports with his divine attributes. He may chuse whether he will act at all, in this he is very indifferent, for he is altogether sufficient to himself. But if he acts he cannot change. His conduct must always bear the impression of his wisdom and his immutability. It seems to me that order, which is his inviolable law, requires it should be thus. See the 2d. discourse, Articles 50, 51, 52.

V.

If therefore it be true, that the World ought to have a beginning, and that the creation of J. C. could not be so ancient as the eternal generation of his divine Person; an eternity must needs have preceded time. Thus, do not think that God delayed the production of his work, he too much loves the glory which he receives thereby in J. C. It may be truly said in some sence, that he has made it as soon as he could. For tho' in respect of us, he might have created it ten Thousand years before the begining of the World; yet ten Thousand years having no relation to eternity, he could not have made it sooner or later; since an eternity must needs have gone before.

VI.

It is plain, that soon and late are the properties of time. And if it should be supposed that God had created the World sooner than he did, by so many Millions of years, as there are grains of sand upon the Sea-shore, might it not still have been asked, Why God who so much loves the glory

glory which he receives by the Eſtabliſhment of his Church, had not begun many Ages before? Thus it is ſufficient to ſay, that an Eternity * went before the Incarnation of the World, to ſhew that this great miſtery was accompliſhed neither too ſoon nor too late. It was therefore neceſſary that God ſhould have created the World for the Church, the Church for J. C. and J. C. for to find in him a Sacrifice, and a Sovereign Prieſt worthy of the divine Majeſty. This order of the deſigns of God cannot be doubted of, if it be obſerved, that he cannot have any other end of his actions but himſelf. And if it be underſtood that eternity is not proper to creatures, it will be granted, that they were made when they ought to have been. Theſe truths being ſuppoſed, let us endeavour to diſcover ſomething in the conduct which God obſerves for the execution of his great deſign.

* Ought to have gone.

Additions.

Read the Objection and Anſwer which is at the end of the third explication, where I ſhew, that St. Auguſtine *did not pretend that the Judgments of God are impenetrable in this ſence; that the truths which Faith teaches us being ſuppoſed, it is unlawful to juſtifie his wiſdom and goodneſs in the execution of his intentions. 'Tis certain, that the Fathers, and all Divines have endeavoured to give a reaſon of their Faith, and we ought to meditate upon the truths of Religion, to attain unto the underſtanding of that which we already believe. But to remove all ſcruple concerning my way of proceeding, I ſhall now ſhew, that St.* Auguſtine *himſelf approves it by his Example and his Reaſons.*

Con-

Conſentius *had ſome difficulties concerning the Trinity, he had propoſed them to* Alipius, *that he might obtain the reſolution of them from St.* Auguſtine. *But having learnt that St.* Auguſtine *was in a place of retirement, and proper for meditating and clearing up his doubts, he writ to him himſelf,* (as unto a man whoſe ſpirit * penetrated into the higheſt myſteries) *that he would give him thoſe explications he deſired, if he thought convenient. Nevertheleſs he openly declares, that 'twas his opinion, the reaſons of our myſteries ought not to be ſought after, but that men ſhould depend upon Faith only. Theſe are his words,* Epiſ. 221.

* Senſum altiſſima myſteria perſcrutantem.

Ego igitur, cum apud memetipſum prorſus definierim, veritatem rei divinæ ex fide, magis quam ex ratione, percipi oportere, ſi enim fides Sanctæ Eccleſiæ ex diſputationis ratione, non ex credulitatis Pietate, apprehenderetur, nemo præter Philoſophos atq; Oratores, beatitudinem poſſederet. Sed quia placuit Deo, qui infirma Mundi hujus elegit, ut confundat fortia, per ſtultitiam Prædicationis ſalvare credentes; non tam ratio requirenda de Deo, quam autoritas eſt ſequenda Sanctorum. Nam profecto, neque Ariani, qui Filium, quem genitum confitemur, minorem putant, in hac impietate perſiſterent, neque Macedoniani Spiritum Sanctum, quem neq; genitum neq; ingenitum credimus, quantum in ipſis eſt a Divinitatis arce detruderent, ſi Scripturis Sanctis, magis quam ſuis ratiocinationibus, accomodare fidem mallent.

But ſee St. Auguſtin's *Anſwer.*

Quod autem petis, ut queſtionem Trinitatis hoc eſt de Unitate Divinitatis, & diſcretione Perſonarum, caute, prudenterq; diſcutiam, ut doctrinæ

mcæ

meæ, ſicut dicis, ingeniiq; ſerenitas, ita nebulam veſtræ mentis abſtergat, ut quod nunc cogitare non poteſtis, intelligentiæ a me lumine declaratum quodammodo videre poſitis. Vide prius, utrum iſta petitio cum tua ſuperiori definitione concordet, ſuperius quippe in eadem ipſa Epiſtola, in qua hoc petis, apud temetipſum definiſſe te dicis, ex fide veritatem magis quam ex ratione, percipi oportere. *Si enim fides*, inquis, *Sanctæ Eccleſiæ, ex diſputationis ratione, & non ex credulitatis pietate apprehenderetur, nemo præter philoſophos atq; Oratores beatitudinem poſſideret, ſed quia placuit, inquis Deo, qui infirma hujus Mundi elegit, ut confundat fortia, per ſtultitiam Prædicationis ſalvos facere credentes, non tam ratio requirenda, quam autoritas eſt ſequenda Sanctorum.* Vide ergo, ſecundum hæc verba tua, ne potius debeas, maxime de hac re, in qua fides noſtra Conſiſtit, ſolam Sanctorum autoritatem ſequi, nec ejus intelligentiæ a me quærere rationem. Neq; enim cum cæpero te in tanti hujus ſecreti intelligentiam utcunq; introducere (quod niſi Deus intus adjuverit omnino non potero) aliud diſſerendo facturus ſum, quam rationem, ut potero, redditurus: quam ſi a me, vel quolibet doctore non irrationabiliter flagitas, ut quod credis intelligas, Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem reſpuas, ſed ut ea que fidei firmitate jam tenes, etiam rationis Luce conſpicias. Abſit namq; ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis animantibus excellentiores creavit. Abſit inquam, ut ideo credamus, ne rationem accipiamus, ſive queramus; cum enim credere non poſſemus, niſi rationales animas haberemus. Ut ergo in quibusdam rebus, ad doctrinam ſalutarem pertinentibus

tinentibus, quas ratione nondum percipere valemus, ſed aliquando valebimus, fides precedat rationem, qua cor mundatur, ut magnæ rationis capiat, & perferat Lucem, hoc utique rationis eſt. & ideo rationabiliter dictum eſt per Prophetam, *Niſi credideritis non intelligetis.* Iſa. 7. 9. ſecund. 70. Ubi proculdubio diſcrevit hæc duo, deditq; conſilium, quo prius credamus, ut id quod credimus intelligere valeamus. Proinde ut fides præcedat rationem rationabiliter viſum eſt. Nam ſi hoc præceptum rationabile non eſt, ergo irrationabile eſt. Abſit ſi igitur rationabile eſt, ut ad magna quædam, quæ capi nondam poſſunt, fides precedat rationem; proculdubio, quantulacunq; ratio quæ hoc perſuadet, etiam ipſa antecedit fidem. Propterea monet Apoſt. Petrus, paratos nos eſſe debere ad reſponſionem omni poſcenti nos rationem de fide, & ſpe noſtra: quoniam ſi a me infidelis rationem poſcit fidei & ſpei meæ, et video quod antequam credat, capere non poteſt hanc ipſam ei reddo rationem, in qua, ſi fieri poteſt, Videat, quam prepoſtere ante fidem poſcat rationem earum rerum quas capere non poteſt. Si autem jam fidelis rationem poſcat, ut quod credit, intelligat; capacitas ejus intuenda eſt, & Secundum rationem redditam ſumat fidei ſuæ, quantum poteſt, intelligentiam, majorem, ſi plus capit; minorem ſi minus: cum tamen quouſq; ad plenitudinem Cognitionis, perfectionemq; perveniat, ab itinere fidei non recedat. Hinc eſt quod dicit Apoſtolus, *Phil.* 3. 15, 16. *Et tamen ſi quid aliter ſcitis, id quque vobis Deus revelabit: verum tamen in quod pervenimus, in eo ambulemus.* Jam ergo, ſi fideles ſumus, ad fidei viam pervenimus,

quam

quam ſi non dimiſerimus, non ſolam ad tantam intelligentiam rerum incorporearum, & incommutabilium, quanta in hac vita capi non ab omnibus poteſt, verumetiam ad ſummitatem Contemplationis, quam dicit Apoſtolus, *facie ad faciem* ſine dubitatione perveniemus. Nam quidam, etiam minimi, & tamen in via fidei perſeverantiſſime gradientes, ad illam beatiſſimam Contemplationem pervenerunt. Quidam vero, quid ſit natura inviſibilis, incommutabilis, incorporea utcunq; jam ſcientes, & viam quæ ducit ad tantæ beatitudinis manſionem, quoniam ſtulta illis videtur, quod eſt Chriſtus Crucifixus, tenere recuſantes, ad quietis ipſius penetrale, cujus jam Luce mens eorum, velut in longinqua radiante perſtringitur, pervenire non poſſunt. Sunt autem quædam, quæ cum audierimus, non eis accomodamus fidem, & ratione nobis reddita, vera eſſe Cognoſcimus quæ credere non valemus. Et univerſa Dei miracula ideo ab infidelibus non Creduntur, quia eorum ratio non videtur. Et revera ſunt, de quibus ratio reddi non poteſt, non tamen non eſt. Quid enim eſt in rerum natura, quod irrationaliter fecerit Deus? Sed quorundam mirabilium operum, ejus etiam expedit tantiſper occultam eſſe rationem, ne apud animos faſtidio languidos, ejusdem rationis cognitione vileſcant. Sunt enim, & multi ſunt, qui plus tenentur Admiratione rerum, quam Cognitione Cauſarum, ubi miracula eſſe deſiſtunt; & opus eſt, eos ad inviſibilium fidem viſibilibus miraculis excitari, ut charitate purgati, eo perveniant, ubi familiaritate veritates mirari deſiſtant. Nam & theatris Homines funambulum mirantur, muſicis delectantur: in illo ſtupet difficultas,

tas, in his retinet, paſcitq; jucunditas. Hæc dixerim, ut fidem tuam, ad amorem intelligentiæ cohorter, ad quam ratio vera perducit, & cui fides animum præparat. *And afterwards* —— Porro autem qui vera ratione jam quod tantummodo credebat intelligit, profecto præponendus eſt ei qui capit ad huc intelligere quod credit. Si autem nec cupit, & ea quæ intelligenda ſunt credenda tantummodo exiſtimat, Cui rei fides proſit, ignorat, vid. de Lib. arbit. Lib. 11. c. 2.

We ſee then, by this Epiſtle of St. Auguſtine, *that they who blame my way of proceeding, are of* Conſentius's *opinion, which St.* Auguſtine *Condemns.* Corrige definitionem tuam, non ut fidem reſpuas, ſed ut ea quæ fidei firmitate, jam tenes, etiam rationis luce conſpicias. Abſit enim, ut hoc in nobis Deus oderit, in quo nos reliquis Animantibus excellentiores creavit. ——— Hæc dixerim ut fidem tuam ad amorem intelligentiæ cohorter, ad quam Ratio vera perducit, & cui fides animum præparat. *This is the Method, which I think I have hitherto obſerved, according to St.* Auguſtine; *who did not believe that he had any wiſe derogated from the Majeſty of our Myſteries by the* 15. *Books which he Compoſed, about the Trinity.*

VII.

If I was not perſwaded that all men are reaſonable, only becauſe they are enlightned by the Eternal Wiſdom; I ſhould doubtleſs be very raſh to ſpeak of the deſigns of God, and to endeavour to diſcover any of his wayes in the production of his Work. But ſince it is certain, that the Eternal Word is the univerſal reaſon of minds, and by the light which he continually caſts upon

on us, we may all have ſome commerce with God; I ought not to be blamed for conſulting this reaſon, which altho' conſubſtantial with God himſelf, fails not to Anſwer all thoſe who know how to petition him by a ſerious attention.

Additions.

That which I ſay here, that it is the Eternal Wiſdom which enlightens us, &c. *is all taken out of St.* Auguſtine. *I have ſufficiently prov'd it,* in the preface to the *Search after Truth,* in the Chapter concerning the nature of Ideas, and in the Explication of the ſame Chapter.

VIII.

I confeſs nevertheleſs, that Faith teaches many Truths, which cannot be diſcovered by the natural union of the mind with *Reaſon.* The Eternal Truth doth not anſwer all our Prayers; for we ſometimes ask for more than we can receive. But we ſhou'd not uſe this as a pretence to cover our Idleneſs and want of application.

Additions.

We ask more than we can receive, when we attend but a little to ſubjects much compounded, or when we do not reaſon upon clear Ideas.

IX.

The generality of men are ſoon tired by the natural prayer, which the mind ſhou'd make by its attention to inward truth, to the end it may receive therefrom light and underſtanding. And tired by this troubleſome exerciſe, they ſpeak of it with contempt, diſcourage one another, and hide their weakneſs and their ignorance under the deceitful appearance of a falſe humility.

Additions.

Thus they do, who are of the opinion of Conſentius *condemn'd by St.* Auguſtin.

X.

Their example ſhould not teach us this agreeable virtue, which entertains in mens minds ſloth and negligence, and comforts them in the ignorance of thoſe truths, which are moſt neceſſary for them. We ought continually to beg of him who enlightens all men, that he would communicate to us his light; that he would reward our Faith with the gift of underſtanding; and above all, that he would hinder us from taking probality and confuſed ſentiments, (which precipitate the minds of the proud into the darkneſs of error) for that evidence which attends his Anſwers.

Additions.

To this end we *ſhould obſerve the rule which I think I have demonſtrated* in *the* 2*d. Chapter* of the Search after Truth, *and the neceſſity of which I have ſhewn in all the reſt of that Book; for the* Libertines *are either the moſt ignorant, or fulleſt of errors and prejudices.*

XI.

He that pretends to ſpeak of God with any exactneſs, ought not to conſult himſelf, or ſpeak as the common ſort of men. He ſhould lift up his mind above all creatures, and with a great deal of attention and reſpect, conſult the vaſt Idea of a Being infinitly perfect: And ſince this Idea repreſents to us the true God, very different from him whom the greateſt part of men do fancy to themſelves; we ſhould not ſpeak of him according

cording to the popular Language. It is permitted to all men to ſay with the Scripture, that God *repented* he had made man; that he was *angry* at his people; that he delivered *Iſrael* from Captivity with the Strength *of his Arm*. But theſe expreſſions, and the like, are not permitted to Divines, when they ſhould ſpeak exactly: Thus, when it ſhall be obſerved in what follows, that my expreſſions are not common; none ought to be ſurpriſed thereat. It ſhould rather be carefully conſidered, whether they are clear, and whether they perfectly agree with the Idea which all men have of the Being infinitely perfect.

Additions.

The reaſon of this is, becauſe we ought not to judge of things, but by the Idea we have of them; For to judge of God by ones ſelf, is to make God like unto himſelf: A man cannot judge even of other men by himſelf, without falling into many errors.

XII.

This Idea of an Infinitely perfect Being, contains two Attributes abſolutely neceſſary for creating the World; a Wiſdom which has no bounds, and a Power which nothing is able to reſiſt. The Wiſdom of God diſcovers unto him an infinite number of Ideas of different works, and all poſſible wayes of executing his deſigns; and his Power makes him ſo much Maſter of all things, and ſo independent upon all aſſiſtance whatſoever, that it is ſufficient for him to will, to the end, that what he wills may be done. For it muſt eſpecially be obſerved, that God has no need of Inſtruments for acting; that his will is neceſſarily efficacious: In a word, that as his Wiſdom is his

own underſtanding, ſo his Power is not different from his Will. Of this infinite number of wayes whereby God might have executed his purpoſe, let us ſee which is that which he was obliged to prefer before all others; let us begin with the Creation of the Viſible World, of which, and in which, he forms the Inviſible World, which is the Eternal Object of his Love.

Additions.

Of this infinite number of ways by which God might have executed his purpoſe, let us ſee which is that he was obliged to prefer before all others. *This without doubt is that which agrees beſt with the character of the divine attributes. Now this is the moſt ſimple, the moſt general, the moſt uniform. But obſerve, I do not engage my ſelf to enquire which is the moſt ſimple, this is not neceſſary: It is ſufficient for my purpoſe, that God acts by ſimple and general wayes, becauſe theſe wayes are more worthy of him, than thoſe which are particular; and that amongſt theſe ſimple and general ways, he chuſes that which is moſt worthy of his Wiſdom, in relation to his Work. It is not at all neceſſary, that I ſhould particularly explain, which is this moſt wiſe way, and moſt worthy of God.*

XIII.

An excellent Workman ſhould proportion his Action to his Work; he does not that by wayes very much compounded, which he may perform by more ſimple; he acts not without an end, and never labours in vain. Hence it muſt be concluded, that God diſcovering in the infinite treaſures of his Wiſdom an infinity of poſſible Worlds, as neceſſary conſequences of the Laws of motion which

which he might eſtabliſh, determined to create that which might be produced and preſerved, by the moſt ſimple Laws; or which might be the moſt perfect in relation to the ſimplicity of the means neceſſary to its production and preſervation.

Additions.

This is a compariſon which I uſe, to keep up attention of mind, and to heighten it ſo as to conceive the way by which he acts, unto whom none can be compared. For few men can comprehend that the deſigns of God are wiſe and enlightned, and that God does not form them, but according to the relation which they have with the ways or manners of acting which carry in them the character of his Attributes. They think that God chuſes the deſign moſt worthy of him, without conſidering, or without regard to the ways of executing it. But let them obſerve, that God wills that his ways be moſt wiſe, as well as his deſigns. He wills not that his deſigns ſhould honour him, and his ways diſhonour him. He compares the wiſdom of his deſign, with the wiſdom of his ways, and chuſes both the deſign and the ways which altogether beſt agree with the character of his Attributes. This is my Principle, by which I ſhall juſtifie the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, notwithſtanding all the irregularities of nature, monſters, ſin, and the miſeries to which we are now ſubject. I begin with the faults of the Material World.

XIV.

God doubtleſs might have made a World more perfect, than that which we Inhabit. He might, for example, have ordered that the rain which ſerves to make the Earth Fruitful, ſhould fall

more regularly upon Lands that are cultivated, than upon the Sea, where it is not ſo neceſſary. But to have this World more Perfect, he muſt have changed the ſimplicity of his ways, and have multiplyed the Laws of the communication of motions, by which our World ſubſiſts: And then there wou'd no more have been that proportion betwixt the Action of God and his Work, which is neceſſary to determine an infinitely wiſe Being to act: Or at leaſt, there wou'd not have been the ſame proportion between the Action of God and ſuch a perfect World, as there is betwixt the Laws of Nature, and the World which we Inhabit. For our World, how imperfect ſoever it may be imagined, is founded upon Laws of motion ſo ſimple and ſo natural, that it is perfectly worthy of the infinite Wiſdom of its Author.

Additions.

I uſe the example of the irregularity of ordinary rain, to prepare the mind for another rain, which is not given to the merits of men, no more than the common rain which falls equally upon Lands that are Sown, as well as thoſe that lie Fallow. I ſuppoſe it to be eaſily comprehended, that it is becauſe the rain falls in conſequence of natural Laws, that it is ſo ill diſtributed in relation to the neceſſities of the Earth. But I think I ought to adviſe, that they who don't diſtinctly remember the proofs which I have given in the Search after Truth, *that it is God who does all, that he does not communicate his power unto Creatures, but by making them the occaſional cauſes of determining the efficacity of the general Laws, by which he executes his deſigns in a way worthy of him*

him. I think, I ſay, I ought to adviſe theſe perſons to read and meditate upon at leaſt the firſt explication, which is at the end of the third diſcourſe; for to do it well, recourſe ought to be had to thoſe places wherein I demonſtrate my Principles.

XV.

In truth, I am perſwaded that the Laws of motion neceſſary to the production and conſervation of the EARTH, and of all the STARS in the HEAVENS are reduced to theſe two. The firſt, that Bodies in motion endeavour to continue their motion in a right Line: The ſecond, that when two Bodies meet one another, their motion is diſtributed from one to another proportionably to their bulk; ſo that afterwards they may be mov'd with an equal celerity. Theſe two Laws are the cauſe of all the motions which make that variety of form which we admire in nature.

XVI.

I confeſs nevertheleſs, that the ſecond does not always ſeem to be obſerv'd in the experiments which may be made upon this ſubject; but this is becauſe we ſee only that which happens to Bodies that are viſible, and that we think not at all upon the Inviſible that ſurround them, which by the efficacy of the ſame Law make the ſpring of viſible Bodies, thereby obliging them to recoil, and not obſerve this ſame Law. I muſt not in this place explain this any further. Search after Truth, in the laſt C. of Method.

XVII.

Now theſe two Laws are ſo ſimple, ſo natural, and at the ſame time ſo fruitful, that tho there were no other reaſons to judge that nature obſerves them, yet we ſhould have cauſe to believe,

that they are appointed by him, who always acts by the most simple wayes, in whose Action there is nothing irregular, and who proportions it so wisely with his Work, that he does infinite marvels, by a very few [Practical] Resolutions.

Additions.

It would require a whole Book to prove that which I say here concerning the fruitfulness of these two general laws of the communication of motion. It will be easily seen that I speak not at all adventures by those who are exactly well acquainted with the Physical principles of Mon. des Cartes. *But this is not essential to my subject. It is sufficient that the Laws of Nature are general. These three Articles may be looked upon as a kind of parenthesis.*

XVIII.

We must not judge of the general cause as of particulars, of the Infinite Wisdom, as of limited understandings. God foreseeing all that should follow the natural Laws, even before their establishment, could not have established them to overturn them. The Laws of Nature are constant and Immutable, they are general for all times and all places. Two Bodies of such a magnitude and such a swiftness striking upon one another, will be reflected after the same manner now as heretofore. If the rain falls upon certain grounds, and the Sun burns up others; if a season favourable to the Fruits of the Earth, be succeeded by a Frost which destroys them; if a Child comes into the world with a monstrous and useless head which grows out of his breast and makes him miserable; it is not because God intended to produce these effects by particular wills, but because he

he has eſtabliſhed the Laws of the communication of motions, of which theſe effects are neceſſary conſequences: Laws otherwiſe ſo ſimple, and withal ſo fruitful, that they produce all that we ſee beautiful in the world, and in a little time repair the greateſt Mortality and Dearth.

XIX.

He that having built an houſe, and then undermines the Foundation, diſcovers his ignorance; he that plants a Vineyard, and immediately pulls up that which had taken root, ſhews his folly: Becauſe he that wills and wills not, wants either underſtanding, or conſtancy of mind. But it can't be ſaid that God acts either by caprice or thro' Ignorance; when an Infant comes into the world with ſuperfluous members, which hinder him from living, or when an Hail-Storm deſtroys the Fruit almoſt ripe. Thus if God makes the Fruit to fall by a Storm before it is ripe, it is not becauſe he wills and wills not: For God acts not by particular wills, as particular cauſes do. He has not eſtabliſhed the Laws of communication of motions with a deſign to produce Monſters, or to make the Fruits Fall before they be ripe; he appointed theſe Laws by reaſon of their Fœcundity, and not their Barrenneſs. Thus that which once he willed, he wills ſtill; and in general, the world for which he made theſe Laws, ſhall ſubſiſt eternally.

Additions.

I have not here proved a Poſteriori, *or by the effects, that the general cauſe, acts by general Wills or Laws, whoſe efficacy is determined, by the action of occaſional or particular cauſes, tho' theſe ſorts of proofs*

proofs are very many and undeniable. (1.) *Because I ſuppoſed in the Advertiſement to the Reader, that he had read what I have written againſt the pretended efficacy of ſecond cauſes.* (2.) *Because none can want theſe ſort of proofs; for every one knows, that a body is never mov'd before it be ſtruck, and that it is never ſtricken without being mov'd: Every one knows it is day when the Sun is riſen, and that it is night when it is ſet; and that thus God produces the motion, and the light in conſequence of the general laws of nature.* (3.) *To conclude, becauſe the proofs* a priori, *taken from the nature of the cauſe, tho more abſtracted, appear to me clearer, ſtronger, and more proper to the ſubject I Treat of. For if I had not proved only by the effects, that God does all that we ſee in nature, by ſimple, general, uniform and conſtant ways, it might be anſwered: 'Tis true, but in grace he does quite otherwiſe; he there does all by particular wills. Whereas having proved by the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, that he does all that we ſee by ſimple ways; ſince God does not bely himſelf, this proves that he does by the like wayes all that we do not ſee. Thus men begin to reflect, that God muſt act after ſuch a manner as comports with his Divine Attributes. Nevertheleſs at the end of this firſt Diſcourſe, I have proved the ſame principle by Arguments* a poſteriori, *that I might touch the minds even of thoſe who reflect upon nothing.*

The laſt Article.

XX.

Here it muſt be obſerved, that the eſſential rule of the will of God, is Order; and that if man, for example, had not ſinned, (a ſuppoſition which wou'd much have changed his deſigns) then order,

order, not permitting he ſhou'd have been puniſhed, the natural Laws of the communication of motion, cou'd never have been able to have made him unhappy: For the Law of order, which requires that the Juſt do ſuffer nothing, whether he will or no, being eſſential to God; the Arbitrary Law of the communication of motions ought neceſſarily to be ſubmitted thereunto.

Additions.

God has but two Laws; Order, which is his inviolable Law, his natural Law, his Word, or his Wiſdom, which he loves invincibly; and the divine Decrees, the Arbitrary Laws, with which he ſometimes diſpences; but he never diſpences with them, but when order requires: For it is againſt order, that a wiſe and immutable Being ſhould change his conduct without reaſon. It is a weakneſs to have a changeable mind, it argues want of knowledge, or of conſtancy. Man, tho' ſubject to error, is offended when he is reproached with his change. We muſt therefore take care not to ask miracles of God, or to attribute them every moment unto him: This is to tempt God, and to have ſentiments unworthy of him. See the fourth Explication, in which I ſhew, that all that is done now, or which was done under the Jewiſh *Law, againſt thoſe natural laws which are known to us, is not always a miracle, or an effect produced by God, by particular wills; becauſe the Angels, for example, have power over the preſent world in conſequence of ſome general laws which are unknown to us; as I have proved by Gods way of proceeding in the old Teſtament.*

XXI.

There are indeed ſome few occaſions, where theſe

theſe general Laws of motion muſt ceaſe to produce their effect. But this is not becauſe God changes theſe Laws, or corrects himſelf; it is becauſe by the order of grace, to which that of Nature muſt be ſubſervient, Miracles are wrought upon certain occaſions. Beſides, it is convenient that men ſhould know, that God is ſo much Maſter of Nature, that if he ſubmit himſelf to the laws which he has eſtabliſhed, it is becauſe he chuſes to do ſo, rather than that he is abſolutely neceſſitated.

Additions.

Since the greateſt part of men imagine, that beſides God, there is a certain Nature that does all: 'Tis convenient that God to make himſelf the better known, ſhould act againſt the cuſtom of this pretended Nature. God makes himſelf admired by the wiſe, or true Philoſophers in his ordinary works; but all the world are not Philoſophers. There muſt be effects, which ſurpriſe and ſtrike the mind of thoſe who make no reflection upon any thing that is ordinary. See St. Auguſtine *upon St.* John, *Tract.* VIII. & XXVIII. Chriſtian Meditations. 8. Medit.

XXII.

If then it be true, that the general cauſe ought not to work by particular wills, and that God was obliged to eſtabliſh certain, conſtant and invariable Laws of the communication of Motions, by the efficacy of which he foreſaw that the world might ſubſiſt ſuch as we now ſee it; it may be truly ſaid in ſome ſence, that God deſires that all his creatures ſhould be perfect; that he wills not that Infants ſhould periſh in the womb of their Mothers, that he loves not Monſters, that he

he has made no laws of nature to beget them; and that if he could have made and preſerved a World more perfect by as ſimple means, he wou'd not have eſtabliſhed Laws, whereof ſo many Monſters are the neceſſary conſequences: But that it would have been unworthy of his Wiſdom to multiply wills to hinder certain particular diſorders, which in the Univerſe make a kind of Beauty.

Additions.

That if he could have made and preſerved a World more perfect by as ſimple means, he would not have eſtabliſhed laws whereof ſo many Monſters are the neceſſary conſequences. *This is evident at leaſt in the order of grace, in relation to which I ſay this. For God* wills that all men ſhould be ſaved, 1 *Tim.* II. 4. This is the will of God, our Sanctification, 1 *Theſ.* IV. 3. *God has no need of the wicked*, Eccles. XV. 12. *On the contrary*, He hates the ungodly and his ungodlineſs. *Wiſdom* XIV. 9. *Certainly the deſign of God in the* CREATION *is to make a Beautiful work. Now all irregularity diſfigures the* WORK. *God truly deſerves to be admired, but much more in the ſimplicity of his ways, than in the Beauty of the Univerſe. If God has made the world for man, why ſo much barren ground? why more Sea than habitable Earth? It is becauſe all this is a conſequence of the ſimplicity of his ways. This is not becauſe God particularly wills that ſuch a ground ſhou'd want water, for 'twou'd be a formal diſobedience if it was ſo; 'twould be to find fault with Gods conduct, and to inſult over his wiſdom, to make new water courſes. Can any thing be more diſorderly and leſs regular, than the diſtribution of Rivers, than the diſpoſition*

of Land and Sea? The Philoſophers looked upon the Univerſe as the work of blind nature; the reaſon is, becauſe they thought not on the ſimplicity of the ways by which it is preſerved. But if there had been as ſimple ways, or as worthy of God, capable to form and preſerve a more beautiful work than the world we now inhabit; it muſt be ſaid, things being as they are, that either the Author of Nature wanted underſtanding, or that his intention was to make an imperfect work. See the 3d. *Explication, Chriſtian Meditat.* 7, 8.

Monſters make in the Univerſe a kind of Beauty. *Not that Monſters are Beautiful in themſelves, for all things being equal, it would be better there were none at all; but it is becauſe men often judge of the beauty of certain things, by the deformity of others. Certainly the Church of* Jeſus Chriſt, *the future world ſhall be more perfect than the preſent world, and have no Deformity, no Monſters, no Injuſtice, no Sin.* Eph. V. 27. Apoc. XXII.

XXIII.

God gave to every Seed its own bud [*germe*,] which contains in little, the plant and the fruit, another bud which is faſtned to this, and contains the root of the plant, which root has a new root, whoſe imperceptible branches ſpread themſelves in two *Lobes*, or into the Pulp of this Seed. Does not he ſufficiently ſhew by this, that he truely wills in ſome ſence, that all thoſe ſeeds ſhould produce their like? For why ſhould he have given to thoſe grains of Corn which he intended ſhould be barren, all the parts proper to make them fruitful. Nevertheleſs, ſince rain is neceſſary to make them encreaſe, and ſince it falls not upon

upon the Earth, but by general Laws which do not ſhower it down upon improv'd grounds only, and preciſely at proper ſeaſons, all theſe grains are not increaſed thereby: Or if they be, the Hail, or ſome other unlucky accident, which is a neceſſary conſequence of the ſame Laws of Nature, hinders them from nouriſhing their Ear. Now becauſe it is God who has eſtabliſhed theſe Laws, it might be ſaid, that he would that ſome certain ſeeds ſhould be fruitful rather than others; if we did not know otherwiſe, that the general cauſe ought not to act by particular wills, nor an infinitely wiſe Being by compounded ways; God ought not to take other Meaſures than thoſe which he has taken to govern the rains according to the ſeaſons, and places, and deſires of the Husbandmen. We need to ſay no more of the order of Nature: Let us explain a little more largely that of Grace; and above all things, let us obſerve that it is the ſame wiſdom, and the ſame will; in a word, the ſame God, who has eſtabliſhed both the one and the other of theſe Orders.

Additions.

Above all, let us obſerve, that it is the ſame wiſdom and the ſame will; in a word, the ſame God who has eſtabliſhed both the one and the other of theſe orders; *that is to ſay, that of Grace, and that of Nature, This is of the greateſt conſequence. For God cannot be falſe to himſelf, or not follow his wiſdom in the eſtabliſhment of the order of Grace. It is therefore neceſſary, to the end that Gods conduct may bear the Character of his divine attributes, that his ways be ſimple, general,*

ral, uniform and conſtant. Thus we may already ſee, that it will not be impoſſible to juſtifie the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, tho Grace often falls without effect, and tho there be more men who are damned, than thoſe who are ſaved: God will appear wiſe, tho Grace ſhould not be always proportioned to our weakneſs: He will be good, and love men, tho all be not ſaved; becauſe we cannot take it ill, that God has greater love for his wiſdom, which is conſubſtantial to him, than for his work, which is only an imperfect Image of his ſubſtance.

THE SECOND PART.

Of the Neceſſity of the general Laws of Grace.

XXIV.

GOD loving himſelf by the neceſſity of his Being, and reſolving to procure an infinite glory to himſelf, and honour perfectly worthy of him, conſulted his wiſdom about the accompliſhment of his deſires. This divine wiſdom, filled with love for him from whom he received a Being by an Eternal and ineffable generation, ſeeing nothing in all poſſible creatures (the intelligible Ideas of which he contains) that might be

be worthy of the Majeſty of his Father, offered himſelf that he might eſtabliſh to his Honour an Eternal Worſhip, and as Sovereign Prieſt; offer unto him a victim, which by the dignity of his Perſon might be capable to pleaſe him. He re-repreſented unto him an infinite number of deſigns, for the Temple which he intended to raiſe to his glory, and at the ſame time, all poſſible ways of performing them. That deſign which at firſt ſight ſeems Greateſt and moſt Magnificent, the juſteſt and moſt eaſily underſtood, is that which has moſt relation to the Perſon unto whom all the Glory and Holineſs thereof muſt refer; and the wiſeſt manner of performing this deſign, is to Eſtabliſh certain very ſimple and fruitful Laws to bring it to its perfection. This is that which Reaſon ſeems to anſwer, to all thoſe who conſult it with attention, and according to the principles which Faith teaches us: Let us examine the circumſtances of this Great deſign, and afterwards endeavour to find out the ways of performing it.

Additions.

The proof of all this is; becauſe God does nothing without his Wiſdom, or without his Son, which Scripture teaches us, as well as Reaſon, Joh. I. 3. Heb. I. 2. &c. *That Jeſus Chriſt is the principle deſign of God, ſee the firſt Article, and the following. That he is the Model of the Elect,* Rom. VIII. 29. *And above all, that his ways do more than any other bear the Character of the divine Attributes; that which I have already proved, and which you may ſee further manifeſted in the third explication. I ſhall not hereafter ſtop, in the Explication of what is clear enough in its ſelf, and of little conſequence.*

XXV.

The Holy Scripture teaches us, that it is Jesus Christ who makes all the Beauty, the Holyneſs, the Greatneſs and Magnificence of this Great Work. For if it be compared therein to a City, it is Jeſus Chriſt who makes all the Splendor thereof: The Sun and the Moon does not enlighten it, but the Brightneſs of God and the Light of the Lamb. If it be repreſented as a living body, all whoſe parts have a marvelous relation to one another; it is Jeſus Chriſt who is the head thereof; it is from him that Spirit and Life is communicated to all the Members that compoſe it. If it be ſpoken of as a Temple, it is Jeſus Chriſt who is the Corner-ſtone, upon which all the building is founded; it is he who is the Sovereign Prieſt: It is he who is the Sacrifice thereof. None of the Faithful are Prieſts, but becauſe they partake of his Prieſthood: They are not Sacrifices, but becauſe they partake of his Holineſs. It is only in him and by him that they continually offer themſelves to the Majeſty of God. To conclude, it is only by the Relation which they have to him, that they contribute to the beauty of this auguſt Temple, which always has been, and for ever will be, the delightful Object of God himſelf.

Apocal. XXI. 23.

Col. I. 18 II. 19. Eph. I. 22, 23.

Eph. II. 20, &c.

Heb. IV. V, &c. X, &c.

Phil. III. 9. 10, 11, &c.

XXVI.

Reaſon alſo teaches us theſe Truths: For what relation is there betwixt creatures how perfect ſo ever they are ſuppoſed to be, and the Action by which they are made? Every Creature being limited, how can it be worth the Acti-

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on of a God whoſe price is infinite? Can God receive any thing from a pure Creature, which may incline him to act? But let it be, that God hath made man in hopes of being honoured by him: Whence is it that the number of thoſe who diſhonour him is much the greater? Doth not God hereby ſufficiently declare, that he very much neglects the glory pretended to be received by his work, if ſeparated from his well beloved Son; that it is only in Jeſus Chriſt that he reſolved to produce it, and that without him it ſhould not ſubſiſt a moment?

XXVII.

A man reſolves to do ſomthing, becauſe he hath need thereof, or becauſe he wou'd ſee what wou'd be the effect of his work, or laſtly becauſe he learns by trying his ſtrength what he is able to do: But God has no need of his creatures. He is not like men, who receive new impreſſion from the preſence of objects: His Ideas are eternal & immutable, he ſaw the world before it was form'd, as he ſees it at preſent. In ſhort, being conſcious that his will is efficacious, he perfectly knows, without making any tryal of his ſtrength, whatſoever he is able to do. Thus Scripture and Reaſon teach us, that it is by Jeſus Chriſt that the world ſubſiſts, and that it is by the dignity of this divine perſon, that it receives a beauty, which renders it agreeable in the ſight of God.

XXVIII.

It follows, in my opinion, from this principle, that Jeſus Chriſt is the Model or Pattern by which we are made, that we are form'd according to his Image and likneſs, and that we have nothing beau-

tiful, but ſo far as we are his repreſentations, and figures; that he is the end of the Law, and the finiſhing of the *Jewiſh* Ceremonies and Sacrifices; that till this ſucceſſion of generations which preceded his birth had an end, it was neceſſary they ſhou'd have had certain relations to him by which they were made more agreeable to God than any others. That ſince Jeſus Chriſt was to be the Head and Spouſe of the Church, to repreſent him, all men were to proceed from one, and their propagation to begin after that manner which *Moſes* relates, and St. *Paul* explains. In a word, it follows from this principle, that the preſent world ought to be the figure of the future, and that as far as the ſimplicity of the general Laws will permit it, all they who have or ſhall dwell therein, have been or ſhall be figures and reſemblances of Gods only Son, from *Abel* in whom he was ſacrificed, to the laſt Member that ſhall be of his Church.

XXIX.

We may judge of the perfection of a Work by the conformity there is betwixt this work, and the Idea which the eternal wiſdom gives us of it: For there is nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, but by relation to the eſſential, neceſſary and independent beauty. Now this intelligible beauty being made ſenſible, became alſo in this eſtate the rule of beauty and perfection: Thus all Corporeal Creatures muſt ſtill receive from him their Beauty and Splendor. All minds muſt have the ſame thoughts and the ſame inclinations with the ſoul of Jeſus, if they would be agreeable to thoſe who ſee nothing Beautiful, nothing Amiable, but that which is conformable to Wiſdom and Truth.

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Since then we are obliged to believe that the work of God has a perfect conformity with the eternal Wisdom; we have all reason to believe, that the same work has infinite relations to him who is the Head, the principle, the model and the end thereof. But who can explain all these relations?

XXX.

That which makes the Beauty of a Temple, is the order and variety of the Ornaments which are there to be seen. Thus, to render the living Temple of the Majesty of God worthy of him who is to inhabit it, & proportion'd to the infinite wisdom & love of its Author; all Beauties ought to be found therein. But it is not with the Glory and Magnificence of this Spiritual Temple, as it is with the gross and sensible Ornaments of Material Temples. That which makes the Beauty of the Spiritual Edifice of the Church, is the infinite diversity of the Graces, which he who is the Head thereof, communicates to all the parts that compose it; it is the order, and the admirable relations they have by him to one another; it is the divers degrees of Glory which shine on all sides.

XXXI.

It follows from this principle, that to establish this variety of rewards which compose the beauty of the Heavenly *Jerusalem*, it is necessary that men upon Earth shou'd be subject, not only to afflictions which purifie them, but also to the motions of Concupiscence, which gives them opportunity of gaining so many Victories by engaging them in so great a number of different Combats.

XXXII.

The Blessed in Heaven will doubtless have an

Holineſs and variety of gifts, which will perfectly anſwer the diverſity of their good works. Theſe continual ſacrifices, by which the Old Man is deſtroyed and annihelated, will Adorn and Beautifie the Spiritual ſubſtance of the New Man. And if it became Jeſus Chriſt himſelf to ſuffer all ſorts of afflictions, before he entred into his glory; the ſin of the firſt Man, which brought the evils into the World which accompany Life, and Death which follows, it was neceſſary, that men having been tryed upon Earth, might juſtly be rewarded with that Glory, the variety and order of which will make the beauty of the future World.

Luke XXIV. 26.

Additions.

The ſin of the firſt Man was not neceſſary in it ſelf. God might without this ſin, have found a Thouſand means to make the future Church as Beautiful as it ſhall be; but ſince God acts always as wiſely as is poſſible, and according to the character of the divine attributes, ſince he invincibly loves his Wiſdom: There cou'd be no ſuch means for Men to Merit the Glory which one day they ſhall poſſeſs, as that which ſuffers them to be inguls'd in ſin, that mercy might be ſhewn to them all in Jeſus Chriſt. For the Glory which the Elect ſhall obtain, by the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt, in reſiſting their Concupiſcence, will be greater, and alſo more worthy of God than any other. See the 34, *and* 35. *Articles. St.* Aug. *de cor. & grat. & C.* 10.

XXXIII.

If I had a clear Idea of the Bleſſed Spirits which have no body, perhaps I might clearly anſwer a difficulty which ariſes in reſpect of them. For it may be objected, either that there is little variety

ty in the merits and recompences of Angels, or else that it was adviseable that God should unite Spirits to bodys, on which they do at present so much depend. I confess that I do not see any great diversity of rewards which ought to answer the merits of substances purely intelligible, especially if they have merited their reward by one single act of Love. They not being united to a body which might occasion God to give them, according to certain most simple and general Laws a succession of different sentiments or thoughts; I can see no diversity in their combats, nor in their victories. But perhaps there may be an order established which to me is unknown: And upon this account, I ought not to speak of it. It is enough for me to have setled a principle, whence we may conclude that it became God to create Bodys, and to unite Spirits unto them, that by the most simple Laws of the Union of these two substances, he might in a general, constant, and uniform way give us, that great variety of sentiments and motions, which is the principle of our different Merits and Rewards.

XXXIV.

To conclude, God ought to have all the Glory of the Beauty and Perfection of the future World. This Work which infinitely surpasses all others, must be a work of pure mercy: The Creatures ought not to boast of having any other part therein but that which the grace of Jesus Christ hath given them. In a word, it was adviseable that God shou'd suffer all men to be engaged in Sin, that he might have mercy upon them all in Jesus Christ. Rom. XI. 32. Gal. III. 22.

XXXV.

Thus ſince the firſt man was able by the ſtrength of his Love to perſevere in original righteouſneſs, it was not neceſſary that God ſhou'd keep him to his duty by preventing pleaſures, he having no concupiſcence to overcome; it was not fit that God ſhou'd prevent his free will by the delectation of his grace. In ſhort, having all that was neceſſary for meriting his reward, God who does nothing that is uſeleſs, ought to have left him to himſelf, tho he foreſaw his fall; ſince he intended to raiſe him up in Jeſus Chriſt, to confound free will, and to make his mercy Illuſtrious. Let us endeavour at preſent to find out the ways by which God executes his eternal purpoſe of Sanctifying his Church.

XXXVI.

For tho in the eſtabliſhment of the future World, God acts by ways very different from thoſe by which he preſerves the preſent; nevertheleſs we ought not to imagine, that this difference is ſuch, as that the Laws of grace do not carry in them the character of the cauſe which has eſtabliſhed them. Since God himſelf is the Author of the Order of Grace, and of that of Nature; it is neceſſary that theſe two Orders agree with one another, in reſpect of all that which they have in them relating to the Wiſdom, and other Attributes of their Author. Thus, ſince God is a general cauſe whoſe wiſdom has no limits, it is neceſſary for reaſons which I have already mentioned, that in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature, he ſhould act as a general cauſe; that having for his end his own glory, by the raiſing of his Church, he ſhould eſtabliſh the moſt ſimple and general Laws; and which

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compared with their effect have the greateſt proportion of Wiſdom and Fruitfulneſs.

XXXVII.

The more any Agent has of knowledge, the more extenſive is his will. A mind much limited, every moment takes up new reſolutions; and when he undertakes to execute any one of them, he uſes ſeveral means, ſome of which are always uſeleſs. In a word, a ſtinted mind does not ſufficiently compare the means with the end, the ſtrength and the Action with the effect which they ſhou'd produce. On the contrary, an extenſive and penetrating ſpirit compares and weighs all things: He does not take up his reſolutions but by the knowledge which he has of the means of executing them; and when he ſees that theſe means wiſely relate to their effect, he employs them. The more ſimple any Machines are, and the more different their effects, the more Spiritual they are, and more worthy of Eſteem. The great number of the Laws of any State, often ſhews the want of penetration, and comprehenſion of mind in the Law-Makers: It being rather experience of the want of 'em, than a wiſe foreknowledge which has ordained them. God whoſe Wiſom has no bounds, muſt make uſe of the moſt ſimple and moſt fruitful ways in the formation of the future World, as well as for the conſervation of the preſent. He ought not to multiply his wills, which are the executing laws of his purpoſes, but ſo far as neceſſity obliges him thereunto: He muſt act by general wills, and thus eſtabliſh a conſtant and regular order, according to which he foreſaw by the infinite comprehenſion of his Wiſdom, that ſuch an admirable work as his

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is might be form'd. Let us ſee the conſequences of this principle, and the application which may be made thereof, for the explaining thoſe difficulties which may appear ſufficiently entangled.

Additions.

I don't think that any one can read this Article, and thoſe which go before with attention, without granting, that ſeeing God cannot be falſe to himſelf, nor act by thoſe ways which do not agree with his Attributes, he is obliged to perform his deſigns by the moſt ſimple means, the moſt general, uniform, and conſtant ways. Therefore I ſhall not ſpend time to prove this in particular by the Idea of a being infinitely perfect, and by all the natural effects of cauſes which we know. Beſides all that I am to ſay, I have proved this principle ſeveral ways in the Search after Truth, *by overthrowing the pretended efficacy of ſecond cauſes; in the* Med. Chriſt. *from the fourth to the eighth incluſively; and alſo in the Explications which are at the end of this Treatiſe. But let us ſee if the uſe which I am about to make of this principle, for explaining the truth which faith teaches us, does not at once demonſtrate both this principle and theſe truths.*

XXXVIII.

The H. Scripture teaches us on the one ſide, that God wills that all men ſhou'd be ſaved, and come to the knowledge of the Truth; and on the other, that he doth all that he wills; and yet nevertheleſs Faith is not given to all the World, and that the number of thoſe who Periſh, is even greater than of the Predeſtinated, how ſhall we make this agree with his Power?

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Additions.

It is becauſe his Wiſdom renders him unable. For ſince it is that which obliges to him to act by the moſt ſimple ways, it is not poſſible that all men ſhou'd be ſaved, by reaſon of this ſimplicity of his ways.

XXXIX.

God from all eternity foreſaw Original Sin, and the infinite number of Perſons whom this ſin wou'd carry down to Hell. Nevertheleſs he created the firſt Man in an Eſtate from which he knew he wou'd fall; and alſo made ſuch a relation between this Man and his Poſterity, as muſt communicate to them his ſin, and render them all worthy of his Averſion, and his Anger. How does this agree with his goodneſs?

Additions.

It is becauſe God more loves his Wiſdom, than his work. For ſince his Wiſdom preſcribes unto him the ways which beſt ſuit with his Attributes, and ſince his ways require that Adam *being otherwiſe able to perſevere, ſhould not have had preventing Grace; that which did happen, ought to have happened to him.*

XL.

God often communicates his Graces, tho they have not the effect for which his goodneſs obliges us to think they were given. He makes ſome perſons to encreaſe in Piety till towards the end of their life, and then ſin reigns over them to their death; and throws them into Hell: He makes the dew of grace to fall upon hardn'd hearts, as well as upon prepared Souls; men reſiſt it and render it uſeleſs for their Salvation. In a word,

God

God unmakes and renews continually, it ſeems as if he will'd and will'd not *the ſame thing*. How can this agree with his Wiſdom?

Additions.

It is becauſe ſince God ought not to Sanctify men by particular wills, he does not give Grace to ſuch an one upon ſuch an occaſion, to the end that it ſhould have ſuch a certain effect and nothing more. It becomes limited Underſtandings to act after this manner. But God having an infinite underſtanding, it became him to eſtabliſh general Laws for the executing of his deſigns: This is what I have already ſo often ſaid, and ſhall further ſay in the following Articles.

XLI.

Behold, as I think, the great difficulties; all the OEconomy of Religion, the Idea which we have of a good, wiſe, and powerful God; conſtant in his deſigns, regular in his actions; a thouſand places of Scripture ſupplying us with many more againſt that which we ſee come to paſs every day in the order of Grace: and tho very able men have anſwered them, yet it ſeems to me they cannot be ſo eaſily reſolved by their principles, as by that I ſhall lay down.

XLII.

As for my ſelf, I have always believed that God in truth wills in general, that all men ſhould be ſaved. Both Reaſon and Scripture has always hindred me from doubting thereof. And tho ſome Authors, for whom I have a great reſpect, have in the foregoing Ages publiſh't divers explications of this Truth, I never could eaſily admit of thoſe which ſeem'd without any neceſſity to ſet bounds

to

to the infinite goodneſs and mercy of God. Thus conſulting the Idea which all men have of God, I entertained the Sentiment, which I at preſent expoſe to the cenſure of all thoſe, who examine it with Attention, and judge of it with Equity.

Additions.

We tempt God, when we deſire him to do that which he ought not to do; that is to ſay, that he ſhould act after a particular manner, and not in conſequence of general Laws; otherwiſe, what harm wou'd it be for one to caſt himſelf headlong, as Satan *deſired* J. C. *to do? If it be as wiſe for to ſuſtain an heavy body in the Air, as to make it fall upon the Earth; we ſhould not tempt him, we ſhould not engage him to do a thing unworthy of him, when truſting in his goodneſs we ſhould throw our ſelves out of the windows. In a word provided a man has always a good deſign, he can never want prudence.*

XLIII.

God being obliged alway to act, as becomes him, by ſimple, general, conſtant, and uniform ways; in a word, ſuch as are agreable to the Idea which we have of a general cauſe, whoſe Wiſdom has no bounds; it became him to eſtabliſh certain Laws in the Order of Grace, as I have prov'd he has done in that of Nature. Now theſe Laws by reaſon of their ſimplicity, have neceſſarily woful conſequences in reſpect of us; but theſe conſequences do not oblige that God ſhould change theſe Laws for thoſe that are more Compounded. For theſe Laws have a greater proportion of Wiſdom and Fruitfulneſs to the work which they produce, than all thoſe which he could ordain for the ſame purpoſe; ſince he

he always acts after the most wise and perfect manner. It is true, that God might prevent these sad consequences by an infinite number of particular wills; but his Wisdom which he loves more than his Work, the immutable and necessary order, which is the rule of his will, do not permit it. The effect which wou'd happen from each of his wills, wou'd not be worth the Action which shou'd produce it. And consequently we ought not to find fault, because God does not confound the order and simplicity of his Laws by miracles; which wou'd indeed be very convenient for our necessities, but very much opposite to the Wisdom of God, which it is not lawful to tempt.

XLIV.

Thus, seeing we ought not to be displeased, that the rain falls into the Sea where it is useless, and not upon Sown-grounds where it is necessary; because the laws of the communication of motions are very simple, fruitful, and perfectly worthy of the wisdom of the Author; and that according to these Laws it is not possible that the rain should fall rather upon the Land than the Seas; so that we ought not to complain of that apparant irregularity, whereby Grace is given to men. It is the regularity wherewithal God acts, it is the simplicity of the Laws which he observes, it is the wisdom and uniformity of his Conduct, which is the cause of this seeming irregularity. It is necessary, according to the Laws of Grace, which God has established in favour of the Elect, and for the building of his Church, that this Heavenly rain should fall sometimes upon hardned Hearts, as well as upon prepared Souls. If therefore Grace is given sometimes

times to no purpoſe, it is not becauſe God acts without deſign; much leſs that he acts with an intention, to render Men more culpable by the abuſe of his favours. It is becauſe the ſimplicity of the general Laws permits not, that this grace, inefficacious in reſpect of a corrupted heart, ſhou'd fall upon another heart where it wou'd be efficacious. This Grace not being given by a particular will, but in conſequence of the immutability of the general order of Grace, it is ſufficient that this order ſhou'd produce a work proportionable to the ſimplicity of his Laws, to the end it might be worthy of the wiſdom of its Author: For to conclude, the order of Grace wou'd be leſs Perfect, leſs Admirable, leſs Amiable, if it was more Compoſed.

XLV.

If God ſhould have given Grace by particular wills, without doubt for the Converſion of a ſinner who had four degrees of Concupiſcence, he would not have reſolved to have given but three degrees of Spiritual pleaſure, ſuppoſing that theſe degrees of grace had not been ſufficient to convert him. He wou'd have deferred his bounty, till the ſinner ſhould not have been in the preſence of the Object that tempted him: Or rather he wou'd have given this ſame grace of three degrees of ſtrength to ſuch an one, whoſe Concupiſcence ſhould have been leſs active. For what an odd deſign would it be to give three degrees of Spiritual delight to one, to whom four are neceſſary; and refuſe them to him, whom they wou'd have Converted? Does this agree with the Idea which we have of the wiſdom and goodneſs of

of God? Is this to love Men? Is this to will that all ſhall be ſaved? Is this to do all that can be done for them? Yet God crys out by his Prophet; *Inhabitans of* Jeruſalem, *and men of* Judah, *judge between me and my Vineyard. What could have been done more to my Vineyard, that I have not done in it? Wherefore had I not reaſon then to look for good Grapes, when it brought forth wild Grapes?* What wiſdom is it by particular wills to give ſo many inefficacious Graces to ſinners; ſuppoſing that God wills their Converſion as Scripture teaches us, and that he has not that fatal deſign of rendring them by his gifts, more Culpable and blame Worthy?

Iſa. V. 3, 4.

XLVI.

But if Grace be given to men by moſt ſimple and general Laws, all theſe great difficulties vaniſh away. The order of Grace which God hath eſtabliſh't having more Wiſdom and fruitfulneſs in reſpect to the work which it produces than any other; God was obliged to chuſe it for the eſtabliſhment of his Church. Thus we may be aſſured, that God truly wills the ſalvation of all men; that he hath done all for them that he cou'd do, acting as he ought to do, that if there had been any order of Grace as ſimple and more fruitful; as worthy of his wiſdom and more uſeful to men, he wou'd have choſen it; and that thus he ſaves as many perſons as he can ſave, acting according to thoſe adorable rules which his wiſdom preſcribes.

Additions.

Men muſt in my opinion, be much out of humour to take it ill, that they find the Wiſdom and Goodneſs

neſs of God thus juſtified, by the principle I have laid down. For to like it well, that ſo many Nations ſhould periſh, meerly becauſe God would not afford them the light of his Goſpel, and to take it ill that God ſhould do in this what his Wiſdom preſcribes; that Wiſdom which to him is an inviolable Law, that Wiſdom which he loves, and which he ought to love infinitely more than his work; this aſſuredly is an extraordinary diſpoſition of mind. To deſire that God ſhou'd every moment by particular wills, give Graces uſeleſs to thoſe who receive them, and to thoſe who he foreſaw would become more culpable, and more criminal by the contempt of them; this is to deſire that a wiſe Being ſhould not proportion the means to the end, or that God ſhould not wiſh well to them to whom he has applyed the Blood of Jeſus Chriſt; this is to deſire to maintain paradoxes.

XLVII.

Let men therefore love and adore not only the good will of God, by which the Elect are Sanctifyed, but alſo the ſecret judgments of his Juſtice, by which there are ſo many Reprobates. It is the ſame order of Wiſdom, the ſame laws of grace which produce ſuch different effects; God is equally adorable, and amiable in all that he does, his Conduct is always full of wiſdom and of goodneſs: Wo be to the wicked who condemn it without knowing any thing of it, who deſire that the immutable order of divine wiſdom ſhould accommodate its ſelf to their Paſſions and Intereſts.

XLVIII.

The wiſe and diligent Husbandmen Labour, Manure, and Sow their Lands with a great deal of trouble and expence. They carefully obſerve the

moſt proper *ſeaſons* for their different *cultures*, and only depend upon God for the ſucceſs of their labours. They give up their work to the order of Nature, well knowing that it is to no purpoſe to tempt God, and preſume that in favour to us, he ſhould change the order which his wiſdom preſcribes unto him.

XLIX.

Jeſus Chriſt came to teach us to imitate their example. As he has an immenſe charity for us, and would ſave us all, as far as the ſimplicity of the general Laws of Nature and Grace can permit him; ſo he has forgotten nothing *to bring us into the way* which leads to Heaven. There is not any thing more oppoſite to the efficacy of Grace, than ſenſual pleaſures and the ſentiments of pride: For nothing ſo much corrupts the mind and hardens the heart. But has not Jeſus Chriſt in his Perſon ſacrificed and annihelated all greatneſs, and all ſenſible pleaſures? Was not his life, a continual example of Humility and Penance? How was he born, how did he dye, how did he converſe among men? All the world knows it. What is the ſum of his Doctrine; or whither tended all his Councels? Is it not to Humility and Penitence, to a general privation of all things that flatter the ſenſes, of all that corrupts the purity of the Imagination, of all that maintains and fortifies the concupiſcence of Pride? That which he has ſaid, that which he has done, that which he has ſuffered, has been to prepare us by his doctrine, by his example, by his merits, to receive the Heavenly ſhowers of grace, in ſuch a manner as that they may operate beſt in us. Since he

he cou'd not, or ought not, to change the laws of Nature, tempt God, nor trouble the order and ſimplicity of his ways, he has done for men all that he could, to inſpire them with the moſt extenſive, the moſt diligent, and the moſt ardent charity. See the laſt Explication of the Search after Truth.

L.

I fear not to ſay, that the Charity of Jeſus Chriſt is immenſe and incomprehenſible, after that which the Scripture ſays of it. And tho all men do not receive the effects of it, it would be raſhneſs to ſet bounds thereto. He died for all men, even for thoſe who daily periſh. Why do not ſinners enter into the Order of Grace, why do they not follow the Councels of Jeſus Chriſt, why do they not prepare themſelves to receive the rain of Heaven? They cannot merit it, 'tis true, but they may promote its efficacy in reſpect of themſelves. Can they not by Self-love, or by the fears of Hell, avoid a great many occaſions of ſinning, deprive themſelves of pleaſures, at leaſt of thoſe which as yet they have not taſted, and to which conſequently as yet they are not enſlaved? They may alſo remove ſome impediments of the efficacy of Grace, and prepare the ſoil of the heart, ſo that it may become fruitful, when God ſhall ſend his rain according to the general laws he hath preſcribed. But they deſire that God ſhould ſave them without any pains of theirs; like to thoſe idle and ſloathful Husbandmen, who without beſtowing the ordinary labours upon their field, preſume that God ought to ſend them ſuch fructifying and plentiful Rains as may ſpare their pains. Falſe and 1 Cor. 8. 11.

Sottiſh Confidence! God cauſes it to rain upon fallow Lands, as well as upon thoſe that are Cultivated. But let the Proud and the Voluptuous know, that the rain of Grace ſhall fall much leſs upon them, than upon other men; and that in the mean time they put themſelves in ſuch a condition, that to convert them, they have need of much more.

LI.

Since God does not ordinarily confer his grace but by general Laws, we clearly ſee the neceſſity of the counſels of Jeſus Chriſt. It appears that we ought to follow his wiſe counſels, that God may ſave us by the moſt ſimple ways, and that giving us *as little* grace, *as may* be, *he* may operate much in us. It clearly appears, that man on his part ought to labour continually; that he ought to till the ground before the heats of Concupiſcence has dried and hardened it, or at leaſt as ſoon as the rain has taken away this drineſs and hardneſs; that he ought carefully to obſerve the moments when he is at liberty from his paſſions, that he may make his advantage thereof; that he ought, as much as in him lies, to weed out all that may Choak the ſeed of the Word; and not fooliſhly imagine that he ſhall be Converted, after he has made his fortune in the World, or ſhall be ready to quit it. For, beſides that it depends not on the Husbandmen, to cauſe it to rain according to their neceſſities, after a piece of ground has a long time lain fallow, the Briars and Thorns have taken ſuch deep root, that they who have not accuſtomed themſelves to labour, have neither ſtrength, nor even deſire to cultivate it.

LII.

LII.

But if God ſhould act in the order of Grace by particular wills, if he ſhould efficaciouſly cauſe in all men their good motions, and all their good works with a particular deſign; I do not ſee how it could be maintained that he acts by the moſt ſimple Laws. When I conſider all the turnings by which men come whither God leads them; for I doubt not at all, but that God often gives to a man more than an Hundred good thoughts in one day. Neither can I any more comprehend, how his Wiſdom and Goodneſs can be made to agree with all thoſe inefficacious graces which the Malice of men reſiſts: For God being good and wiſe, is it not evident that he muſt proportion his aſſiſtance to our needs, if he granted them with a particular deſign of encouraging us?

Additions.

It appears by theſe Articles, that my principle does ſtill perfectly well agree with the Counſels of Jeſus Chriſt, and that as the Husbandmen ought on their part to Cultivate, Plow, and Sow their Lands; ſo men on theirs ſhould endeavour to remove the impediments of the efficacy of Grace: But that as the labours of men, are not the cauſe of rain, ſo Grace likewiſe is not given to natural merits; ſince its diſtribution depends upon certain general Laws, like as the ordinary rain is the natural conſequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions.

LIII.

God cauſes the weeds to grow with the Corn till the day of Harveſt, he makes it to rain on the juſt and on the unjuſt, becauſe grace falling on men by general Laws, is often given to ſuch as make no

uſe thereof; whereas if others had received it, they wou'd have been converted by it. If Jeſus Chriſt had preached to the *Tyrians* and *Sydonians*, as well as to the Inhabitants of *Bethſaida*, & *Corazin*, they wou'd have Repented in Sackcloath and Aſhes. If the rain which falls upon the Sands, was ſhed upon well-managed Land, it would have rendred it fruitful. But whatſoever is regulated by general Laws, does not agree with particular deſigns. That theſe Laws be wiſely eſtabliſhed, it is ſufficient that being extreamly ſimple, they bring to perfection the great work for which God appointed them.

LIV.

But tho I do not think that God has infinite particular deſigns in reference to each of the Elect, ſo that he every day gives a great number of good thoughts and good motions by particular wills: Yet nevertheleſs I deny not, but they are all predeſtinated by the good will of God towards them; for which they ought to be eternally thankful. See how I explain theſe things.

LV.

God diſcovers in the infinite treaſures of his wiſdom, an infinite number of poſſible works, and at the ſame time the moſt perfect way of producing each of them. Amongſt others he conſiders his Church, J. C. who is the Head thereof, and all perſons who in conſequence of certain general laws muſt compoſe it. In ſhort, having in mind Jeſus Chriſt and all his members, he eſtabliſhed his laws for his own glory. This being ſo, is it not evident that J. C. who is the principle of all that glory that comes to God from his work, is the firſt of the predeſtinated? That all the Elect alſo are truly and freely

ſreely beloved and predeſtinated in J. C. becauſe they may honour God in him; that laſtly they are all infinitely obliged to God, who without conſidering their merit, hath eſtabliſhed the general Laws of Grace, which muſt ſanctify the Elect, and bring them to that glory which they ſhall eternally poſſeſs.

Additions.

Man is a ſtrange creature, he is as full of pride, as he is worthy of contempt. He is not ſatisfied with God, if God does not go out of his way to pleaſe him: He looks upon himſelf as the Centre of the Univerſe; he refers all things to his own particular, even God himſelf, and his Eternal Attributes. God is not good but as he is good to him, and even the incarnation of J. C. is a work uſeleſs and ill managed, if it do not deliver him from his miſeries.

But on Gods ſide, what exceſs of bounty! It ſeems as if God, to render himſelf Amiable to thoſe who are moſt in love with themſelves, favours this prejudice by his way of ſpeaking unto men. God ſo loved the World, *ſays J. C. himſelf*, that he gave his only begotten Son, to the end that all that believe in him ſhou'd have eternal life. *What! is J. C. in the eternal deſigns of God made Man only for mens ſalvation? No doubtleſs. On the contrary, men were made for Jeſus Chriſt. They are the materials wherewith he is to build the Eternal Temple, and this Temple is only for God. This is the deſign of the uncreated Wiſdom. J. C. is the Head of the Church; now the Members are for the Head, and not the Head for the Members. J. C. is the firſt in all things,* In omnibus primatum tenens: *But he himſelf is for God;* Omnia veſtra ſunt, vos autem Chriſti, Chriſtus autem

Dei. *Let us be ſatisfied that God who has no need of us, was pleaſed to create us in Jeſus Chriſt for his own glory. He might have left us in our nothing; yet he has loved us in J. C. before the creation of the world. But let us not flatter our ſelves; it is becauſe we have J. C. as our Head, that we can render unto him divine Honours. For God cannot act but for his own glory;* Omnia propter ſemetipſum operatus eſt Dominus. *But he cannot find it except in himſelf: Becauſe a prophane World, a Temple, a Worſhip, a Prieſthood which is not conſecrated by the eternal Spirit, has no proportion with the Holineſs of God.*

God after ſin might have reduced us to nothing, and yet on the contrary he hath made us his adopted Sons in J. C. He will give us a part in the inheritance of his well beloved Son. How thankful ſhould we be for ſuch an extream kindneſs! It is true, that they who ſhall be thus happy are not choſen by an abſolute and raſh will; it is becauſe the ſimplicity of the general Laws of the order of Grace is favourable unto them, and that herein God acts after ſuch a manner as may be moſt worthy of him. But what! ſhall not God be amiable to men, if he does not forſake his wiſdom to love them with a blind love? Should Nothing exalt its ſelf, and not be content with its Creator, if he does not without reaſon prefer it before the reſt of his creatures? ſhall he not rather put himſelf in the condition of ſo many ſinners & nations abandon'd to error, whom God leaves therein without help, he who has ſworn by his Prophets that he deſires their Converſion and Sanctification? God deſires the Salvation of a ſinner, and yet he ſuffers him to dye in his ſin; God ſearches the hearts, and turns them as he pleaſes, and without injuring their liberty, and yet all the World is full of diſorders. Who can reſiſt God but God him-

himself? But on the other hand, who can be displeased that God loves his Wisdom more than his Work? Let all those who love order, adore and love his Conduct, who makes it his inviolable Law; let them love and adore his goodness, who being fully sufficient to himself, has vouchsafed to form a design of making them eternally happy.

LVI.

It may be said perhaps that these Laws are so simple and so fruitful, that God must needs prefer them before all others; and that loving only his glory, his Son must needs become incarnate; & that thus he has done nothing only for his Elect. I confess, that God hath done nothing only for his Elect; for St *Paul* teaches us that he has made his Elect for Christ, and J. Christ for himself. If to render God Amiable to men, he must be made to act only for us, or after such a manner as is not the most wise; I had rather say nothing, *than talk at this rate.* Reason teaches me to render God Amiable, by considering him infinitely perfect, and representing him so full of Charity for his Creatures, that he hath made none of them with a design to render 'em miserable. For if all be not so happy as to enjoy his presence, it is because order requiring that so great a good should be merited, all men do not merit it, for Reasons which I have already mentioned: Is not this to render God Amiable, to represent him such, that even the Reprobate cannot but adore his conduct, and repent of their negligence? 1 Cor. 3. 23.

Additions.

Altho Predestination be not founded but upon the prescience of God, and the freedom of grace, (as may be seen

ſeen in St Auſt. *de dono Pers. from the* 17. *C. to the end*) *nevertheleſs the greateſt part of men, to the Idea which anſwers to this word, fix a divine decree ſo abſolute, that one ſeems to them to oppoſe free grace, when he maintains that God was obliged, by reaſon of his wiſdom, which he loves invincibly, to chooſe thoſe whom he hath choſen. As the* Palagians *ſuppoſe that the reaſon of Gods choice is to be found in the natural merits of men; and St.* Auguſtine *with the whole Church having maintained that this depends upon the will of God, many imagine that he oppoſes predeſtination, who aſſerts that the choice of the Elect depends upon the will of God, tho it be a will enlightned and conducted by eternal Wiſdom. To ſay that the reaſon of Gods choice is in man, is to be a* Pelagian, *and maintain that grace is given to merits: But to aſſert that the reaſon of this choice, is in the eternal wiſdom, which is the Law of God, or the rule of his proceedings. This is to cry out with St.* Paul. O altitudo divitiarum Sapientiæ, & Scientiæ Dei! *But many men do not underſtand theſe words in this ſence, they pretend that one is choſen, and another reprobated, meerly becauſe God wills it, and that his will is his only reaſon; and that it is upon this account that the Elect are more eſpecially obliged to God. It is in condeſcenſion to this diſpoſition of mind which I have obſerved in a great many honeſt men, that I have compoſed this Article. But they who will Meditate a little may eaſily ſee what are my thoughts thereof.*

LVII.

In the mean time, to ſatisfie thoſe who ſuppoſe that God has predeſtinated every one of the Elect by a particular will, it may be ſaid without injuring the ſentiment which I have Propoſed, that God, before

fore he created Souls to unite them to bodys, foreſaw all that ſhould happen to them, according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace, and all that they ſhould do in all poſſible circumſtances. Thus according to this ſuppoſition, it being in his power to create the Soul of *Paul*, or that of *Peter*, and to unite it to ſuch a body which he foreſaw would be the body of one of the predeſtinated; he reſolved from all Eternity to create the Soul of *Paul*, thro' the good will he had for him, and to predeſtinate him by this choice to Eternal Life. Whereas he creates the Soul of *Peter*, and unites it to another body by a kind of neceſſity, by reaſon of the Laws of Union of Souls with Bodies, which he has very wiſely eſtabliſhed; for as ſoon as Bodies are made, he has obliged himſelf to unite Souls unto them; which was advantageous for all before ſin. Now the Body of *Peter* being begotten by an *Heathen* Father, or by a Father who has no care to Educate his Children; or laſtly, *Peter* by Birth finding himſelf engaged in times, places, and employments, which led him to that which is evil, he will infallibly be amongſt the reprobate. In the mean time *Peter* will be uſeful to the deſigns of God, for tho he himſelf does not make one of the Predeſtinated, yet ſome of his poſterity may. He will promote the Beauty and Greatneſs of the Church of Jeſus Chriſt, by the many relations he will have to the Elect. In ſhort, he will not be miſerable, but proportionably to the ill uſe which he ſhall have made of his liberty: For God does not puniſh [with grief] any but voluntary irregularities. This is all I can ſay to ſatisfie the inclination of ſome per-

perſons: But I do not clearly ſee that any one ought to ſtop here.

LVIII.

They who pretend that God has particular deſigns and wills for all the particular effects which are produced in conſequence of general Laws, do ordinarily make uſe of the authority of Scripture, whereon to found their opinion. Now ſeeing Scripture is made for all the World, for the ſimple as well as for the learned, it is full of *Anthropologies*. It gives to God not only a Body, a Throne, a Chariot, an Equipage, the paſſions of Joy, of Sadneſs, of Anger, Repentance, and other motions of the ſoul; but alſo attributes unto him thoſe ways of acting which are uſual among men, that it may ſpeak to the Vulgar after the moſt ſenſible manner. If J. C. was made Man, this was partly to ſatisfie the inclination of men, who love that which reſembles them, and attend to that which affects them. It is to perſuade them by this true and real kind of Anthropology, of thoſe truths which they would not have been able to comprehend. Thus St. *Paul* to accommodate himſelf to all men, ſpeaks of the Sanctification and predeſtination of the Saints, as if God continually acted in them by particular wills. And even J. C. himſelf ſpeaks of his Father, as if he did by ſuch wills adorn the the Lilies, and preſerve even the hairs of the heads of his Diſciples; becauſe in truth the goodneſs of God towards his Creatures being extream, theſe expreſſions give a great Idea thereof, and render God amiable even to thoſe minds which are moſt groſs, and have moſt of ſelf love in them. Nevertheleſs, ſince by the Idea which we have of God,

and

and by thoſe paſſages of Scripture which agree with this Idea, we correct the ſence of ſome other places, which aſcribe unto God members or paſſions like unto ours: So when we wou'd ſpeak exactly of the manner of Gods acting in the order of Nature, or grace, we ought to explain the paſſages which make him act as a man, or a particular cauſe by that Idea which we have of his wiſdom and his goodneſs, and by other places of Scripture which are agreable to this Idea. For in concluſion, if the Idea which we have of God, permits, nay obliges to ſay, that he does not cauſe every drop of rain to fall by particular wills, tho this ſentiment is authorized by the natural ſence of ſome places of Scripture, there is the like neceſſity to think, that notwithſtanding certain authorities of the ſame Scripture, God does not give to ſome ſinners by particular wills, all thoſe good motions which are of no effect to them, and yet to ſeveral others wou'd be effectual; becauſe otherwiſe it ſeems impoſſible to me, to make the Holy Scripture agree either with reaſon, or with its ſelf, as I think I have proved.

LIX.

If I thought, that what I have already ſaid was not ſufficient to convince conſidering perſons, that God acts not by particular wills, as particular cauſes or limited underſtandings do, I ſhould proceed to ſhew, that there are few truths whereof more proofs may be given, ſuppoſing it granted that God governs the World, and that the Nature of HEATHEN PHILOSOPHERS is but a Chimæra. For in truth nothing is done in the World, which doth not prove this ſentiment, Miracles

racles only excepted; which nevertheleſs wou'd not be Miracles different from the effects which are called natural, if it was true that God ordinarily acts by particular wills; ſince Miracles are not ſuch, but becauſe they happen not according to general Laws. Thus do Miracles ſuppoſe theſe Laws, and prove the ſentiment which I have laid down, but as for ordinary effects, they clearly and directly demonſtrate general Laws or Wills. For example, if a ſtone be let fall upon the head of one that paſſes by, the ſtone will always fall with equal ſwiftneſs, without diſtinguiſhing either the piety or the quality, the good or evil diſpoſitions of the paſſenger. If any other effect be examined, we ſhall ſee the ſame conſtancy, in the action of the cauſe which produces it. But no effect proves that God acts by particular wills, tho men often imagine that God works Miracles every moment for their ſakes. Since the way by which they wou'd have God to act, is agreable to ours; ſince it flatters ſelf-love which refers all things to its ſelf; ſince it comports well with the ignorance we are in of the combination of occaſional cauſes, which produce extraordinary effects, it naturally enters into the mind, when we do not ſufficiently ſtudy Nature, and conſult with attention enough, the abſtracted Idea of an infinite Wiſdom, of an Univerſal Cauſe, of a Being infinitely perfect.

Additions.

Let me be permitted to deſire of the Reader, that he do meditate ſome time upon this firſt Diſcourſe, before he reads that which follows.

The

The Second Diſcourſe.

Of the Laws of Grace in particular, and of the Occaſional Cauſes, which Govern and Determin their Efficacy.

First Part.

Of the Grace of Jeſus Chriſt.

Additions.

Before this 2d. Diſ. read 3d. C. of 2d. P. of *Search after Truth*, and the Expli. of the ſame C. where the Author oppoſes the Efficacy of pretended ſecond cauſes.

I Have proved in the First Diſcourſe, the neceſſity of Occaſional Cauſes in the Order of Grace, as well as in that of Nature; and I don't think that which I have written can be diſtinctly underſtood, but it muſt be granted. But now I am about to prove by thoſe arguments which Faith ſupplies, that Jeſus Chriſt is this cauſe. Since this is of the greateſt conſequence, clearly to underſtand the principles of Religion, and to make us draw near with confidence to the true Propitiatory, or the occaſional cauſe, which never fails to determine the

the efficacy of the general Law of Grace: I think I may require the Reader to Meditate upon this Second Diſcourſe with all diligence, and without prejudice.

I.

Since there is none but God who acts immediately and by himſelf upon Spirits, & who produces in them all the different Modifications whereof they are capable; it is he alone who enlightens our minds, and inſpires us with certain ſentiments which determine our divers wills. Thus there is none but God who can as the * true cauſe, produce grace in our Souls. For the principle of all the regular motions of our love, is neceſſarily, either knowledge which teaches us, or a ſentiment which convinces us that God is our happineſs; ſince we never begin to love any object, if we do not either clearly ſee by the light of Reaſon, or confuſedly feel by the taſte of pleaſure that the object is good, I mean capable of rendring us more happy than we are.

* By the *true cauſe* I underſtand the Cauſe which Acts by its own ſtrength.

II.

But ſeeing all men are engaged in Original ſin, and all even by their nature infinitely below God; it is only J. Chriſt who by the dignity of his Perſon, and the holineſs of his Sacrifice, could have acceſs to his Father, reconcile us to him, and merit his favours for us. Thus it is J. C. only, who cou'd be the Meritorous cauſe of Grace. Theſe truths are agreed on. But we do not ſeek after the cauſe which Produces Grace by its proper efficacy, nor that which merits it by his ſacrifice and good works, we ſeek after that which regulates, and determines, the

the efficacy of the general cauſe, that which may be called the ſecond, particular, and occaſional.

III.

For that the general cauſe may act by general Laws or Wills, and that his action may be regular, conſtant, and uniform; it is abſolutely neceſſary, that there be an occaſional cauſe which determines the efficacy of theſe Laws, and ſerves to eſtabliſh them. If the percuſſion of bodies, or ſome ſuch thing, did not determine the EFFICACY of general LAWS of the Communication of motions, it would be neceſſary that God ſhould move bodies by particular wills. The Laws of the union of the Soul and Body, are made efficacious only by the changes which happen in each of theſe ſubſtances. For if God ſhould make the Soul feel a pungent pain, tho the body was not pricked, or if the brain ſhou'd not be moved as if the body was pricked, he wou'd not act by the general Laws of the union between Soul and body, but by a particular will. If it ſhou'd rain upon the Earth any other ways but by the neceſſary conſequence of the general Laws of the communication of motions, the rain and the fall of each drop that compoſes it, would be the effect of a particular will: Inſomuch that if order did not require that it ſhould rain, this will would be altogether unworthy of God. It is therefore neceſſary that in the order of Grace, there be ſome occaſional cauſe which eſtabliſhes theſe Laws, and determines the efficacy of them; and this is that cauſe which we muſt endeavour to find out.

IV.

Tho we never ſo little conſult the Idea of In-

telligible order, or consider the sensible order which appears in the works of God, we clearly discover that the occasional causes which determine the efficacy of the general Laws, and establish them, must necessarily have relation to the design for which God appoints these Laws.

For example, we see by experience that God has not, and Reason convinces us that he ought not, to have made the motions of the Planets the occasional causes of the union of soul and body. He could not have willed that our Arm shou'd be moved after such and such a manner, nor the soul suffer the pain of the Tooth-ach, at the time of the Moons conjunction with the Sun, if this conjunction does not act upon the body. The design of God being to unite the Soul to the Body, he cou'd not give to the Soul the sentiments of grief, but when some changes happen in the body which are contrary to it. Thus we ought not to seek any where else but in the Soul, and in the Body the occasional causes of their union.

V.

Hence it follows, that God having a design to form his Church by J. C. could not according to this design seek any where else but in J. C. and the Creatures united by reason to J. C. the occasional causes which serve to establish the general Laws of Grace, by which the spirit of J. C. is shed upon his Members, and communicates unto them his Life and Holiness. Thus Grace is not showered down upon our hearts according to the divers scituation of the Stars, nor according to the meeting of several bodies; nor even according to the different motion of the animal

spirits

ſpirits which give unto us motion and life. No bodies can excite in us any motions and ſentiments, but what are purely natural; for all that comes to the ſoul by the body, is only for the body. The Angels themſelves are not made occaſional cauſes of inward grace. They are as well as we Members of that body of which J. C. alone is the Head, they are Miniſters of J. C. for the ſalvation of the Saints. I grant that they may produce ſome change in the bodies which ſurround us, and even in that which we animate; and that thus they may remove ſome impediments of the efficacy of Grace. But certainly they cannot diſtribute to men ſuch a precious gift; they have not immediate power over the minds of men, which by their nature are equal to them. To conclude, St *Paul* teaches us, to believe that God has not ſubjected to them the future World, or the Church of J. C. Thus the occaſional cauſe of Grace cannot be found but in J. C. or in man. Heb. ii. 5.

VI.

But ſeeing it is certain that grace is not granted to all thoſe that deſire it, nor as ſoon as they deſire it, and it is often given to thoſe who do not ask it; it follows, that even our deſires are not the occaſional cauſe of Grace. For this kind of cauſes always have readily their effect, and without them the effect is never produced. For example, the ſtriking of bodies upon one another being the occaſional cauſe of the change which happens in their motion, if two bodies do not meet one another their motions are not changed; and if they be changed, we may be aſſured that they did. The general Laws by which Grace is

poured into our hearts, do find nothing in our wills which may determine their efficacy; like as the general Laws which govern the rains, are not founded upon the diſpoſitions of the places where it rains. For whither Lands lye Fallow, or whither they be cultivated, it rains indifferently in all places, even upon Sands and in the Sea.

VII.

We are then brought to maintain, that ſince none but J. C. cou'd merit grace, there is likewiſe none but he who cou'd give the occaſions of the general Laws according to which it is given to men. For the principle of the foundation of general Laws, or that which determines their efficacy, being neceſſarily either in us, or in J.C. ſince it is certain it is not in us, for the reaſons above mentioned, it muſt needs be found in J. C. Thus it was neceſſary that God after ſin ſhould have no regard to our wills: Being all in diſorder, we cou'd no more be the occaſion of Gods giving us Grace. A Mediator therefore was neceſſary not only to give us acceſs to God, but alſo to be the natural or occaſional cauſe of thoſe favours we hope to receive from him.

VIII.

Since God deſigned to make his Son the Head of his Church, it was convenient he ſhould make him the natural or occaſional cauſe of Grace, which ſanctifies it; for it is from the Head that Life and motion ought to be given to the members. And it was even with this foreſight that God permitted ſin, for if man had continued in his Innocence, without being aſſiſted by the Grace of J. C. ſeeing his wills wou'd have merited Grace, and

and even Glory, God ſhould have eſtabliſhed in man the occaſional cauſe of his perfection and happineſs: The inviolable Law of order requires this; ſo that J. C. wou'd not have been the Head of his Church, or ſuch an Head whoſe influences the Members wou'd have had no need of.

IX.

If our ſoul had been in our body, before it was form'd, and all the parts which compoſe it diſpoſed of according to our different wills, with how many divers ſentiments and motions wou'd ſhe have been affected, by all the effects which ſhe would have known ought to have followed from her wills, eſpecially if ſhe had had an extream deſire to have made a more Vigorous and better form'd body? Now the Holy Scripture does not only ſay that J. C. is the Head of the Church, but it alſo teaches us that he begot it, that he form'd it, that he nouriſhes it, that he ſuffered in it; that he merits in it, that he acts and influences it without ceaſing. The zeal which J. C. has for the glory of his Father, and the love he bears to his Church, inſpires him continually with a deſire of making it the moſt ample, the moſt magnificent, and the moſt perfect, he can poſſibly. Thus ſeeing the ſoul of J. C. has not an infinite capacity, and yet deſires to give infinite beauties and ornaments to his Church, we have all the reaſon to believe that there is a continual ſucceſſion of thoughts and deſires in his Soul, in reſpect of his Myſtical body which he continually forms.

Eph. I. 22, 23. IV. 16. Col. II. 19. Act. IX. 5. Col I. 24. 1 Cor. XII. 27. &c.

X.

Now these continual desires of the Soul of Jesus, which sanctifie the Church, and render it worthy of the Majesty of his Father, God hath made the occasional causes of the efficacy of the general Laws of Grace: For Faith teaches us that God hath given to his Son an absolute power over Men, by making him the Head of his Church; and this cannot be conceived if the different wills of J. C. be not followed by their effects. For it is visible, I should have no power over mine arm, if it should move it self whether I would or no, and if when I desire to move it, it should remain as if it was dead and without motion.

XI.

J. C. has merited his Sovereign power over men, and this quality of Head of the Church, by the Sacrifice he offered upon Earth; and after his Resurrection he took full possession of this right. 'Tis upon this account, that he is now Sovereign Priest of future good things, and that by his many intercessions, he continually prays unto the Father in the behalf of men. And seeing his desires are occasional causes, his prayers are always heard; his Father denies him nothing, as the Scripture teaches us. Nevertheless he must pray and desire that he may obtain: For the occasional, physical, natural causes (for all these words signifie the same thing) have no power of themselves to do any thing; and all creatures, even J. C. himself considered as man, are in themselves nothing but weakness and impotence.

Joh. VII. 39. Heb. 7. 25. Rom. 8. 34. 1 Joh. II. 1. Joh. XI. 42.

Additions.

I don't think that hitherto there is any difficulty,

culty, if it be not in this laſt Article, where I ſay, that J. C. prayeth unto his Father; for there are ſome Perſons whom this very much offends. For I ſpeak as St. *Paul* to the *Romans*, and to the *Hebrews*, and as Jeſus Chriſt himſelf: *I will pray the Father, and he ſhall give you another Comforter:* which is to be underſtood of J. C. after his reſurrection, according to theſe words of St. *John*; The ſpirit was not yet given becauſe Jeſus was not yet glorified.

For the Spirit fell not upon the Apoſtles till Ten days after J. C. was entered into the Holy of Holies, a Sovereign Prieſt of true good things.

In all theſe Articles, I ſpeak only of J. C. as to his humanity, according to which he received all power in Heaven and Earth; becauſe all his prayers or his deſires, which certainly are in his power, (or otherwiſe he has no power) are executed in conſequence of his qualities, as Sovereign Prieſt of the Houſe of God, King of *Iſrael*, Architect of the Eternal Temple, Mediator betwixt God and men, Head of the Church; or to ſpeak like the Philoſophers, (for whom I chiefly write this Treatiſe) the occaſional, natural, or diſtributive cauſe of Grace: The cauſe which Determines the Efficacy of the general Law by which God wou'd ſave all men in his Son.

XII.

J. C. having then ſucceſſively divers thoughts in relation to the divers diſpoſitions, whereof Souls in general are capable, theſe divers thoughts are accompanyed with certain deſires in relation to the Sanctification of theſe Souls. Now theſe de-

ſires being the occaſional cauſes of Grace, they muſt pour it down upon thoſe perſons in particular whoſe diſpoſitions reſemble that upon which the Soul of J. C. actually thinks: And this Grace muſt be ſo much the ſtronger and more abundant, as theſe deſires of J. C. are greater and more laſting.

XIII.

When a perſon conſiders any part of his body, which is not form'd as it ought to be, he has naturally certain deſires in relation to this part, and the uſe he deſires to make of it in common life; and theſe deſires are followed by certain inſenſible motions of the animal Spirits, which tend to give that proportion or diſpoſition to this part which we deſire it ſhou'd have. When the Body is altogether form'd, and the fleſh firm, the motions change nothing in the conſtruction of the parts; they can only give them certain diſpoſitions which are called Corporeal habits. But when the body is not altogether form'd, and the fleſh is very ſoft and tender, theſe motions which accompany the deſires of the Soul, do not only give the body certain particular diſpoſitions, but may alſo change the conſtruction thereof. This ſufficiently appears by Children in the Womb, for they are not only moved with the ſame paſſions as there Mothers, but they alſo receive the marks of theſe paſſions in their bodies, from which yet the Mothers are always free.

XIV.

The Myſtical body of J. C. is not yet a perfect
Eph. IV. man, it will not be ſo till the end of the world J.
13. C. forms it continually; for it is from the Head

the

the whole body joyned together receives nouriſhment by the efficacy of his influence, according to the meaſure which is proper to every one, to the end it may be form'd and edified in love. Theſe are the truths which St *Paul* teaches us. Now ſince the ſoul of J. C. has no other action but the divers motions of its heart, 'tis neceſſary that theſe deſires be ſucceeded by the influence of grace, which only can form J. C. in his Members, and give them that beauty and proportion which muſt be the eternal object of the divine Love.

XV.

The divers motions of the ſoul of J. C. being the occaſional cauſes of Grace, we ought not to be ſurpriſed, if it be ſometimes given to great ſinners, or thoſe who make no uſe of it. For the ſoul of J. C. deſigning to raiſe a Temple of vaſt extent, and infinite beauty, may deſire that Grace may be given to the greateſt ſinners; and if in this moment J. C. thinks actually, for example, upon Covetous perſons, the Covetous ſhall receive Grace. Or elſe, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain merit for the conſtruction of his Church, which is not ordinarily acquired, but by thoſe who ſuffer certain perſecutions, of which the paſſions of men are the natural principle: In a word, J. C. having need of Spirits of a certain character, for bringing to paſs certain effects in his Church, may in general apply himſelf to them, & by this application beſtow upon them the Grace which ſanctifies: In like manner, as the mind of an Architect thinks in general upon ſquare ſtones, for example, when theſe ſort of ſtones are actually neceſſary for his building.

XVI.

XVI.

But as the ſoul of J. C. is not a general cauſe, there is reaſon to think that it often has particular deſires in reſpect of certain particular perſons. When we pretend to ſpeak exactly of God, we ought not to conſult our ſelves, and make him act as we do; we ought to conſult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect, and make him act according to this Idea, but when we ſpeak of the action of the ſoul of Jeſus, we may conſult our ſelves, we may ſuppoſe it to act as particular cauſes would act, which yet are joyned to eternal wiſdom. We have reaſon, for example, to believe that the calling of St. *Paul* was the effect of the efficacy of a particular deſire of J. Chriſt. We may alſo look upon the deſires of the ſoul of J. C. which generally relate to all the minds of one certain character, as particular deſires, tho they comprehend many perſons; becauſe theſe deſires change every moment, as thoſe of particular cauſes do. But the general Laws by which God acts are always the ſame, becauſe his wills muſt be firm, and conſtant, ſeeing his wiſdom is infinite; as I have ſhewn in the firſt Diſcourſe.

Additions.

I think I have demonſtrated, that J. C. as man, is the occaſional cauſe of Grace. Now, ſince God acts not, if Order doth not require, or ſome occaſional cauſe determine him thereunto; and that, in reſpect of Grace, altogether free, Order never requires that God ſhou'd give it, ſeeing it cannot be merited: 'Tis evident, that all the difficulties which we find in the diſtribution of Grace, muſt *be aſcribed to* J. C. as man. This is that which

I have already done in a general way; for it was not at all neceſſary, that I ſhould particularly juſtifie the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, which was my only deſign in the conſtruction of his Church, as I did at firſt advertiſe.

But that the minds, leaſt able to diſcern the uſefulneſs of the principles laid down, may not fail to apprehend it; I ſhall endeavour, as clearly as poſſibly I can, to ſhew the conſequences which may be drawn from theſe principles.

There are many difficulties in vindicating Gods Conduct in his way of diſtributing the rain of Grace, as well as in that by which he ſends down the ordinary rain, the chief of which are, that it is not always proportioned to the need of ſinners, and that even in reſpect to the juſt, tho it anſwer their neceſſities, yet it does not always hinder them from falling into diſorder.

God is wiſe, he wills the converſion of ſinners, he has ſworn ſo by his Prophet. A Being infinitely wiſe proportions the means to the end. How then can it be that the Grace which the ſinner receives ſhou'd not be ſtrong enough to make him quit his ſin? Or to take away all equivocation, Why ſhou'd not ſuch an Infant be Baptiſed? Why ſhould there be ſo many Nations who know not J. C.? It is eaſily comprehended by what I have ſaid in the firſt Diſcourſe, that this is a conſequence of the ſimplicity of Gods ways, and muſt proceed from the occaſional cauſe which God has eſtabliſhed for the executing his deſign after ſuch a manner, as beſt reſembles his Divine Attributes.

For

For if it rains upon the High-ways, upon the Sand, upon the Sea, as well as upon the Sown Lands; it is becauſe theſe rains are neceſſary conſequences of the ſimplicity of thoſe ways which God has eſtabliſhed for making the Earth Fruitful.

But whence does it proceed that J. C. who is an intelligent occaſional cauſe, abandons ſo many ſinners and ſo many nations? Or to come to the greateſt difficulty, Whence is it that J. C. forſakes even the juſt, the members of his body, who are ſtraight united to him by charity? For as to ſinners, and they who do not call upon him, it may be ſaid that he neglects them as unworthy of his care. But whence comes it to paſs, that he gives to the juſt, expoſed to temptation, ſuch a Grace, which he well foreſaw, notwithſtanding his aſſiſtance wou'd be overcome? This Grace was altogether ſufficient, I grant, and that it only depended upon the juſt to make it efficacious. But why did not J. C. give it more force, ſince he foreſaw the fall of one of his well-beloved Children? If my principle can clear up theſe difficulties, without injuring the love of J. C. towards men, as well as it defends the wiſdom and goodneſs of God, againſt the reaſonings of Libertines, certainly the conſequences thereof will be very advantageous to Religion. This is that which I am about to examine.

J. C. may be conſidered according to two reſpects, one as Architect of the Eternal Temple; the other, as Head of the Church. I have partly explained the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect becauſe this manifeſted the fruitfulneſs

neſs and neceſſity of my principle. But I wou'd not ſpeak of the way by which he acts as Head of the Church, by reaſon of the difficulty of the fall of the juſt, which ſuppoſes certain things whereof I thought not then to ſpeak. *That I may explain more particularly the manner after which J. C. acts as Architect upon the materials which do not as yet make part of his Temple, and as Head in reſpect of the Juſt who are members of his Body, I am obliged to ſay what I think concerning the holy Soul of J. C. which regulates all his deſires, with reſpect nevertheleſs to the divine Law, the immutable and neceſſary order; for the wills of J. C. are always agreeable to thoſe of his Father. Tho ſeveral of the* * *Fathers and thoſe eſpecially who wrote againſt the* Arrians, *as* Athanaſius, *were contented to attribute to Jeſus Chriſt, as God, the knowledge of all things, and expounded concerning J. C. as man, that which St.* Mark *reports,* The Day of the Lord knoweth no Man, no not the Son of Man himſelf; *and ſome of them feared not even to ſay, that Ignorance is one of the defects of Humane Nature which J. C. took for our ſakes: Nevertheleſs I am far from this thought. For I am perſwaded that J. C. as man knows all Sciences, and hath a perfect knowledge of all things; that he not only knows all the Beings which God hath created, with all their Modifications, and all their relations; but alſo upon much greater reaſon, all thoſe which God can create: In a word, all that which God contains in the immenſity of his Being. I ſay that J. C. knows upon much greater reaſon, all poſſible Creatures than the exiſtence and relation of thoſe which God hath made; becauſe he knows the firſt by the right which his union with the Word, which*

Athan. Orat. 4. in Arianos. S. Iren. Lib. V. S. Baſil Ep. 391. ad Amphil. S. Greg. Naz. Orat. 36. S. Cyr. of Alex. Thres. lib. 9. C. 4. Theod. Tom. 4. p. 731.

which contains them as the Word, gives him; whereas he knows not the other but by a kind of a Revelation as I ſhall ſhew hereafter.

I believe then that J. C. as man, knows all things; but it ought to be obſerv'd that there is a great difference between knowing all things habitually, and knowing all things actually; between knowing all things and thinking of all things; which is almoſt always confounded. There is no man but knows that two and two make four, and yet there are but few who actually think of it. A Geometrician knows his Enclid, but he is often a long time without thinking of any of the propoſitions of this Author. A man knows a truth, or Science, when by his Labour, or otherwiſe, he has gain'd a right thereunto; inſomuch, that he can no ſooner think of theſe things, but they immediately preſent themſelves to his mind very clearly, without putting him to any trouble.

Now the ſoul of J. C. is perſonally united to the Word, and the Word, as the Word, contains all poſſible being with their relations; he contains all immutable, neceſſary, & eternal truths. J. C. as man, can no ſooner think of any truths, but they are inſtantly diſcovered to his mind. J. C. therefore knows all Sciences; he knows all poſſible things, ſince he may without any effort of mind, ſee all that the Word contains as the Word. For the ſame reaſon J. C. knows all the divine Perfections, ſince the Word is a ſubſtantial repreſentation of the divine Nature, and the Father communicates to his Son all his Subſtance. He knows even the Exiſtence, the Modifications, the relations of the Creatures; but by a kind of revelation which the Father gives to him whenſoever

ſoever he deſires him ; according to thoſe words of J. C. himſelf, *I know, O Father that thou always heareſt me.* For ſince the creatures are not the neceſſary emanations of the Divinity, the Word as the Word, does truly repreſent their Nature or Eſſence, but not their Exiſtence ; for their Exiſtence depends upon the free will of the Creator, which the Word, meerly as the Word, does not contain, ſeeing the Divine Decrees are common to all the three Perſons. Thus the Exiſtence of the Creatures cannot be known but by a kind of Revelation. J. C. therefore as man, knows all things. In him are hidden all the treaſures of the wiſdom and knowledge of God, but he does not actually think upon all things; and this is evident: For the ſoul of J. C. has not the capacity of an infinite mind. And thoſe who maintain that there are no ſucceſſion of thoughts in J. C. and that he always knows whatſoever he does know, thinking to attribute to the ſoul of J. C. a ſort of immutability which is due only to God, they neceſſarily make him liable to very great ignorance. See the proof of this: It is certain that natural effects are combined amongſt themſelves, and with thoſe of Grace, after an infinitely infinite manner, and that theſe combinations are every moment changed after infinite ways, by reaſon of the mutability of Mens wills, and the irregular courſe of the animal Spirits, which change all our traces and all our Ideas, in conſequence of the Laws of Union of Soul and Body.

Now the capacity of thinking, which the Soul of J. C. has as Man, is finite. Therefore if he knew, or always actually thought upon that which he

he knows, he must necessarily be ignorant of an infinite number of things.

Furthermore, it is certain that the properties of numbers are not only infinite but infinitely infinite: That in respect of Figures, there may be, for example, an infinite number of Triangles of different kinds, each of their sides being capable of being lengthned or shortned to infinity. Now to say that J. C. knows not the properties of such Triangles, or the relation of one of their sides, or its Square, or its Cube, or its Quadrata-quadrate, &c. with other Sides, or their Squares, or their Cubes, or their Quadrata-quadrates, &c. this is to suppose that J. C. is ignorant of that which the Geometricians know. But if it be maintained that J. C. as Man, always actually knows every thing that he knows, it is necessary that he be ignorant of an infinite number of the properties of these Triangles. Nevertheless let us suppose, that Natural effects are not combined with the effects of Grace; and that likewise all the thoughts of men, their circumstances, their combinations, were something finite, which the mind of man might discern all at once; certainly to suppose that the Soul of J. C. does always think of them, is to give unto him a very useless and troublesome knowledge. It is troublesome, for that which renders the soul of J. C. happy, is the contemplation of the perfection of the Sovereign good. Now the knowledge of all the Chimæraes which do, have, and shall pass in our minds, according to this supposition, continually distracting the capacity of the soul of J. C. (otherwise entertain'd in beholding the Beauties and tasting the

the ſweetneſs of the chief Good) would not be very agreeable to him. For it muſt be obſerved, that it is one thing to ſee God, and another thing to ſee the Creatures and their modifications in God. I think I have demonſtrated that we ſee all in God in this life, but this is not to ſee God, or to enjoy him. Thus it cannot be ſaid, that J. C. ſees all our thoughts, without dividing his capacity of thinking; becauſe he ſees them all in God. This actual knowledge therefore, which ſome wou'd give to J. C. is troubleſome; for it is very irkſome to think actually upon thoſe things, upon which we do not deſire to think of. A Geometrician who ſhould have found out the Squaring of a Circle, or any other more ſurpriſing Truth, wou'd be very miſerable, ſhould it be always preſent to his mind. J. C. has an Object more worthy of his application, than the modification of the Creatures; therefore always to have an actual knowledge of our thoughts and needs, paſs'd, and future, would be very troubleſome.

Moreover, it would be altogether uſeleſs to him, and to us. Certainly it is ſufficient that J. C. thinks of aſſiſting me, when I ſhall have need; without thinking thereof for two or three Thouſand years, or rather from all Eternity: For J. C. muſt actually think thereof from all Eternity, if there be no ſucceſſion of thoughts in his ſoul.

As in the Treatiſe of Nature and Grace, (which I compoſed for thoſe Perſons who are not over credulous) I reſolved not to propoſe any Principles which might be conteſted; and ſince if I had ſuppoſed that the ſoul of J. C. had actually known all things, my ſuppoſition might have been oppoſed,

by the reaſons which I have produced, and perhaps by others better: I have therefore only ſuppoſed, that J. C. has a clear Idea of the ſoul, and the modifications of which it is capable, to produce a noble effect in the Temple which he builds to the glory of his Father; that which Reaſon and Faith do demonſtrate. Thus I ſuppoſe J. C. to act in conſequence of this only ſuppoſition, in the XIII, XIV, XV, XVI. Articles, where I compare him to an Architect, and to a Soul which ſhould have power to form all the parts of its Body. For as an Architect may form a Deſign, and build an Edifice, without concerning himſelf from whence the materials come he employs therein; ſo J. C. by his union with the Word, may form his deſigns, and deſires, without thinking on the actual diſpoſitions of all men. He hath admoniſhed them by his Counſels in his Goſpel, to put themſelves in ſuch a condition, that Grace may not be uſeleſs to them. It becomes him not to order his deſires, (the diſtributive cauſes of his Graces) according to the negligence, or wickedneſs of men, but according to the condition wherein he finds the Work he is to build, according to the deſigns he continually forms; according to the beauty wherewith he intends to Adorn his Church.

Now this way, after which, I ſuppoſe J. C. might act, wou'd be ſufficient to juſtifie Gods Conduct, and make it in general comprehended; whence it is that the rain of Grace is ſent down without effect upon hardned hearts, at ſuch unſeaſonable times, after ſuch an unequal manner, and almoſt always ſo little anſwerable unto the concupiſcence of thoſe who receive it: For this reaſon I ought not to enter

ter particularly upon the fall of the Juſt, under an Head who has ſo much love for ſinners. Nevertheleſs I ſhall at preſent endeavour to explain it to ſatisfie the moſt difficult.

Whilſt J.C. acts as Architect, he only regulates his deſires according to his deſigns. It is indifferent to him to have in his Temple, *Paul*, or *John*; if both the one and the other reſemble the Idea which determines his deſires: As it is indifferent to an Architect, who needs only a ſquare ſtone, or a pillar, to have that which is on the right hand, or on the left, if they be altogether alike. Thus the deſire of J. C. beſtowing Grace which moves men to come unto him, and caſt themſelves in his hands, thoſe who come firſt, and are moſt watchful, are they whom he employs in his building.

But men having once followed the motion of Grace, I think it is certain that J. C. is advertiſed of their diſpoſitions; and that when he has plac't them in his Temple, or made them parts of his Body, no need, no temptation, happens to them, which he has not notice of, and which he doth not provide for. When Bread is once become part of our fleſh, it cannot be touched without hurting us. When a ſtone is wrought and laid in the building, it cannot be broken without offending the Architect. J. C. conſidered as Head of the Church, is therefore advertiſed of all our neceſſities, even before he particularly deſires to know them. Herein his Father prevents his Charity; It ſeems to me, that order requires this. Perhaps he may even actually know the effect, which the aſſiſtance he gives us, will have, even before it be given; and this is that which makes all the difficulty.

For J. C. loves the juſt, he tenderly cheriſhes thoſe who are united unto him by Charity. Now he has notice of a Temptation which ſolicits one of his Members, and he may give him Victorious Graces. If therefore he foreſaw, that with ſuch aſſiſtance, the Juſt, tho he might have overcome, would nevertheleſs be vanquiſhed; Why did he not augment this aſſiſtance? He deſires the juſt ſhould be Victorious; Why therefore doth he not proportion the means to the end, if he actually knew the relation of the means to the end?

For my part, I had rather believe that J. C. as man, or the occaſional cauſe of Grace, doth not actually know the future determination of the will of the juſt, to whom he gives aſſiſtance, than think that he in any ſenſe, wants Goodneſs and Charity for his Members. I grant that J. C. as man, may know all the future determination of our wills, as I know that two and two are four. But I doubt whether he actually thinks thereon. and I do not believe that he always thinks thereon, that he may regulate the diſtribution of Graces according to this knowledge. Theſe are my Reaſons.

J. C. does not ſee in the Word, preciſely as the Word, whether the juſt will follow, or will not follow the motion of his Grace: He cannot know it, unleſs God diſcover it to him by a ſort of revelation, as I have already ſaid. Now it ſeems to me, that he ought not always to demand what effect his Grace will have; becauſe it ſeems clear to me, that Order, which is his Rule, and his Law, doth not require that he ſhou'd proportion his gifts to mens future negligence, but only to their neceſſities for his own proper deſigns.

J. C.

J. C. muſt act as man, or as the occaſional cauſe, that God may build up his Church by the moſt ſimple ways. Now none but God can dive in mens hearts, and ſee the free determinations of their wills. J. C. therefore before he acts, ought not to deſire of his Father to reveal to him, whether the juſt being tempted, will, or will not be vanquiſhed, by ſuch or ſuch a degree of Grace: For thus his action would not bear the Character of an occaſional cauſe. If God ſhould by himſelf, give unto the juſt Grace to vanquiſh Temptations, being by nature Searcher of Hearts, his Conduct ought to comport with this Character; and if the juſt ſhould be vanquiſhed, it might be believed, that God deſigned to forſake him. But Order requiring that J. C. as Man, ſhould act as Man, his action is not to bear the Character of Searcher of Hearts: For God intending to make his wiſdom his fore-ſight, the infinite extenſion of his knowledge, to appear in the conſtruction of his great work; he was obliged to form it by the moſt ſimple ways. For in concluſion, what marvel would it be, if J. C. ſhould make a beautiful work, and ſave even all men, if on the one ſide he acted by particular wills, and on the other, his action did not carry in it the character of an Occaſional cauſe, but of an infinite Wiſdom, certainly GOD ought not to appoint an Occaſional Cauſe, if this Occaſional cauſe muſt act as God, and not as man? He ought to do all immediately by himſelf. But how ſhou'd we have juſtified his wiſdom and goodneſs, ſeeing ſo many Monſters among Bodies, ſo many irregularrities among Spirits, ſo much diſproportion in his action, in re-

lation to his Attributes, ſo much rain upon the Sand and in the Sea, ſo many Graces given to hardned Hearts; Graces which ſerve only to make them more culpable and more criminal, which yet cou'd not have been given, with a deſign ſo unworthy of Gods goodneſs, who deſires the Converſion of ſinners, and to whom the wicked were never neceſſary?

Ezek. 33. 2. Eccles. 15. 12.

If that which I have ſaid of the fall of the juſt, and the manner after which Jeſus Chriſt forms his Church, be clearly underſtood; perhaps it would be found to be probable enough: But I think I ought to ſay, that this is no ways neceſſary in order to defend my principles, and the manner by which I have juſtified the wiſdom and goodneſs of God. For it may be that God has given to J. C. as man, a particular kind of knowledge and power in relation to his deſign, by eſtabliſhing him the occaſional cauſe of the general Law of Grace. To make my thought underſtood by a compariſon, let us imagine that as ſoon as *Adam* was formed, God acquainted the Angels, that he had united a Spirit to a Body, to the end that it might take care thereof, without informing them any thing of the Laws of this union. According to this ſuppoſition, the Angels reaſoning according to their Ideas, would doubtleſs have imagined, that the firſt man had no ſentiment of Objects; and that, to eat and nouriſh himſelf, he ſtudied to know the configuration of the parts of the fruits of *Paradiſe*, the relation they might have with thoſe of his Body, thereby to judge whether they would have been proper for his nouriſhment. In all probality they would have believed, that to walk,

Adam

Adam had thought on the Nerves which answered to his Legs, and that he had continually conveyed to them such a quantity of Animal spirits to remove them; and thus they would have judged of other Functions by which Mans life is preserved. We very near do the same thing as to the manner in which J. C. forms his Church: We will needs judge thereof according to our Ideas, and yet perhaps we understand nothing thereof. God united the Soul to the Body of the first Man, after a much more wise and real manner, than the Angels themselves could imagine: For God advertised him by sentiments, after a short and undoubted manner, of what he ought to do; and this without dividing, as little as might be, the capacity which he had of thinking upon his Sovereign good: For then his Senses kept silence whensoever he desired it. Man may still walk and meditate, both together, but the first man upon all occasions, might, and also ought, without withdrawing himself from the presence of God, to give unto his Body all that which was necessary for it. Why may not God at present therefore, give unto J. C. certain kinds of compendious knowledge, whereof we have no Idea, that he may thereby better facilitate the construction of his Church, so that the relation which he has to us, may not divide the capacity which he has of seeing God and enjoying his happiness? God appointed certain general Laws of the union of Soul and Body, that the first Man might preserve his Life without applying himself over-much to particular Objects. Why may not God, by making his Son the Head of the Church, have established such

like general Laws? It may be this ought to have been ſo, that God might act in ſuch a manner as agrees beſt with the divine attributes; and perhaps that apparent irregularity with which Grace is given unto men, is in part a conſequence of this marvelous invention of eternal wiſdom. Aſſuredly, it may be the firſt *Adam* was even in this a figure of the ſecond, and that J.C. beſides his knowledge and deſires, which we cannot deny to him, without impiety, hath ſtill compendious ways, worthy of an infinite wiſdom, by which, as we by our ſentiments and paſſions, he acts in his myſtical body, without being diverted from his Sovereign good, which he loves too much to loſe the ſight of, or remove himſelf from its preſence. There are ſeveral paſſages in Scripture may countenance this opinion, but I might well be accounted raſh, ſhould I pretend to eſtabliſh it as a point which ought to be believed. That which I ſay may be true, but I ought not to aſſert it as true, before I am well convinced of it my ſelf. If this be not, it may be, or ſome ſuch like thing; as for my part, I have not juſtified the Wiſdom and Goodneſs of God, but by leaving to J. C. as Architect of the Eternal Temple, that we cannot take from him without offering violence to Reaſon and good Senſe. But I am glad to know that there are ſeveral ways of anſwering thoſe who oppoſe the Quality which I give to J.C. of an occaſional cauſe, which determines the efficacy of the good will of God in reſpect to men; and that all the Objections which can be made againſt me in this, can upon no other account be hard to be reſolved, but becauſe we are ignorant of a great many things which it would

be

be neceſſary to know for the clearing them up.

XVII.

The divers deſires of the Soul of J. C. giving Grace, hence we clearly apprehend whence it is, that it is not equally given to all men, and that it falls upon certain perſons at one time more than at another. Since the Soul of J. C. does not think at the ſame time of ſanctifying all men, it has not at the ſame time all the deſires of which it is capable. Thus, J. C. does not act upon his Members after a particular manner, but by ſucceſſive influences; like as our Soul does not at the ſame time remove all the Muſcles of our Bodies: For the Animal Spirits go equally and ſucceſſively into our Members, according to the different impreſſions of Objects, the divers motions of our paſſions, and different Deſires which we freely form in our ſelves.

XVIII.

It is true, that all the juſt continually receive the influence of the Head that gives them life, and that when they act by the Spirit of J. C. they merit and receive new graces, tho it be not neceſſary that the Soul of J. C. has any particular deſires which may be the occaſional cauſes of them; for the order, which requires that all Merit be rewarded, is not in God an Arbitrary Law; it is a Neceſſary Law, which depends not upon any occaſional cauſe. But tho he that has done a Meritorious Action, may be rewarded for it, and yet the ſoul of J. C. have actually no deſires in reſpect of him; nevertheleſs, it is certain that he has not merited Grace, but by the dignity and holineſs which the Spirit of J. C. communicated to him: For men

are

are not acceptable to God, and do nothing that
John 15. 4. is good, but ſo far as they are united to his Son by Charity.

Additions.

Altho I ſay order requires that the Juſt Merit Grace, it muſt not be underſtood of all Graces, but only of thoſe which are abſolutely neceſſary for the vanquiſhing unavoidable temptations. But God is faithful who will not ſuffer you to be tempted above that ye are able, ſays St. Paul. *Now Order requires that God ſhould be faithful.* Quis autem dicat eum qui jam cœpit credere, ab illo in quem credit non mereri, *ſays St.* Auguſtine *de Prædeſt. Sanct. Ch.* 2. The juſt therefore may merit Grace, by the aſſiſtance of Grace; but he cannot in ſtrictneſs merit thoſe Graces which are not abſolutely neceſſary for him. This depends upon the good will of J. C. as he is the occaſional cauſe of the order of Grace. And in ſtrictneſs, good works perhaps merit only the reward of happineſs: But it is not neceſſary that I ſhould ſtand to explain the different *ways of underſtanding merit.*

XIX.

Moreover, it muſt be confeſt, that they who obſerve the councels of J. C. by the eſteem which they have for them, and by the fear they have of future Puniſhments, do ſolicite, as I may ſay, by their obedience, the love of J. C. to think of them, tho as yet they ſhould act only by ſelf-love. But all their actions are not occaſional cauſes, neither of Grace, ſince they are not infallibly attended therewith, nor even of the motions of the Soul of J. C. in their behalf, ſince theſe ſame motions never fail of giving it. Thus, the deſires of J. C. alone

alone have infallibly their effect, as occaſional cauſes; becauſe God having made J. C. Head of the Church, it is only by him that the Grace which ſanctifies the Elect ought to be given.

XX.

Now we may conſider in the Soul of J. C. two ſorts of deſires, actual, tranſient, and particular deſires, the efficacy of which continue but a little time, conſtant and permanent deſires, which conſiſt in a firm and laſting diſpoſition of the ſoul of J. C. in relation to certain effects which tend to the execution of his deſign in general.

If our ſoul by its different motions did communicate to our bodies all that which is neceſſary to form and make it grow, we might diſtinguiſh therein two kinds of deſires; for it would ſend into the Muſcles of the Body the Spirits that give it certain diſpoſitions, in reſpect of the preſent Objects, or actual thoughts of the mind, by actual and tranſient deſires. But it would give to the Heart and the Lungs the natural motions, which ſerve for reſpiration and circulation of the Blood by ſtable and permanent deſires. It would alſo by ſuch like deſires digeſt its nouriſhment, and diſtribute it to all the parts which have need thereof; becauſe this ſort of action is at all times neceſſary for the preſervation of the body.

XXI.

By theſe actual, tranſient, and particular deſires of the ſoul of J. C. Grace is given to perſons who are not prepared, and after a manner which hath ſomething ſingular and extraordinary in it. But it is given regularly by permanent deſires to thoſe who worthily receive the Sacraments. For the

Grace

Grace which we receive by the Sacraments, is not given meerly by the Merit of our Action, tho we receive with fit diſpoſitions; it is becauſe of the merits of J. C. which are freely applyed to us in conſequence of his permanent deſires. We receive by the Sacraments much more Grace than our preparation can deſerve, and it is even ſufficient for the receiving ſome influence thereby that we do not put any impediment: But it is alſo to abuſe that which is moſt holy in Religion, to receive them unworthily.

Additions.

Since J. C. as man, does not act, but by his deſires, and the Grace of the Sacraments is permanent; it is evident, that the Grace which he communicates to thoſe who receives them worthily, comes not from J. C. as the occaſional cauſe. If there be not in J. C. a permanent deſire, or a conſtant will to do good unto thoſe who come unto the Sacraments, there would be no great miſtery in them.

XXII.

Among the actual and tranſient deſires of the Soul of Jeſus, there are certainly ſome which are more laſting and frequent than others; and the knowledge of the deſires is of very great uſe in morality. Doubtleſs J. C. thinks oftner upon them who obſerve his councels, than on other men. The motions of love which he has for the Faithful, are more frequent and laſting, than thoſe which he hath for the Libertine and the Wicked.

And ſince all the Faithful are not equally diſpoſed to enter into the Church of the predeſtinated, the deſires of the Soul of J. C. are not in reſpect of

of them all equally lively, frequent & abiding. Man more earneſtly deſires thoſe fruits which are more proper to nouriſh his Body, he thinks oftner upon Bread and Wine, than on thoſe Meats which are difficultly digeſted. J. C. having a deſign to form his Church, ought therefore to concern himſelf more for thoſe who may eaſily enter therein, than for thoſe who are very far from it.

Thus the H. Scripture teaches us, that the humble, the poor, the penitent, receive greater Graces, than other men; becauſe they who diſpiſe Honours, Riches, and Pleaſures, are much fitter for the Kingdom of God. They who according to the example of J. C. have learnt to be meek and humble in heart, ſhall find reſt to their ſouls. The yoak of J. C. which the Proud can't bear, will become eaſie and light by the aſſiſtance of Grace: For God hears the Prayers of the Humble, he will comfort them, he will juſtifie them, he will ſave them, he will heap Bleſſings upon them; but he will bring down the Haughtineſs of the Proud.

Bleſſed are the Poor in ſpirit, for theirs is the Kingdom of Heaven: But Curſed are the Rich, for they have received their Conſolation in this World. How hard is it, ſays J C. for the Rich to enter into the Kingdom of GOD! *It is eaſier for a* Camel *to paſs thro' the eye of a* Needle. Which cannot be without a Miracle.

As for them, who, like *David*, humble their ſouls with Faſting, put on Sack-cloath: In a word, afflict themſelves at the ſight of their Sins, and the Holineſs of God, will become fit objects for the compaſſion of J. C. for God never will diſpiſe

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an humble and a contrite Heart. We always diſarm his wrath, when we preſer the intereſts of God before our own, and take vengeance upon our ſelves.

XXIII.

Since the will of *J. C.* is altogether agreeable to Order, of which all men have naturally ſome Idea, it may further be diſcern'd by Reaſon, that the ſoul of *J. C.* has more thoughts and deſires, in reſpect of ſome Perſons, than others. For Order requires, that *J. C.* ſhould beſtow more Graces; for example, upon thoſe who are called to H. Orders, than thoſe whoſe vocation neceſſarily engages them in the buſineſs of the World. In a word, upon thoſe who make the principal parts of the body of the Church Militant, than they who have not the overſight of any, or are engaged in the Eccleſiaſtical Function, and raiſe themſelves above others by ambition or intereſt. For if it be fit that *J. C.* give Graces unto theſe in reſpect of the Perſons whom they govern, yet they don't deſerve ſuch as may ſanctify them in that ſtate which they have choſen by ſelf-love. They may have the gift of Prophecy, without having that of Charity, as Scripture teaches us.

XXIV.

We have proved, that the different deſires of the ſoul of *J. C.* are the occaſional cauſes of Grace, and we have endeavoured to diſcover ſomething of theſe deſires. Let us now ſee of what kind of Grace they are the occaſional cauſes. For tho *J. C.* be the Meritorious cauſe of all graces, it is not neceſſary he ſhould be the occaſional cauſe of the graces of knowledge, and certain outward Graces, which

which prepare the heart for converſion, but cannot effect it; for *J. C.* is always the occaſional or neceſſary cauſe, according to the order eſtabliſhed by God, in reſpect of all Graces which conduce to men ſalvation.

XXV.

Diſtinctly to underſtand what is the grace, which *J. C.* as Head of his Church, beſtows upon his Members, we muſt know what is the concupiſcence which the firſt man has communicated to all his Poſterity. For the ſecond *Adam* came to cure the diſorders which the firſt had cauſed, and there is ſuch a relation between the Sinful and Earthly *Adam*, and the Innocent and Heavenly *Adam*, that St. *Paul* looks upon the firſt communicating ſin to his Offſpring, by his diſobedience, as the figure of the ſecond giving to Chriſtians by his obedience, righteouſneſs, and holineſs. Rom. V. 14, 17, 18. 19. 1 Cor. 15 48.

XXVI.

Order requires that the ſoul ſhould govern the body, and that ſhe ſhould not be diſtracted whither ſhe will or no, with all thoſe ſentiments, and all thoſe motions which turn her to ſenſible Objects.

Thus the firſt man, before ſin, was ſo much Maſter of his ſences, and his paſſions, that they were ſilent whenſoever he deſired it; nothing was able to turn him from his duty againſt his will, and all the pleaſures which then prevented his reaſon, did only reſpectfully after a gentle & eaſie manner, advertiſe him of what he was to do for the preſervation of his life. But after ſin, he loſt all at once the power he had over his body, ſo that not being able to ſtop the motions, nor effuſe thoſe traces which ſenſible

ſible Objects made in the principal part of his brain, his ſoul by the Order of Nature, and as a puniſhment of his diſobedience, became miſerably ſubject to the Law of Concupiſcence, to that Carnal Law which continually fights againſt the mind, and every moment inſpires it with the Love of ſenſible goods, and rules over it by paſſions ſo ſtrong, and lively, and yet at the ſame time, ſo ſweet and agreeable, that it cannot; nay, will not, make all neceſſary endeavours to break the bonds which captivates it. For the infection of ſin is communicated to all the Children of *Adam*, by an infallible conſequence, of the Order of Nature, as I have elſe where Explained.

XXVII.

The Heart of Man is always a ſlave to pleaſure, and when Reaſon teaches us it is not convenient to enjoy it, yet we do not avoid it, but that we may find another more ſweet or ſolid. We willingly ſacrifice leſſer pleaſures to greater; but the invincible impreſſion which we have for our own happineſs, permits us not all our lives long to deprive our ſelves of that ſweetneſs which we taſte, when we ſuffer our ſelves to follow our paſſions.

Additions.

In the third diſcourſe you will ſee how this ought to be underſtood.

XXVIII.

It is certain, that pleaſure makes him happy who enjoys it; at leaſt, while he does enjoy it. Thus men being made to be happy, pleaſure always gives a touch to the will, and moves it towards

wards that object which causes it, or seems to cause it: The contrary must be said of grief. Now Concupiscence consists only in a continual succession of sentiments & motion which prevent reason, & which are not subject thereunto. of pleasures, which coming from the objects about us, inspire us with the love of them; of griefs, which making the exercise of vertue harsh and painful, give us an abhorrence of them.

It therefore became the second *Adam*, that he might cure the disorders of the first, to produce in us pleasures and aversions contrary to those of concupiscence; pleasures with respect the true goods, and horrors or aversions in respect of sensible goods. Thus the grace whereof J. C. is the occasional cause, and which, as Head of the Church, he continually bestows upon us, is not the Grace of knowledge, (tho he has merited this Grace, and tho he may sometimes communicate it, as I shall shew by and by,) but it is the Grace of sentiments. It is this previous delectation which produces and entertains the love of God in our hearts; for pleasure naturally produces and entertains the love of those objects, which cause, or seem to cause it: It is likewise the horror which sometimes accompanies sensible objects, which gives us an aversion to them, and makes us capable of governing the motions of our love by our knowledge

XXIX.

The Grace of sentiment should be opposed to concupiscence, pleasure to pleasure, horror to horror, that the influences of J. C. might be directly opposed to the influence of the first man. The remedy that it may cure the disease must be contrary thereto. For the Grace of knowledge can-

not heal an Heart wounded with pleaſure; to this end this pleaſure muſt either ceaſe, or another ſucceed in its room. Pleaſure is the weight of the ſoul which naturally enclines it towards it ſelf; ſenſible pleaſures weigh it down towards the Earth. That the ſoul may determine it ſelf, either theſe pleaſures muſt be diſſipated, or the delectation of Grace raiſe her towards Heaven, and put her almoſt in Equilibrio. 'Tis thus that the new Man oppoſes the old, that the influences of our Head reſiſts the influences of our Father *Adam*, that J. C. overcomes all our domeſtick Enemies.

Since Man had no concupiſcence before his ſin, it was not neceſſary he ſhould be carried to the love of good by a previous delectation. He clearly knew that God was his good, it was not neceſſary that he ſhould feel it. There was no need that he ſhould be drawn by pleaſure to love him, whom to love nothing hindred, and who he knew was perfectly worthy of his love; but after ſin the Grace of delectation was neceſſary to him, to counter-ballance the continual effort of concupiſcence. Thus, knowledge is the Grace of the Creator, delectation the Grace of the Redeemer. Knowledge is communicated by J. C. as Eternal Wiſdom: Delectation is given by him as Wiſdom Incarnate. Knowledge in its original was no more than Nature, Delectation was always pure Grace. Knowledge after Sin was not granted to us, but through the Merits of J. C. Delectation is given to us through the Merits, and by the Efficacy of the power of J. C. In ſhort, Knowledge is ſent down upon our minds, according to our different deſires and applications, as I

ſhall

ſhall Explain: But the Delectation of Grace is not ſhed upon our Hearts, but according to the various deſires of the Soul of J. C.

Additions.

That the Healing Grace of J. C. conſiſts in a preventing Delectation, is a thing ſo much out of doubt with St. Auguſtine, *that* F. Deſchamps, *who has ſo Learnedly confuted* Janſenius, *and is ſo oppoſite unto him, agrees with him in this Point; tho they differ from one another as to the manner in which Grace acts in us.* See *Janſenius* de Grat. Chr. Lib. IV. c. 1. and *Deſchamps* Lib III. Diſp. III. c. 16. & 19.

I cannot perſwade my ſelf to continue the Explication of thoſe things which to me ſeem clear of themſelves. Inſomuch, that what follows either needs it not, or is not particular to me. My Principles are ſufficiently confirm'd by what has been ſaid, and if they be clearly underſtood, I dont think there will be any difficulty in what follows.

XXX.

It is true, that pleaſure produces Knowledge, becauſe the ſoul gives more attention to the Objects from which ſhe receives more pleaſure. Since the generallity of men diſpiſe or neglect the truths of Religion, becauſe theſe abſtracted truths do not affect them, it may be ſaid that this delectation of Grace doth inſtruct them; for making theſe truths ſenſible, they learn them more eaſily by the attention which they bring to them. 'Tis upon this account that St. *John* ſays the unction we receive from J. C. teaches us all things, and that they who have this unction have no need to be inſtructed. 1 Joh. ii. 27.

It is true, that concupiſcence, ſuch as we feel, is not neceſſary in order to merit. Jeſus Chriſt, whoſe ſufferings were infinite, was not at all ſubject to it. But altho he was abſolute Maſter of his Body, he willingly ſuffered the moſt troubleſome motions and ſentiments to be excited therein, that he might thus merit all thereby which was prepared for him. Of all the ſentiments, that of Grief is the moſt contrary to a ſoul which deſires and deſerves to be happy, and yet he willingly ſuffered the moſt tormenting. Pleaſure makes him actually happy, who actually enjoys it, and yet he willingly depriv'd himſelf thereof.

Thus as we ought, he has offered an infinite number of Sacrifices by a Body which he took like unto ours; but theſe his Sacrifices differed from thoſe of the greateſt Saints, becauſe he willingly excited in himſelf all thoſe painful ſentiments, which in the reſt of Men are the neceſſary conſequences of ſin; and that thus theſe Sacrifices being altogether voluntary in him, were more Pure, and more Meritorious.

XXXI.

Nevertheleſs, it muſt be obſerved that this Unction doth not of its ſelf produce knowledge; it ohly excites our attention, which is the natural or occaſional cauſe of our knowledge.

Thus we ſee, that they who have the moſt Charity, have not always the moſt Knowledge. All men not being equally capable of attention, the ſame unction doth not equally inſtruct all thoſe who receive it. Thus, tho knowledge may be communicated to the Soul by a ſupernatural infuſion, and it may often be produced by Charity;

rity; nevertheleſs, this Grace ought often to be accounted as a natural effect, becauſe Charity does not ordinarily produce knowledge in the minds of Men, but proportionally as it cauſes the ſoul to deſire the knowledge of that which ſhe loves. For to conclude, the various deſires of the ſoul are the natural or occaſional cauſes of the diſcoveries we make in any ſubject whatſoever: But theſe truths I muſt explain more at length in the Second Part of this Diſcourſe.

THE SECOND PART.

Of the Grace of the Creator.

XXXII.

I Know but two Principles which determine directly, and by themſelves, the motions of our Love, Knowledge, and Pleaſure: Knowledge, by which we diſcern different goods, Pleaſure, by which we taſte them. But there is great difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleaſure. Knowledge leaves us altogether to our ſelves, it makes no attempt upon our liberty, it does not force us to love any thing, it does not produce in us a natural or neceſſary love; it only puts us in a condition of determining our ſelves, and loving the objects which it diſcovers to us with a love of

choice, or which is the ſame thing, of fixing the general impreſſion of Love which God continually gives us upon particular goods. But Pleaſure efficaciouſly determines the will, it tranſports it, as I may ſay, towards the object which cauſes it or ſeems to cauſe it; it produces in us a natural and neceſſary love; it diminiſhes our liberty, diſtracts our reaſon, and does not leave us wholly to our ſelves: A ſmall attention to our inward ſentiments may convince of theſe differences.

XXXIII.

Thus Man before ſin, having a perfect freedom, and no Concupiſcence which might hinder him from following his Knowledge in the motions of his Love; and ſince he clearly ſaw that God was infinitely amiable, it was not expedient he ſhould have been determined by a preventing Delectation, (as I have already ſaid) nor by other Graces of Sentiment, which might have diminiſhed his merit, and have engaged him to have loved by inſtinct, that good which ought to be loved only by Reaſon. But ſince ſin, beſides Knowledge, the Grace of ſentiment has been neceſſary, that he might thereby reſiſt the motions of Concupiſcence. For Man invincibly deſiring to be happy, it is impoſſible he ſhould continually ſacrifice his Pleaſure to his Knowledge; his Pleaſure which renders him actually happy, & which ſubſiſts in himſelf (notwithſtanding he never ſo much reſiſts it) to his knowledge which ſubſiſts not, but by a troubleſome application of mind, which the leaſt actual pleaſure diſtracts; & which laſtly, doth not promiſe actual happineſs till after death; which to the imagination, ſeems to be a real Annihilation.

XXXIV.

XXXIV.

Knowledge therefore is neceſſary to Man, for guiding him in the ſearch after that which is good: It is the Effect of natural order: It ſuppoſes neither the Corruption, nor the Reſtoration of Nature. But Pleaſure which draws us to true happineſs is pure Grace; for naturally what is truly good, ought only to be loved by reaſon. Hence the occaſional cauſes of the Graces of ſentiment muſt be found in J. C. becauſe he is the Author of Grace: But the occaſional cauſes of Knowledge muſt ordinarily be found in the order of Nature, becauſe it is the Grace of the Creator. Let us endeavour to find out theſe cauſes.

XXXV.

In the order eſtabliſhed by Nature, I only ſee two occaſional cauſes, which diſtribute knowledge to Spirits, and thus determine the general Laws of the Grace of the Creator. The one in us, which in ſome ſort depends upon us; the other, which is to be found in the relation we have to the things about us. The firſt is nothing elſe but the different motions of our wills. The ſecond is the concourſe of ſenſible objects which act upon our mind, in conſequence of the Laws of union of the Soul with the Body.

XXXVI.

The inward ſentiment which we have of our ſelves, teaches us that our deſires produce or excite knowledge in us, and that attention of mind is the natural prayer by which we prevail with God to enlighten us; for all who apply themſelves to truth, diſcover it proportionably to their attention. And if our prayer was not interrup-

ted, if our attention was not disturbed, if we had any Idea of what we ask, and if we asked it with necessary perseverance, we should never fail to obtain as far as we are capable to receive. But our prayers are continually interrupted, if they be not preingaged [by pleasure.] Our senses and our imagination trouble and confound all our Ideas; and tho the truth we consult answers our request, yet the confused noise of our passions hinders from understanding its answers, or causes us presently to forget them.

XXXVII.

If it be considered, that Man before sin was animated with Charity, that he had in himself all that was necessary for his perseverance in Righteousness, and that he ought by his perseverance and application to have merited his reward; it may easily be apprehended, that the various desires of his Heart were to be made the occasional causes of the knowledge communicated to his mind: Otherwise, his distraction would not have been Voluntary, nor his attention Meritorious. Now Nature, although corrupted, is not destroyed; God has not ceased to will that which he once willed, the same Laws still remain. Thus our different wills are still at this day the occasional or natural causes of the presence of Ideas to our minds. But because the union of the Soul with the Body is changed into a dependance by the natural consequence of sin, and the immutability of the will of God, as I have * elsewhere explained, our Bodies at present disturb our Ideas, and speaking so loudly in behalf of the goods which respect them, that the mind rarely asks, and

Search after Truth, 1. explic. That God is not the Author of our concupiscence.

and diſtractedly hears the inward TRUTH.

XXXVIII.

Experience further teaches us every moment, that our converſation with knowing Perſons, is capable of inſtructing by exciting our attention; that Sermons, reading, converſe, and many ſuch like occaſions, may raiſe in us good ſentiments. The death of a friend doubtleſs is able to make us think of Death, if ſome great paſſion does not wholly imploy us. And when an able Preacher undertakes to demonſtrate a very plain truth, and convince others of it, it muſt be granted that he may perſwade his Auditors thereof, and even move their Conſcience, excite their hope and fear, and ſuch like paſſions in them, which diſpoſes them leſs to reſiſt the efficacy of the Grace of J. C. Men being made to live in ſociety one with another, it was neceſſary that they might mutually communicate their thoughts and motions. It was needful that they ſhould be united by the Mind as well as the Body, and that ſpeaking by the Voice to the Ears, and by writeing to the Eyes, they ſhould communicate knowledge and underſtanding to attentive minds.

XXXIX.

Now Knowledge, what way ſoever it is produced in us, whether by our particular deſires, or whether ſome accidents be the occaſion thereof, it may be called Grace, eſpecially when it very much concerns our ſalvation, tho it ſhould only be a conſequence of the order of Nature; becauſe ſince ſin, God owes us nothing, and all the good we have, is only what J. C. has merited for us. For even our very Being ſubſiſts not but by

J. C.

J. C. But this kind of Grace, tho merited by J. C. is not the Grace of J. C. 'Tis the Grace of the Creator; becauſe J. C. not being ordinarily the occaſional cauſe thereof, the cauſe of it muſt be ſought for in the order of Nature.

XL.

There are a great many natural effects, which may reaſonably be accounted Graces. For example, two Perſons at the ſame time have very different deſires of Curioſity. The one would go to an Opera, & the other hear a fam'd Preacher. If they ſatisfie their curioſity, he who ſhall go to the Opera will find ſuch objects, as conſidering the preſent diſpoſition of his mind, will excite in him paſſions which will ruine him. The other on the contrary, may find in the Preacher ſo much clearneſs and ſtrength, that the Grace of Converſion being given at this moment, may be very efficacious in him. This being ſuppoſed, a ſhower of rain or ſome other accident interveens, which keeps them at home; this rain doubtleſs is a natural effect, ſince it depends upon the natural Laws of the communication of motions. Nevertheleſs, it may be ſaid to be a Grace in reſpect of him whoſe Ruine it prevents, and a Puniſhment to him, whoſe Converſion it hinders.

XLI.

Grace being joyned with Nature, all the motions of our Souls and of our Bodies, have ſome relation to our Salvation. Such a man is ſaved for having, whilſt he was in the ſtate of Grace, made a ſtep which happily cauſed him to break his neck. And is damn'd for having, at ſome time

time, unluckily eſcaped the ruines of an houſe ready to fall. We know not what is beneficial for us, but we very well know nothing is ſo indifferent in its ſelf, but that it has ſome relation to our ſalvation, by reaſon of the mixture & combination of the effects which depend on the general Laws of Nature with thoſe of Grace.

XLII.

Since then Knowledge diſcovers the true good, the means of obtaining it, our duty towards God, in a word, the ways which we ought to follow; ſince it is ſufficient alſo for thoſe who are animated with charity to make them act well, merit new Graces, vanquiſh certain temptations, as I ſhall elſewhere Explain; I think it may very deſervedly be called by the name of Grace, tho J. C. be only the meritorious cauſe of it.

And ſince the outward Graces which act not immediately upon the mind, nevertheleſs enter into the order of predeſtination of Saints, I alſo look upon them as true Graces. In a word, I think the name of Grace may be given to all natural effects, when they relate to ſalvation, when they are ſubſervient to the Grace of J. C. and remove ſome impediments of its efficacy. Nevertheleſs, if any deny this, I have no deſign to diſpute upon words.

XLIII.

All theſe ſorts of Graces, if we will allow unto them this name, being Graces of the Creator, the general Laws of theſe Graces, are the general Laws of Nature. For it muſt be obſerved, that ſin hath not deſtroyed nature, tho it has corrupted it; the general Laws of the communi-

cation

cation of motions are always the ſame, and thoſe of the union of ſoul and body are not changed, excepting in this only, that what was but a union in reſpect of the mind, is changed into a dependance, for reaſons I have mentioned elſewhere. For at preſent we depend upon Bodies, to which by the inſtitution of Nature we were only united.

XLIV.

Now the Laws of Nature are always very ſimple and very general. For God acts not by particular wills, except when order requires a Miracle. I have ſufficiently proved this truth in the firſt diſcourſe. Thus, when a ſtone falls upon the Head of a good man and kills him, it falls in conſequence of the Laws of motions; this happens not, becauſe God is juſt, and would by a particular will reward him: When a like accident knocks out the brains of a ſinner, this is not becauſe God would actually puniſh him. For God on the contrary, would ſave all men, but it becomes him not to change the ſimplicity of his Laws to ſuſpend the puniſhment of a Criminal. In like manner, when knowledge is conveyed to the mind, it is becauſe we have deſires which are the occaſional cauſes thereof; 'tis becauſe we hear ſome knowing Perſon, and becauſe our brain is ſuppoſed to receive the impreſſions of him that ſpeaks. 'Tis not becauſe God has any particular will in reſpect of us, but becauſe he follows the general Laws of Nature which he has preſcribed to himſelf. I ſee nothing myſterious in the diſtribution of theſe kinds of Graces, and I ſhall not ſtand to draw the conſequences which may be inferred from theſe Truths.

XLV.

It muſt be obſerved that J. C. who alone is the meritorious cauſe of the good things which God gives us according to the order of Nature, is ſometimes the occaſional cauſe of knowledge as well as of ſentiment. Nevertheleſs I believe that this is very rare, becauſe in truth it is not neceſſary. J. C. as much as is poſſible makes Nature, ſerve Grace. For, beſides that Reaſon teaches us, that order requires this, as being the moſt ſimple way; this ſufficiently appears by his management upon Earth, and by that order which he has founded, and ſtill preſerves in his Church. J. C. made uſe of preaching the Word for to enlighten the World, and ſent forth his Diſciples two by two to prepare the people to receive him. Luke X. 1. He hath appointed Apoſtles, Prophets, Evangeliſts, Doctours, Biſhops, Prieſts, for the Edification of the Church. Is not this to make Nature ſerviceable to Grace, and to communicate the knowledge of Faith to the minds of Men by the moſt ſimple and natural ways. In truth, it did not become J. C. upon Earth to enlighten Men by particular wills, ſince he might inſtruct them as inward Truth and eternal Wiſdom, by the moſt ſimple and moſt fruitful Laws of Nature. Eph. IV. 12. & 12

XLVI.

That which ſeems moſt dark in the order which God hath obſerved in founding his Church, is doubtleſs the times, the place, and other circumſtances of the Incarnation of his Son, and the preaching of the Goſpel. For why ſhould J. C. for whom the world was created, be made man 4000. years after its creation? Why ſhould he be born among

mong the *Jews* who was to reprove this miſerable Nation? Why choſen to be the Son of *David*, when the Houſe of *David* was fall'n from its Glory; and not the Son of any of the *Emperours*, who commanded all the Earth, ſince he came to convert and enlighten all the World? Why did he chuſe low, mean, and ignorant perſons for his Apoſtles and Diſciples; Preach to the Inhabitants of *Bethſaida* and *Corazin*, who were reſolved to continue in their incredulity, and paſs by *Tyre* and *Zidon*, who would have been converted if they had had the ſame favour; Hinder St. *Paul* from Preaching the word of God in *Aſia*, and command him to paſs into *Macedonia*? Theſe, and a thouſand other circumſtances which attended the preaching of the Goſpel, doubtleſs are Myſteries, whereof 'tis not poſſible to give clear and evident reaſons, neither is this my deſign. I would only lay down ſome principles, which may give ſome light to theſe and ſuch like difficulties, or at leaſt make it appear, that from them nothing can be concluded againſt, what I have hitherto ſaid concerning the Order of Nature and of Grace.

XLVII.

It is certain that natural effects are combined and mixed after infinite ways with the effects of Grace. And that the order of Nature encreaſes or leſſens the efficacy of the effects of the order of Grace, according to the different manners by which theſe two orders are mixed one with another. The Death, which according to the general Laws of Nature, ſometimes happens to a good or evil Prince, to a good or an evil Biſhop, cauſes

ſes a great deal of good or evil to the Church; becauſe ſuch like accidents make great change in the conſequence of effects which depend upon the order of Grace. Now God would ſave all men by the moſt ſimple ways. Therefore it may, and it ought to be ſaid in general, that he hath choſen the times, the place, the manners, which in ſucceſſion of time, and according to the general Laws of Nature and Grace, will (*cæteris paribus*) cauſe the greateſt number of the Predeſtinated to enter into the Church. God does all for his Glory. Therefore, amongſt all the poſſible combinations of Nature with Grace, he by the infinite extenſion of his knowledge, has choſen that, which muſt make the Church moſt perfect, and moſt worthy of his Majeſty and Wiſdom.

XLVIII.

It ſeems to me, this already ſuffices to anſwer all difficulties relating to the circumſtances of our Myſteries. For if it be ſaid that J. C. ought to have been born of a *Roman* Emperour, and have wrought Miracles in the Capital City of the World, that ſo the Goſpel might have been more eaſily ſpread in the fartheſt diſtant Countries; to this it may be anſwered boldly, that whatſoever men think thereof, this combination of Nature with Grace, would not have been ſo worthy of the Wiſdom of God as that which he hath choſen.

I grant, that Religion would thus at firſt have been ſpread with more eaſe; but its eſtabliſhment would not have been ſo divine and ſo extraordinary, and conſequently not ſuch an invincible proof of its ſolidity and certainty. Thus, according

ding to this combination, Religion perhaps would have been at preſent either deſtroyed, or leſs ſpread in the World. Moreover, when it is ſaid that God acts by the moſt ſimple ways, an equality is always ſuppoſed in all things elſe, eſpecially in the glory which muſt redound to God by his Work. Now the Church would not have been ſo perfect, nor ſo worthy of the greatneſs and holineſs of God, if it had been form'd with ſo much eaſe. For the Beauty of the Heavenly *Jeruſalem*, conſiſting in the different rewards due to the different combate of Chriſtians, it was expedient that the Martyrs ſhould ſhed their Blood as well as J. C. to enter into the glory which they poſſeſs. In a word, this principle, that amongſt all the infinite combinations of the orders of Nature and Grace, God has choſen that which would produce an effect moſt worthy of his Majeſty and Wiſdom, is ſufficient in general to anſwer all the difficulties which may be made concerning the circumſtances of our Myſteries. In like manner, to juſtify the orders of Nature and Grace in themſelves, its enough to know, that God being infinitely Wiſe, he does not form his deſigns, but upon the admirable relation of Wiſdom and fruitfulneſs, which he ſees in the ways capable to execute them; as I have already ſhewn in the firſt Diſcourſe.

XLIX.

Since the generality of men judge of God by themſelves, they imagine that he firſt reſolves upon a deſign, and afterwards conſults his Wiſdom how to bring it to effect; for our wills every moment go before our reaſon, ſo that our deſigns

ſigns are ſcarce ever perfectly reaſonable. For God does not act as Men do. Behold how he acts, if I have well conſulted the idea of an infinitely perfect being. God, by the infinite knowledge of his wiſdom, and in the ſame wiſdom, ſees all poſſible works, and at the ſame time all ways of producing each of them. He ſees all the relation of the means to their ends; he compares all things by an eternal, immutable, neceſſary foreſight, and by the compariſon which he makes of relations of the wiſdom and fruitfulneſs which he diſcovers betwixt his deſigns and the ways of executing them, he freely forms the deſign. But the deſign being reſolved upon, he neceſſarily chuſes thoſe general ways which are moſt worthy of his wiſdom, greatneſs, and goodneſs: for ſince he does not reſolve upon any thing, but by the knowledge he has of the ways of executing it, the choice of the deſign contains the choice of the ways.

L.

When I ſay, that God freely forms his deſign, I do not mean as if he cou'd chuſe another which is leſs, and reject that which is more worthy of his wiſdom; for ſuppoſing that God will make any outward work worthy of himſelf, he is not indifferent in his choice: he muſt produce that which is the moſt perfect in reſpect of the ſimplicity of the ways by which he acts: he owes this to himſelf, to follow the rules of his wiſdom: he muſt always act after the moſt wiſe and perfect manner. But, I ſay, God freely takes up his reſolution, becauſe he invincibly and neceſſarily loves nothing but his own ſubſtance. Neither the Incarnation of the Word, much leſs the Creation of

the World, are neceſſary Emanations of his Nature. God is altogether ſufficient to himſelf. For a Being infinitely perfect may be conceiv'd alone, without having a neceſſary relation to his Creatures.

LI.

Since God neceſſarily loves himſelf, he alſo neceſſarily follows the Rules of his Wiſdom. But ſeeing the Creatures make no part of his Being, he is ſo ſelf-ſufficient as that nothing can oblige him to produce them: he is very indifferent or free in reſpect of them. And it is upon this account that he made the World in time; for this circumſtance makes it evident, that the Creatures are not neceſſary Emanations of the Divinity, but do eſſentially depend upon the Free-will of a Creator.

LII.

Nevertheleſs, behold an Objection which at firſt does ſurprize the mind: If it be true, That God neceſſary follows the Rules of his Wiſdom, the World wou'd not have been created in time. For either the World is worthy, or unworthy of God. If it was better the World ſhou'd have been brought out of nothing, it ought to have been eternal; if better it ſhou'd have remain'd in nothing, it ought not to have been made at all. God therefore is not obliged to follow the Rules this Wiſdom preſcribes, ſeeing the World was created in time. But the Anſwer to this Objection is not difficult: It is better the World ſhou'd be, than not: but it is better it ſhou'd not have been at all, than be eternal. The Creature muſt carry in it the eſſential mark of its dependance: If Spirits had been eter-

eternal, they might have had ſome reaſon to have look'd upon themſelves as Gods, or neceſſary Beings; or at leaſt capable to contribute ſomething to the greatneſs and happineſs of God, imagining that he cou'd not but have made them: they might likewiſe in ſome ſort have compar'd themſelves to the Divine Perſons, thinking they were, like them, produc'd by a neceſſary emanation. Thus God was oblig'd, according to the Rules of his Wiſdom, to leave unto the Creatures the character of their dependance: aſſuring them, nevertheleſs, that he has not made them to annihilate them, and that being conſtant to his deſigns, as his infinite Wiſdom requires, they ſhall ſubſiſt eternally.

LIII.

This Difficulty may be further urg'd, after this manner: God neceſſarily follows the Rules of his Wiſdom; he neceſſarily does what is the beſt. Now, it was better at leaſt, that the World ſhou'd have been created in time, than that it ſhou'd not have been created at all. Certainly it was expedient, according to the Rules of Divine Wiſdom, that the World ſhou'd have been produced with thoſe circumſtances according to which God had made it. Therefore the Creation of the World in time is abſolutely neceſſary, God is not at all free in this reſpect, he cou'd not but have made it.

To reſolve this Difficulty it ought to be obſerved, That tho' God follows the Rules which his Wiſdom preſcribes unto him, yet he doth not neceſſarily do that which is beſt, becauſe he might do nothing: To act and not exactly to follow the Rules of Wiſdom, is a defect. Thus, ſuppoſing

that God will act, he neceſſarily acts after the wiſeſt manner that can be. But, to be free in the production of the World, is a mark of abundance of fulneſs, and ſelf-ſufficiency. It is better the World ſhou'd be, than not be: the Incarnation of J. C. renders the Work of God worthy of its Author: This I grant. But ſeeing God is eſſentially happy and perfect, ſeeing nothing but himſelf can be good, in relation unto him, or the cauſe of his perfection and happineſs, he invinſibly loves only his own ſubſtance; and all that is without him, muſt indeed be made by an eternal and immutable action; but which has no other neceſſity, but upon ſuppoſition of the Divine Decrees.

See yet another Principle, of which I have already ſpoken, which may give ſome light to the Difficulties which may be made about the Circumſtances of the Incarnation of J. C. and the Creation of the World.

LIV.

Reaſon and the Authority of the H. Books, teach us, that the firſt and principal of God's Deſigns is, the Eſtabliſhment of his Church in J. C. The preſent World is not created to continue ſuch as it is. The Lies and Errours, the Unrighteouſneſs and Diſorders which we ſee, ſufficiently ſhew it muſt have an end. The future World, where Truth and Righteouſneſs inhabit, is that Land whoſe Foundations cannot be ſhaken; and which, being the external Object of the Divine Love, ſhall ſubſiſt eternally. God has not created this viſible World, but by little and little, to form thereof that inviſible City of which S. *John* tells us ſo many Wonders. And ſeeing J. C. ſhall be the chief

Beau-

Beauty thereof, God always has had J. C. in view in the production of his Work. He hath made all for Man, and with reſpect to Man, as the Scripture teacheth us: but this Man, for whom God has made all, is, according to S. *Paul*, J. C. 'Tis to teach Men, that they are created, that they do not ſubſiſt, but in J. C. 'tis to bind them cloſely to J. C. 'tis to engage them to become like unto him, that God has repreſented J. C. and his Church in the chiefeſt of his Creatures. For it was neceſſary God ſhou'd find J. C. in all his Work, that this Work might be the object of his Love and worthy of the Action by which it is produc'd. Heb. ch. II.

LV.

If the manner after which the H. Scripture relates the Creation of the firſt Man be conſidered, how his Wife was form'd of his Fleſh and Bone, the Love he had for her, and even the Circumſtances of their Sin, it will doubtleſs be granted, that God thought of the ſecond *Adam* when he made the firſt: that he conſidered the Father of the World to come, when he created the Father of the preſent; and that he intended to make the firſt Man and the firſt Woman expreſs Figures of J. C. and his Church. S. *Paul* ſuffers us not to doubt of this truth, when he aſſures us, that we are made of the Bone and Fleſh of J. C. and that we are his Members, and that the Marriage of *Adam* and *Eve* was the Figure of J. C. and his Church.

LVI.

God might have form'd Men and Animals by ways as ſimple as the ordinary Generation is: But ſeeing this way figured J. C. and his Church; ſince,

it bore the Character of the Chief of God's Deſigns; ſince, it repreſented, as I may ſay, the well-beloved Son of his Father, that Son by whom the whole Creation ſubſiſts: God was obliged to prefer it before all others, whereby to teach us, that as intelligible Beauties conſiſt only in the relation they have to eternal Wiſdom, ſo ſenſible Beauties muſt in ſome manner, much unknown to us, have ſome relation to the Truth incarnate.

LVII.

Doubtleſs there are many relations between the principal Creatures and J. C. who is their model and end. For all is full of J. C. all expreſſes and figures him, as far as the ſimplicity of the Laws of Nature will permit them: but I dare not enter into the particulars of this. For, beſides that I am afraid of deceiving my ſelf, and that I don't ſufficiently know either Nature or Grace, the preſent or the future World, to diſcover the relations thereof: I am ſenſible, that Mens Imaginations are ſo witty and delicate, that one cannot, by Reaſon, lead them to God, much leſs to J. C. without tyring them, and exciting their railery. The greateſt part of Chriſtians are accuſtom'd to a Philoſophy, which rather loves to ſhelter its ſelf in fictions as extravagant as thoſe of the Poets, than have recourſe to God: and ſome are ſo little acquainted with J. C. that a Man ſhou'd paſs with them for a viſionary, if he ſhou'd ſay the ſame things with S. *Paul* and not quote his words: For 'tis rather this great Name, than the Sight of the Truth, which engages them. The Authority of the Scripture hinders them from blaſpheming againſt that which they are ignorant of: but ſeeing they think but little

little of it, they can't thereby be much enlightned.

LVIII.

It is certain the Jews were a figure of the Church, and the moſt holy and famous amongſt the Kings, Prophets and Patriarchs of this People, did repreſent the true Meſſias, our Saviour J. C. This truth can't be denied without undermining the Foundations of Chriſtian Religion, and making the moſt learned of the Apoſtles paſs for the moſt ignorant of Men. J. C. not being yet come, it was neceſſary he ſhou'd at leaſt be prefigured. He ought to be expected, he ought to be deſired, he ought to diſperſe, by his Figures, ſome ſort of Beauty in the World, to make it pleaſing to his Father. Thus it was neceſſary he ſhou'd have been in ſome ſenſe as ancient as the World; it was neceſſary he ſhou'd die preſently after Sin in the perſon of *Abel: Agnus occiſus ab origine Mundi, principium & finis, Alpha & Omega, heri & hodie eſt, erat, venturus eſt.* Theſe are the Qualifications which S. *John* gives to the Saviour of Men.

LIX.

Now, ſuppoſing that J. C. ought to be prefigured, it was expedient he ſhou'd chiefly be ſo by his Anceſtors: and that their Hiſtory, dictated by the H. Spirit, ſhou'd in all times be preſerv'd, to the end that J. C. may ſtill be compar'd with his Figures, and acknowledg'd as the true Meſſias. Of all the Nations of the Earth, God loving that beſt which had moſt relation with his Son, the Jews were to have been the Anceſtors of J. C. according to the fleſh, and to have received this favour of God, ſince they were the moſt

lively and moſt expreſs Repreſentations of his Son.

LX.

But, if this Difficulty be further urg'd, ſo as to demand a reaſon of the choice which God made of the Jews to be the principal Figures of J. C. I think I may and ought to affirm, firſt, That God, always acting by the moſt ſimple ways, and diſcovering in the infinite Treaſures of his Wiſdom, all the poſſible Combinations of Nature with Grace, choſe that which wou'd make the Church moſt ample, moſt perfect, and moſt worthy of his Majeſty and Holineſs, as I have already ſaid. In the ſecond place, I think I ought to anſwer, That God foreſeeing what wou'd happen to the Jews, by a neceſſary conſequence of natural Laws, had more relation to the deſign which he had of repreſenting J. C. and his Church, than any thing which cou'd happen to any other Nation; it was expedient that he ſhou'd chuſe this People rather than any other. For, in concluſion, the predeſtination to the Law is not like the predeſtination to Grace; and tho' there is nothing in Nature which may oblige God to diſpenſe his Grace equally to all People; it ſeems to me, that Nature might merit the Law, in the ſence wherein I here underſtand it.

LXI.

It is true, that all that happen'd to the Jews, who repreſented J. C. was not a neceſſary conſequence of the order of Nature; Miracles were neceſſary to render them the lively and expreſs Images of the Church, but Nature muſt have furniſh'd the Fund and the Matter, and perhaps the prin-

principal Stroaks in ſeveral things; Miracles finiſh'd the reſt. But no other Nation wou'd have been ſo proper for ſo juſt and high a Deſign.

LXII.

It appears to me, that we are oblig'd to think, that God's Wiſdom, foreſeeing all the Conſequences of all the poſſible Orders, and all their Combinations, never works Miracles when Nature ſuffices: and that thus, he was oblig'd to chuſe the Combination of Natural Effects, which, ſaving him, as I may ſay, the expence of Miracles, might nevertheleſs very faithfully execute his Intentions.

For example, 'Tis neceſſary that all Sins ſhou'd be puniſh'd; but not always in this World. Suppoſing, nevertheleſs, that it was expedient for the glory of J. C. and the eſtabliſhment of Religion, that the Jews ſhou'd be puniſh'd in the face of the whole Earth, for putting to death the Saviour of the World: it was convenient that J. C. came into the World towards the end of *Herod*'s Reign; ſuppoſing, that according to the neceſſary conſequence of the Order of Nature, that People ſhou'd be divided amongſt themſelves about that time; that Civil Wars and continual Seditions ſhou'd weaken them; and that, laſtly, the Romans ſhou'd deſtroy and ſcatter them abroad, after the total deſtruction of their City and Temple.

It is true, there ſeems to have been ſomething extraordinary in the deſolation of the Jews. But, ſince it argues more Wiſdom in God to produce ſuch ſurpriſing Effects, by the moſt ſimple and general Laws of Nature, than by particular Wills; I know not whether, on this occaſion, we ought to have recourſe to a Miracle. For my part, I don't diſpute

diſpute of it here: this is a thing which is not eaſie, nor indeed very neceſſary to be cleared. I give this Example, for to make ſome application of my Principles and to make them the better underſtood.

It ſeems to me, that what I have hitherto ſaid, of *Nature and Grace*, is ſufficient to ſatisfie all equitable and moderate Perſons, concerning an infinite number of Difficulties, which diſturb the Minds of thoſe only who judge of God by themſelves. For if we do faithfully conſult the Idea of an infinitely perfect Being, of a general Cauſe, of an infinite Wiſdom; and if the Principles I have eſtabliſh'd of this Idea be granted, I believe none will be ſurprized or offended with God's Conduct, and that inſtead of condemning or murmuring at it, Men will not forbear to admire and adore it.

The Third Diſcourſe.

Of Grace, and the Manner by which it Acts in us.

The Firſt Part.

Of Liberty.

I.

THere is nothing more uncomely, than the ſubſtance of Spirits, if they are ſeparated from God: For what is a Mind without Underſtanding and Reaſon, without Motion and Love? In the mean time the Word and Wiſdom of God is the Univerſal Reaſon of Spirits; it is the Love by which God loves himſelf, which gives to the Soul all the motion that it has towards happineſs: The Mind cannot know the Truth, but by its natural and neceſſary union with Truth its ſelf; it cannot be reaſonable, but by reaſon: in ſhort, it cannot, in ſome ſence, be a Mind and Underſtanding, but becauſe its Subſtance is enlightned, penetrated

ted and perfected by the Light of God himſelf.

Book III. of the *Searchafter Truth*, and in the Explication of the *Nature of Ideas.*

I have elſewhere explain'd theſe Truths. As the ſubſtance of the Soul is not capable of loving that which is good, but by its natural and neceſſary union with the eternal and ſubſtantial Love of the Soveraign Good; ſo it moves not towards that which is good, but ſo far forth as God carries it: it is not Will, but by the motion which God continually imprints upon it; it lives not, but by charity; it wills not, but by the love of good, which God imparts unto it, tho' it abuſes it. For in truth, as God neither makes nor preſerves Minds, but for himſelf, ſo he carries them towards himſelf as long as he preſerves their being: he communicates the love of happineſs to them, as far as they are capable. Now this natural and continual motion of the Soul towards good in general, towards good undetermined, that is, towards God, is that which I here call the Will; becauſe it is this motion which makes the Soul capable of loving different goods.

II.

This natural motion of the Soul towards good in general is invincible; for it is not in our power to chuſe not to be happy. We neceſſarily love that we clearly know, and ſenſibly feel to be the true good. All minds love God by the neceſſity of their nature: and if they love any thing but God by the free choice of the will, it is not becauſe they do not ſeek after God, or the cauſe of their happineſs, but becauſe having a confuſed ſence, that Bodies about them make them happy, they look upon them as their Goods, and by a natural and ordi-

ordinary conſequence, love them, and unite themſelves to them.

III.

But the love of all theſe particular goods, is not naturally invincible. Man, conſidered as God made him, may hinder himſelf from loving thoſe goods which do not fill the whole capacity he has of loving. Seeing there is a good which contains all others, Man may ſacrifice to the love of this good all other loves; for God having made minds for himſelf, he cannot engage them invincibly to love any thing but himſelf, or with relation to himſelf. The inward ſentiment which we have of our ſelves, teaches us, that we may, for example, refuſe any fruit, tho we are inclin'd to receive it. Now this power of loving, or not loving particular goods, this *non-invincibility*, which is in that motion, which carries the minds to love that which does not ſeem to them to contain all goods; this power, this *non-invincibility*, is that which I call liberty. Thus, by putting the definition in the place of the thing defin'd, this expreſſion, *Our will is free*, ſignifies, that the natural motion of our Soul towards good in general, is not invincible, in reſpect of any particular good. We do alſo to this word *free*, joyn the Idea of *voluntary*: but hereafter I ſhall take this word in the ſenſe which I have obſerv'd, becauſe this is moſt natural and moſt ordinary.

IV.

The word good is equivocal, it may ſignifie either pleaſure which makes Men formally happy, or elſe the true or apparent cauſe of pleaſure.

I ſhall in this Diſcourſe always take the word good in the ſecond ſenſe; becauſe in truth pleaſure is imprinted upon the Soul, to the end that ſhe may love the cauſe of her happineſs, that by the motion of her love ſhe may be carried towards it, and be ſtraitly united thereunto, and ſo be continually happy. When the Soul loves nothing but her pleaſure, ſhe truly loves nothing but her ſelf: for pleaſure is only a condition or modification of the Soul which renders her actually happy. Now, ſince the Soul cannot be to her ſelf the cauſe of her happineſs, ſhe is unjuſt, ſhe is ungrateful, ſhe is blind, if ſhe loves her pleaſure, without paying that love and reſpect which is due to the true cauſe which produces it in her. Since there is none but God, who can immediately and by himſelf act upon the Soul, and make her feel pleaſure by the actual efficacy of his Almighty Will, there is none but he who can be truly *good*. Nevertheleſs, I call the creatures which are the apparent cauſes of thoſe pleaſures which they occaſion in us, by the name of *goods*. For I would not avoid the ordinary way of ſpeaking, but as far as it is neceſſary clearly to expreſs my ſelf. All the creatures, tho good in themſelves and perfect in reſpect of God's deſigns, are not good in reſpect to us, I mean, they are not our good, becauſe they are not the true cauſes of our pleaſure or our happineſs.

V.

The natural motion which God continually imprints upon the Soul, to engage it to love him, or (to uſe a term which expreſſes ſeveral Ideas, and which can neither be equivocal nor confuſed, after the

the definition I have given thereof) the *will* is determined towards particular goods, either by clear and distinct knowledge, or by a confused sentiment which shews us these goods. If the mind neither sees nor tastes any particular good, the motion of the Soul continues, as it were, undetermin'd, it tends towards good in general. But this motion receives a particular determination, as soon as the mind has an idea or sentiment of any particular good: for the Soul being incessantly moved towards good indetermin'd, she must be moved as soon as any object seems to be good to her.

VI.

Now, when the good which is present to the Understanding and Senses, does not altogether fill these two faculties; when it appears under the idea of a particular good, which does not contain all goods; and when it is tasted by a sentiment which does not fill all the capacity of the Soul, she must still further desire the sight and enjoyment of some other good; she may suspend the judgment of her love; she need not to rest in the actual enjoyment, but may by her desires seek after some new object. And seeing her desires are the occasional cause of her knowledge, she may, by the natural and necessary union of all Spirits with him, who contains the ideas of all goods, discover the true good; and in the true good, a great many other particular goods, different from what she saw and tasted before. Thus, being acquainted with the vacuity and vanity of sensible goods attending to the secret reproaches of reason, and to the remorse of her conscience, to the complaints and

and threatnings of the true good, who will not that we ſhould ſacrifice him to apparent and imaginary goods; ſhe may (by the motion which God imprints continually upon her, after good in general, or the ſoveraign good, that is, towards himſelf) ſtop her carrier after any good whatſoever. She may reſiſt all ſenſible perſwaſives, ſeek and find other objects; compare them betwixt themſelves, and with the indeleble idea of the ſoveraign good; and love none of them with a determined love. And if this ſoveraign good makes it ſelf to be taſted, ſhe may prefer it to all particular goods; tho the ſweetneſs which they ſeem to transfer into the Soul be very great and very agreeable. Theſe Truths muſt be further explain'd.

VII.

The Soul is carried towards good in general; ſhe deſires to poſſeſs all goods, and would never confine her love; there is no good which appears ſo to her, that ſhe refuſes to love: Therefore, while ſhe actually enjoys any particular good, ſhe has yet a motion to go further; ſhe ſtill deſires ſome other thing, by the natural and invincible impreſſion God puts into her; and to change or divide her love, it is ſufficient to preſent unto her another good, than that which ſhe enjoys, and to make her taſte the ſweetneſs of it. Now the Soul may ordinarily ſeek and diſcover new goods; ſhe may alſo come near and enjoy them. For, in ſhort, theſe deſires are the natural or occaſional cauſes of her knowledge. Objects diſcover themſelves to her, and approach unto her proportionally, as ſhe deſires to know them. An ambitious perſon,

ſon, who conſiders the ſplendour of ſome dignity, may alſo think of the ſlavery, of the conſtraint, of the real ills which accompany humane greatneſs. He may calculate, weigh and compare all things together, if his paſſion does not blind him: For, I confeſs, there are times, when the paſſions entirely rob the mind of its liberty; and they always do diminiſh it. Thus, ſeeing any dignity how great ſo ever it may appear, is not accounted by a Man free and reaſonable, as the univerſal and infinite good; and ſince the will generally reaches to all goods, this Man, who is perfectly free and reaſonable, may ſeek and find others, ſeeing he may deſire them: for 'tis his deſires which diſcover and preſent them unto him. He may examine and compare them with that which he enjoys. But becauſe he can meet with none but particular goods upon earth, he may and ought here below continually and without intermiſſion ſeek and enquire; or, rather, that he may not change every moment, he ought generally to neglect all theſe tranſient goods, and deſire only thoſe which are immutable and eternal.

VIII.

Nevertheleſs, ſeeing Men do not love to ſearch, but to enjoy, ſeeing the labour of examination is at preſent very troubleſome; but reſt and enjoyment always very pleaſant, the Soul ordinarily ſtops as ſoon as ſhe has found any good; ſhe fixes upon it, that ſhe may enjoy it. She deceives her ſelf, becauſe by deceiving her ſelf, and judging that ſhe has found that ſhe ſeeks, her deſire is chang'd into pleaſure; and pleaſure renders her more happy than deſire. But her happineſs can-

not laſt long. Her pleaſure being ill grounded, unjuſt, and deceitful, it preſently troubles and diſquiets her, becauſe ſhe would be truly and ſolidly happy. Thus the natural love of good awakens and produces new deſires in her: Theſe confuſed deſires repreſent new objects. Seeing the Soul loves pleaſure, ſhe runs after thoſe which communicate it, or ſeems to communicate it; and becauſe ſhe loves repoſe, ſhe takes up with them. She does not at firſt examine the defects of the preſent good, whilſt it prevents her by its ſweetneſs; ſhe conſiders it rather on the fair ſide; ſhe applies her ſelf to that which charms her; thinks of nothing but enjoying it. And the more ſhe enjoys it, the more ſhe loves it; the nearer ſhe approaches to it, the more ſhe conſiders it. But now the more ſhe conſiders it, the more defects ſhe diſcovers in it: and ſince ſhe deſires to be invincibly happy, ſhe cannot for ever be deceived. When ſhe is hungry, thirſty, and tired with ſeeking, ſhe preſently ſatiates, and fills her ſelf with the firſt good ſhe meets; but ſhe preſently diſguſts the nouriſhment for which Man was not made. Thus the love of the true good ſtill excites in her new deſires after new objects; and being in continual change, all her life and all her happineſs upon earth, conſiſts only in a continual circulation of thoughts, deſires, and pleaſures. Such is the condition of a Soul which makes no uſe of its liberty, which ſuffers its ſelf to be lead, at all adventures, by the motion which tranſports her, and by the fortuitous impreſſion of objects which determine her. This is the condition of one whoſe mind is ſo weak, that he always takes falſe goods for the true; and a heart

heart ſo corrupted, that he ſells and blindly gives himſelf up to all that affects him, or the good which makes him actually feel the moſt ſweet and agreeable pleaſures.

IX.

But a Man perfectly free, ſuch as we conceive *Adam*, immediately after his creation, clearly knows, that God only is his good, or the true cauſe of the pleaſures which he enjoys. Tho he feels ſweetneſs by the approach of objects which are about him, he does not love them, he only loves God; and if God forbids him to unite himſelf to bodies, he is ready to forſake what pleaſure ſo ever he finds therein. He will not take up, but in the enjoyment of the ſoveraign good: to him he will ſacrifice all others; and how much ſo ever he deſires to be happy, or to enjoy pleaſures, no pleaſure is too ſtrong for his knowledge. Not but that pleaſures may blind him and diſturb his reaſon, and fill the capacity which he has of thinking: for the mind being finite, all pleaſure may diſtract and divide it. But the reaſon is, becauſe (tho pleaſures be under the Command of his Will) he was not cautious to keep himſelf from being intoxicated therewith: becauſe the only invincible pleaſure is that of the bleſſed, or that which the firſt Man would have found in God, if God would have prevented or hindred his fall; not only becauſe this pleaſure fills all the faculties of the Soul, without troubling Reaſon or engaging it in the love of falſe goods; but alſo nothing oppoſes the enjoyment of this pleaſure, neither the deſire of perfection, nor that of happineſs. For whilſt we love God, we are perfect; whilſt we love him, we

are happy; and when we love him with pleaſure, we are perfect and happy both together. Thus the moſt perfect liberty is that of minds, to which no motion towards particular goods is ever invincible; it is that of Man before ſin, before concupiſcence had diſturbed his underſtanding and corrupted his heart. And the moſt imperfect liberty is that of a mind, to which every motion, after any particular good, how little ſo ever it appears, is always and in all circumſtances invincible.

X.

Now, betwixt theſe two ſorts of liberty, there are infinite degrees more or leſs perfect, which is not commonly obſerved. Men ordinarily imagine, that liberty is equal in all Men, and that it is a faculty eſſential to their minds, the nature of which continues always the ſame, tho its action varies according to the different objects. Men, who don't reflect, ſuppoſe a perfect equality in all things where they do not ſenſibly obſerve an inequality. They comfort and excuſe themſelves from all application, by giving to all things an abſtracted form, whoſe eſſence conſiſts in a kind of indiviſibility. But they deceive themſelves: liberty is not ſuch a faculty as they imagine. There are no two perſons equally free, in reſpect of the ſame objects. Children are leſs than Men, who have the full uſe of their reaſon; and there are no two Men who have their reaſon equally firm and aſſured in reſpect of the ſame objects. They who have violent paſſions, and are not accuſtomed to reſiſt them, are leſs free than they who have generouſly oppoſed them and are naturally moderate: There

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are no two Men equally moderate, equally ſenſible, as to the ſame objects, and who have equally contended for the preſervation of their liberty. There are alſo perſons ſo enſlav'd to ſin, that they do leſs reſiſt, and leſs think of reſiſting whilſt they are awake, than good Men do whilſt they ſleep: for, according to the Word of Truth, *He that commits ſin, is the ſervant of ſin.*

XI.

It is true, according to the inſtitution of nature, all Men are equally free: for God does not invincibly engage minds to love any particular good. But concupiſcence corrupts the heart and reaſon: and Man, having loſt the power of obliterating the traces of ſenſible pleaſures, and ſtopping the motions of his concupiſcence, this liberty, equal in all Men, if they had not ſinned, is become unequal, according to the different degrees of their knowledge, and their concupiſcence which differently acts in them. For even concupiſcence its ſelf, which is equal in all Men, as they have loſt the power which they had over their bodies, is unequal a thouſand ways, by reaſon of the diverſity which is to be found in the conformation of their bodies, in the multitude and motion of the animal ſpirits, and in the almoſt infinite relations and connexions which are made, by their concerns in the World.

XII.

Still further, to diſcern more diſtinctly the inequality which is to be found in different perſons, it muſt be obſerved, that any Man who is perfectly reaſonable and free, and who would be truly happy, may and ought, when any pleaſant object preſents

ſents its ſelf, ſuſpend his love, and carefully examine whether this object be the true good, or whether the motion which carries him after it, do exactly agree with that which carries after the true good. Otherwiſe he would love by inſtinct, and not by reaſon; and if he could not ſuſpend the judgment of his love before he had examined it, he would not be perfectly free. But if he ſhould clearly ſee, that this pleaſant object ſhould be truly good for him; and if this evidence joyn'd to the ſentiment be ſuch, that he could not ſuſpend his judgment, then tho perfectly free, yet he is not ſo in reſpect of this good; he invincibly loves it, becauſe pleaſure and knowledge do agree in recommending it: But ſince there is none but God who can act in us, or be our good, ſince the motion which thruſts us forward towards the creatures, does not agree with that which carries us towards God: any Man, who is perfectly reaſonable and free, may hinder himſelf from judging that ſenſible objects are goods: he may and ought to ſuſpend the judgment which governs, or ought to govern his love; for he can never evidently ſee that ſenſible goods are true goods, becauſe he can never evidently ſee that which is not.

XIII.

This power of ſuſpending the judgment, which actually governs the love; this power which is the principle of our liberty, and by which it is that pleaſures are not invincible, is much leſſened ſince ſin, tho not altogether annihilated. And that we may have this power, when any object tempts us, it is neceſſary, beſides ſome love of order, to have preſence of mind, or be ſenſible of remorſe of con-

conſcience; for a Child, or a Man aſleep, has not actually this power. But all Men are not equally inlightned; the minds of ſinners are full of darkneſs. Conſciences are not equally tender; the heart of ſinners is hardened. The love of order and actual graces are unequal in all Men. Therefore all Men are not equally free: they have not an equal power of ſuſpending their judgment; pleaſure determines, and carries them towards ſome objects, rather than others. Such an one can ſuſpend his judgment, or ſtop his conſent, tho the preſent object may make him feel a very lively and ſenſible pleaſure: And another has ſo little a mind, and a heart ſo corrupted, that, to him the leaſt pleaſure is invincible, the leaſt affliction inſupportable. Not being accuſtomed to withſtand ſenſible invitations, his diſpoſition is ſuch, that he'll not ſo much as think of reſiſting them. So that, at this time, he has no power of ſuſpending his conſent; ſeeing he has not ſo much as the power of reflecting thereon: In reſpect of this object, he's like a Man that is aſleep, or one who has loſt his mind.

XIV.

The weaker reaſon is, the more ſenſible the Soul becomes, and judges more raſhly and falſly of ſenſible goods or evils. When a Man is in a ſlumber, if a ſtraw or feather doth but tickle him, he inſtantly awakes, as much affrighted, as if a ſerpent had bitten him. He looks upon this little uneaſineſs, and judges of it, as one of the greateſt afflictions; to him it ſeems inſupportable. His reaſon being weakened by his ſlumber, he cannot ſuſpend his judgment; the leaſt goods or evils

are almoſt always invincible to him. The ſenſes act in him, and they always judge raſhly: This muſt be ſo for many reaſons. When reaſon is not ſo weak, little pleaſures are not invincible, nor little evils inſupportable: we do not always purſue after that wherein we find moſt pleaſure. For there are pleaſures ſo little, that reaſon deſpiſes them; for reaſon always ſuppoſes ſome love of order: It cauſes Men to be not ſo much affrighted at the ſight of little evils; to reſolve, for example, on having a Vein opened, and to endure it; not to judge ſo raſhly, to ſuſpend, to examine; and the ſtronger reaſon is, the more it will ſuſpend the judgment, notwithſtanding the ſenſible attractives and horrours. Now, nothing is more certain, than that all Men do not equally partake of reaſon, tho all do partake thereof; that all are not equally ſenſible, at leaſt, of the ſame objects; that they are not equally born, educated, aſſiſted by the grace of J. C. and that, upon theſe accounts, they are not all equally free, or capable, to ſuſpend the judgment of their love, in reſpect of the ſame objects.

XV.

Now it ought to be obſerv'd, that the principal duty of Spirits is, to preſerve and encreaſe their liberty; becauſe it is only by the good uſe they ſhall make thereof, that they may merit their happineſs, if they be aſſiſted by the grace of J. C. and, at leaſt, leſſen their miſery, if they be left to themſelves. That which diminiſhes our liberty, or that which makes pleaſures with reſpect to us invincible, is becauſe the light of our reaſon is clouded; and we have loſt the power which we ought

ought to have over our bodies. Man therefore ought to inform his reaſon by continual meditations; he ought to conſider his duties, that he may fulfil them; and his weakneſſes, that he may have recourſe unto him who is all our ſtrength. And ſince we have loſt the power of ſtopping the impreſſions which are made upon the body by the preſence of objects, and which afterwards corrupt the underſtanding and heart, we ought to fly theſe objects; we ought to uſe that power which we have remaining; we muſt be continually careful to purifie our imagination, and even labour with all our ſtrength to obliterate the traces which falſe goods have imprinted thereon; ſince theſe traces excite in us ſuch deſires as diſtract our liberty. By this means, a Man, whoſe liberty is almoſt annihilated, in reſpect of whom, all pleaſures, how little ſo ever, are invincible, may acquire ſuch a ſtrength and liberty, that he will not be inferiour to the greateſt Souls, aſſiſtances being ſuppoſed equal. For at the time at leaſt when theſe pleaſures do not ſolicite to evil, he may ſeek to avoid them; he may fortifie himſelf by ſome reaſon, which, by propoſing future pleaſures, may counter balance thoſe which he does not actually enjoy. For as there is no perſon who has not ſome love of order, ſo there's no Man who may not vanquiſh a weak and light pleaſure by a ſtrong ſolid reaſon, by a reaſonable fear of ſome evil, or by the hope of greater good. In ſhort, there's none who may not at leaſt, by the ordinary ſuccours of grace, overcome certain pleaſures and avoid others. Now theſe pleaſures, before invincible, or how ever eagerly purſued, being conquered or avoided, a Man

may

may prepare himſelf to encounter others, at leaſt before they attempt him. For the ſweetneſs which he taſtes after the victory, encourages him to the fight; the joy of a good conſcience, and the grace of J. C. give courage; and even the fear of being overcome is not unuſal: for it may make him repair to him, in whom we may do all things; it makes us wiſely avoid dangerous occaſions. Thus, by this exerciſe, we always gain; for, to conclude, if we be overcome, we thereby become more humble, more wiſe, more circumſpect, and ſome times alſo even more zealous in the fight, and better able to vanquiſh or reſiſt.

XVI.

As in the ſtudy of Sciences, they who do not conſent to the falſe light of probability, and accuſtom themſelves to ſuſpend their judgment till the light of truth ſhall appear, ſeldom fall into errour; whereas the common ſort of Men are deceived every moment by their raſh judgments. In like manner, in the government of Manners, they who uſe to ſacrifice their pleaſures to the love of order, and daily mortifie their ſenſes and their paſſions, eſpecially in things which may appear to be of the leaſt conſequence (which all the World may do) will acquire, even in the moſt important things, a facility of ſuſpending the judgment which governs the love. Pleaſure does not ſurpriſe them like other Men, or at leaſt does not carry them down the ſtream, without thinking thereon. On the contrary, when they feel it, it ſeems to give them notice to take care of themſelves, and conſult Reaſon, or the Rules of the Goſpel. They have a more tender and delicate Conſcience, than they,

they, who according to the Language of the Scripture, *drink in ſin like water:* they are ſenſible of the ſecret reproaches of reaſon, and the wholſom advertiſements of inward truth. So that the habit of reſiſting weak and light pleaſures, is ſome progreſs towards the vanquiſhing the more violent, or at leaſt towards the ſuffering ſome pain and ſhame, when a Man is overcome; which, in a ſhort time, will give an horrour and diſguſt thereof. Thus liberty encreaſing by little and little, and perfected by the uſe made of it, and the aſſiſtance of Grace, may, at laſt, be able to fulfil even the moſt difficult Commandments; becauſe by ordinary graces, which are every moment given to Chriſtians, we may overcome common temptations, we may, in an ordinary way, avoid the greater, and by the aſſiſtance of the grace of J. C. there is none which we may not vanquiſh.

XVII.

It is true, that when the caſe is ſo, that a Man is ſurpriſed by pleaſure, he is not in a condition ſo much as to think of reſiſting it; 'tis true, I ſay, that this Man cannot actually fulfil the Commandment, which forbids him to enjoy it, for this pleaſure is to him invincible.

Thus, ſuppoſing this perſon had this impotence by a natural neceſſity, his ſin not being free, it would make him no more culpable; I mean, no more worthy to be puniſh'd with grief, than if he had been irregular in his ſleep. Likewiſe, if this impotence ſhould have been the neceſſary conſequence of ſins, even freely committed before his converſion, it will not be imputed to him, becauſe of his charity. But ſince he ought and might reſiſt

ſiſt pleaſure, contend for the preſervation and encreaſe of his liberty, have recourſe unto him by Prayer, in whom we may do all things; this ſin, tho actually committed by a kind of neceſſity, renders him culpable and worthy to be puniſhed; if not upon the account of this ſin, yet at leaſt for the negligence, which is the principle of it. The commandment of God is not abſolutely impoſſible; even the ſinner himſelf ought and may, for reaſons already mentioned, put himſelf in a condition to obſerve it: becauſe Men ought, and may continually labour to augment and perfect their liberty, not only by the aſſiſtance of the grace of J. C. but alſo by their own natural ſtrength, or by the ordinary graces; for, in ſhort, Nature may be made ſerviceable to Grace a thouſand ways.

THE SECOND PART.

Of Grace.

XVIII.

THE inequality which is to be found in the liberty of different perſons, being clearly underſtood, it will not, in my opinion, be difficult to comprehend, how Grace acts in us, if to the word *Grace*, we joyn clear and particular Ideas; and if the

the difference between the Grace of the Creator and the Grace of the Redeemer be obſerv'd. I have already ſaid, in the foregoing Diſcourſe, that there is this difference betwixt Knowledge and Pleaſure, that Knowledge leaves us intirely to our ſelves, but Pleaſure makes an attempt upon our Liberty: For Knowledge is without us; it does not touch or modifie our Souls; it does not puſh us on towards the Objects it diſcovers; it only makes us capable to determine our ſelves, or to conſent, with freedom and reaſon, to the impreſſion which God gives us towards Happineſs. The knowledge of our Duty, the clear Idea of Order, ſeparated from all ſentiment, the dry, abſtracted, altogether pure and intelligible ſight of good, that is to ſay, without taſte or foretaſte, leaves the Soul in a perfect liberty: But Pleaſure is in the Soul; it touches and modifies it. Thus it leſſens our liberty, it makes us love good rather by the love of Inſtinct and unaccountable Paſſion, than by the love of Choice and Reaſon; it tranſports us, as I may ſay, towards ſenſible Objects. Nevertheleſs, this is not to be underſtood, as if Pleaſure was the ſame thing with Love, or the motion of the Soul to good; but becauſe it produces it, or determines it towards the object which renders us happy. Since none but thoſe Truths, whereof we have clear Ideas, can be demonſtrated, and ſince we have none ſuch of our inward ſentiments, it is impoſſible, that I ſhould demonſtrate that which I here maintain, as the conſequences which depend upon common Notions, are demonſtrated. Every one therefore muſt conſult the inward ſentiment which he has within himſelf, if he

he would be convinc'd of the difference there is betwixt Knowledge and Pleasure; he must also carefully observe, that ordinarily Knowledge is accompanied with Pleasure, from which nevertheless it ought to be separated, that we may judge solidly thereof.

XIX.

If then it be true, that Pleasure naturally produces Love, and that it is as it were a weight, which makes the Soul incline to the good, which causes it or seems to cause it, it is visible, that the Grace of J. C. or the Grace of Sentiment, is efficacious in its self. For tho the preventing delectation, when it is weak, may not wholly convert the Hearts of those who have very lively Passions, nevertheless it always has its effect, in that it always carries Men towards God; it is always efficacious in some sense, but it has not always all the effect which it might have, because concupiscence opposes it.

XX.

For example, In one of the Scales of a Balance there is a Weight of ten Pounds, and a Weight of six Pounds only in the other; this last Weight truly weighs: for if enough be put therein, or taken out of the other Scale; or, lastly, if the Balance be hung nearer the Scale which has more weight in it, this weight of six Pound will turn the Balance: But tho this Weight weighs, it is plain, that its effect always depends upon the Weights which resist it, and the manner after which they resist it. Thus the Grace of Sentiment is always efficacious in its self, it always lessens the effort of Concupiscence, because Pleasure naturally

rally excites Love for the cauſe which produces it, or ſeems to produce it. But tho this Grace be always efficacious in its ſelf, it depends, or, rather, its effect depends upon the actual diſpoſitions of him to whom it is given. The Weights of Concupiſcence reſiſt it, and ſenſible Pleaſures which tie us to the Creatures, (which ſeem to produce them in us) hinder the Pleaſures of Grace from uniting us ſtrictly to him, who is only capable to act in us and render us happy.

XXI.

But it is not the ſame of the Grace of Knowledge, or of the Grace of the Creator. It is not efficacious of its ſelf; it does not tranſport the Soul; it does not give it any motion; it leaves it freely to its ſelf. But tho it be not efficacious of its ſelf, it fails not to be attended with many effects, when it is great, and animated with ſome grace of ſentiment, which gives it vigour and ſtrength; or elſe when it finds no contrary pleaſure, which do much reſiſt it. This is the difference betwixt the Grace of the Creator, and the Grace of the Redeemer; betwixt Knowledge, and Pleaſure; betwixt the Grace which doth not ſuppoſe Concupiſcence, and the Grace which is given to counter-balance the Pleaſures of Concupiſcence. The one is ſufficient to a Man perfectly free and fortified by Charity; the other is efficacious in a weak Man, to whom Pleaſure is neceſſary, that he may be drawn to the love of the true good.

XXII.

But the ſtrength and efficacy of Grace ought always to be compar'd with the action of Concupiſcence, with the light of Reaſon, and eſpecially with

with the degree of Liberty that Perſon hath to whom it is given. And it ought not to be imagined, that God diſpenſes it by particular Wills, with a deſign it ſhould produce in us certain effects and nothing more: For when it is ſaid, that Grace always produces in the Heart the effect for which God gave it, we are deceived, if we ſuppoſe, that God acts, like Men, with particular deſigns. God diſpenſes his Grace with a general intention, that it may ſanctifie all thoſe who receive it, or as the occaſional cauſe determines him to diſpenſe it; nevertheleſs, he ſees very well, that in ſome Perſons it will not have all the effect it will have in others, not only by reaſon of the inequality of ſtrength in reſpect of Grace, but alſo the inequality of reſiſtance in reſpect of Concupiſcence.

XXIII.

Since Concupiſcence has not altogether deſtroy'd Humane Liberty, the Grace of J. C. as efficacious as it is, is not abſolutely invincible; Senſible Pleaſure may be overcome whilſt it is weak. The jugdment of Love may be ſuſpended when a Man is not hurried along by ſome violent Paſſion; and when he yields to the courtſhip of this falſe Pleaſure, he is to be blamed for the ill uſe of his liberty. In like manner the delectation of Grace is not ordinarily invincible, the good Motions which it inſpires, and which ſeparate us from the falſe good we love, may be oppos'd. This Grace does not ſo fill the Soul, as to draw it along towards the true good, without choice, without underſtanding, without free conſent. Thus when a Man reſigns himſelf to its motion, when a Man goes faſter, as I may ſay, than it invincibly drives,

drives, when he ſacrifices the pleaſures which leſſen its efficacy; or, in ſhort, when he acts by reaſon, or loves the true good as he ought to love it, he then merits by the good uſe which he makes of his Liberty.

XXIV.

It is true, that the delectation of Grace, conſidered in its ſelf, and without reſpect to the pleaſures of Concupiſcence which are contrary thereunto, is always invincible; becauſe this Holy Pleaſure being agreeable to the light of Reaſon, nothing can hinder its effect in a Man perfectly free: When the Mind clearly ſees by the light of Reaſon, that God is its happineſs, and has a lively ſenſe thereof by the taſte of pleaſure; it is impoſſible but that it ſhould love him. For the Mind deſires to be happy, and then nothing hinders it from following the agreeable motions of its love; it ſuffers no remorſe oppoſite to its preſent happineſs, and is not reſtrain'd by pleaſures contrary to that which it enjoys. The delectation of Grace therefore is not invincible: The love alſo which it produces is not Meritorious, if it be not greater than this delight; I mean, the love which is meerly the natural or neceſſary effect of the delectation of Grace, has nothing Meritorious in it, tho this love be always good in its ſelf: For he that goes no faſter than he is driven, or rather, no further than he receives preſent pay for, has no right to be rewarded. When a Man loves God no farther than he is drawn, or only becauſe he is drawn, he does not love him by reaſon, but by inſtinct; he does not love him as he deſires, and ought to be belov-

ed. But when he loves God by Choice, by Reaſon, by the Knowledge which he has of his Amiableneſs, then he Merits: He Merits when he advances, as I may ſay, towards the true good, after pleaſure has only determined the motion of love.

XXV.

This reaſon alone demonſtrates, either that the firſt Man was not carried to the love of God by the blind inſtinct of pleaſure; or at leaſt, that this pleaſure was not ſo lively as that which he felt from the ſight of his natural perfections, or in the actual uſe of ſenſible goods: For 'tis evident, that this pleaſure would have rendred him impeccable; this pleaſure would have put him into a ſtate like to that of the Bleſſed, who do no longer Merit; not becauſe they are not now in the Condition of Travellers; (for Spirits always Merit, when they do Actions in themſelves Meritorious, and God being juſt, it is neceſſary they ſhould be rewarded for them) but they Merit no more, becauſe the pleaſure which they find in God is equal to their love, becauſe they are altogether wrap't up in him; and [becauſe] being delivered from all kind of grief and every motion of Concupiſcence, they have no longer any thing to ſacrifice to God.

XXVI.

For that which renders a man impeccable, does not altogether make him incapable of Meriting: J. C. was impeccable, yet, nevertheleſs he Merited his own glory and that of the Church, of which he is the Head. Since he was perfectly free, he loved the Father, not by the inſtinct of Pleaſure, but

but by Choice and Reaſon; he loved him becauſe he ſaw, by intuition, how lovely he was. For the moſt perfect Liberty, is, that of a Mind which has all poſſible Knowledge, and is not determined by any Pleaſure: For all Pleaſure, preventing or other, naturally produces ſome love; and if Pleaſure be not reſiſted, it efficaciouſly determines the motions of the ſoul towards the agreeable object: But Knowledge, how great ſoever it be conceived, leaves the mind perfectly free; ſuppoſing that this Knowledge be conſidered ſingly and without any Pleaſure.

XXVII.

Seeing J. C. is nothing but the Word, or Reaſon Incarnate, certainly he ought not to love the true good with a blind love, with the love of inſtinct, with the love of ſentiment; he ought to love him with reaſon. He muſt not love a Being infinitely Amiable, and which he knows to be perfectly worthy of his love; as Men love thoſe goods which are not Amiable, and which they cannot know to be worthy of their love: He ought not to love the Father with a love any wiſe like unto that by which Men love the vileſt Creatures, by which they love Bodies. His love, that it may be pure, or at leaſt perfectly Meritorious, ſhou'd by no means, be produced by preventing Pleaſures: For Pleaſure, may and ought to be the reward of lawful love, as it really is at preſent in the Saints and in J. C. himſelf. But it cannot be the principle of Merit; it ſhould not prevent Reaſon if it be not very much weakned. Now Reaſon in J. C. was no wiſe weakned: Sovereign Reaſon in him ſupported Created Rea-

ſon. J. C. not being ſubject to the motions of Concupiſcence, he had no need of preventing delectation, to counter-ballance the ſenſible pleaſures which ſurprize us; perhaps he would not taſte even the Pleaſure of joy, or the Pleaſures which naturally follow'd the knowledge which he had of his Virtue and Perfections; to the end, that being deprived of all ſorts of Pleaſures, his Sacrifice might be more Holy, more Pure, and more diſintereſted. Laſtly, it may be, beſides the privation of all preventing Pleaſures and others, he inwardly ſuffered thoſe *Horrible deſertions*, which ſouls filled with Charity, cannot better expreſs than by being forſaken of God; according to thoſe words of J. C. upon the Croſs, *My God, my God, why haſt thou forſaken me?* But if you will have J. C. to be carried on even by preventing Pleaſures, to the love of the Father, it is neceſſary to ſay, according to the Principles which I have laid down, either that he loved him with more zeal than he taſted Pleaſure; (ſince natural love, which the inſtinct of Pleaſure produces is not at all Meritorious) or, at leaſt, that he Merited by the ſenſible griefs, and by the continual Sacrifice he freely and voluntarily offered unto God. *For it became him to Suffer, that he might enter into his Glory*, as the Scripture teaches us.

Luke 24. 26. Acts 17. 3.

XXVIII.

If the delectation of Grace, without reſpect to any contrary Pleaſure, infallibly turns the Conſent of the Will, the ſame cannot be ſaid of the Pleaſures of Concupiſcence. Theſe Pleaſures conſidered in themſelves, and without reſpect to actual

al Pleaſures, are not always invincible. The light of Reaſon Condemns them, remorſe of Conſcience gives us an Horror of them; a Man may ordinarily ſuſpend his Conſent. Thus the Grace of J. C. is ſtronger than Concupiſcence: It may be called Victorious Grace, becauſe it is always Maſter of the Heart, when its Impreſſion is equal to that of Concupiſcence. For when the Ballance of our Heart is in *Equilibrio*, by the equal weights of two contrary Pleaſures, the moſt ſolid and moſt reaſonable always turns it; becauſe, Knowledge always favours its efficacy, and Remorſe of Conſcience oppoſes the action of Falſe Pleaſure.

XXIX.

From all which has been ſaid, it may be concluded, that we always Merit when we love the true good by Reaſon; and we do not Merit at all when we love it by Inſtinct. We always Merit when we love the true good by Reaſon; becauſe, Order requires that the true good ſhould be loved after this manner, and becauſe Knowledge alone does not tranſport or invincibly carry us towards the good which it diſcovers. We do no wiſe Merit when we love the true good by Inſtinct, or ſo far as Pleaſure invincibly tranſports or determines the Mind; becauſe, Order requires that the true good, or the good of the Mind, ſhould be loved by Reaſon, by a Free love, by a love of Choice and Diſcretion; and, becauſe the love which Pleaſure alone produces, is a Blind, Natural and Neceſſary love. I confeſs that when a Man goes further than he is carried by Pleaſure, he Merits; but this is becauſe he acts by Reaſon, and as Order requires he ſhou'd

act, for that love which he has above the Pleasure, is a Pure and a Reasonable love.

XXX.

In like manner it must be Concluded, that a Man always demerits when he loves false goods by the instinct of Pleasure; provided that he loves them more than he is invincibly engaged to love them. For when we have naturally so little Liberty and Capacity of Mind, that Pleasure invincibly transports us; tho we be irregular, and our love be bad and against Order, we do not demerit: For to demerit, I mean to deserve to be punish'd, a Man must run after false goods with more earnestness, or go farther than Pleasure invincibly carrys him. For it must be observed, that there is a great deal of difference, betwixt a Good action and a Meritorious Action, betwixt an irregular action, and an action which deserves to be punished; the love of a Just Person is often irregular in sleep, and yet deserves not to be punished. Whatsoever is conformed to Order, is good, and all that is contrary thereunto, is bad; but nothing Merits or Demerits, but the good or ill use of Liberty, or that wherein we have some share. Now a Man makes a good use of his Liberty, when he follows his Knowledge, when he goes on, as I may say, freely and of himself towards the true good; whether he be at first determined by the preventing delectation, or by the light of Reason: When he sacrifices sensible Pleasures to his duty, and conquers grief by the love of Order. On the contrary, he makes an ill use of his Liberty when his Pleasure is his Reason; when he sacrifices his

duty

duty to his paſſions, his perfection to his preſent happineſs, his love of Order to Self-love; and does all this at the time when he is not really forced thereunto. I ſhall ſtill explain this more clearly.

XXXI.

When two Objects preſent themſelves to the mind of Man, and he will chuſe one of them, I confeſs that he will never fail to determine himſelf on that ſide where he ſhall find moſt Reaſon and Pleaſure, on that ſide, where he'll ſee moſt good. Since the ſoul cannot will or love, but by the love of good, (the will being nothing but the love of good, or the natural motion of the ſoul towards good) ſhe infallibly loves that which has moſt conformity with that which ſhe loves invincibly. But it is certain, that when ſenſible Pleaſures, or ſome ſuch like thing, does not diſturb the Mind, a Man may always ſuſpend the judgment of his love, and not determine himſelf eſpecially in reſpect of falſe goods; for the ſoul can have no evidence, that falſe goods are true goods, nor that the love of theſe falſe goods does perfectly agree with the motion which carrys us towards the true good. Thus, when a Man loves falſe goods, at the time when his ſenſes and paſſions do not altogether diſturb his Reaſon; he demerits, becauſe then he may and ought to ſuſpend the judgment of his love. For if he had ſtaid a while to have examined what he ought to have done, this falſe good would ſoon have appeared much the ſame as it is; Remorſe of Conſcience, and perhaps even the delectation of Grace, would have changed all the diſpoſitions of his mind and

heart: For the condition of a Traveller has nothing fixed, a thouſand different objects preſent themſelves continually to his mind, and the life of Man upon Earth is only a continual ſucceſſion of thoughts and deſires.

XXXII.

It ſeems, at firſt, that in reſpect of the true good, Man cannot ſuſpend the judgement of his love; for we cannot ſuſpend our judgment, but when the evidence is not full. Now we cannot but ſee that it is moſt evident, that God is the true good, and that alſo none but he can be good to us; we know that he is infinitely more Amiable, than we can comprehend: But it muſt be obſerved, that tho we cannot ſuſpend the judgment of our Reaſon in reſpect of ſpeculative truths, when the evidence is full; yet we may ſuſpend the judgment of our love, in reſpect of good, what evidence ſoever there is in our Ideas.

For, when Sentiments fight againſt Reaſon, when Taſte oppoſes Knowledge, when we ſenſibly find that to be bitter and ungrateful, which Reaſon clearly repreſents as ſweet and agreeable, we may chuſe whether we will follow our Reaſon or our Senſes. We may act, and indeed often do act, againſt our Knowledge; becauſe when we attend to Sentiment, Knowledge is loſt, if we do not uſe violence to retain it; and becauſe we ordinarily attend more to Sentiment than to Knowledge, becauſe Sentiment is more lively and agreeable than the moſt evident Knowledge.

XXXIII.

It is pleaſure which makes minds actually happy: Upon this account we ought to enjoy Pleaſure,

ſure, when we love the true good, the mind thinks upon God, if it draws near to him by its love and taſtes no other ſweetneſs. On the contrary, God ſometimes fills it with bitterneſs and deſolation, He forſakes, He rejects it, as I may ſay, not that it ſhould ceaſe to love him, but rather that its love may be more Humble, more Pure, and more Meritorious: In ſhort, He commands it to do ſome things which makes it actually Miſerable. But if it draws near to Bodies, it finds it ſelf happy, proportionably happy as it is united to them; certainly that is a temptation, what Knowledge ſoever one may have, for we invincibly deſire to be happy. So that a Man Merits very much if fixing upon his Knowledge, he denies himſelf, notwithſtanding all uncomfortable deſertions; if he ſacrifices his actual happineſs to the love of the true good, if living by Faith and truſting in the Promiſes of God, he continues inviolably true to his duty. It therefore plainly appears that J. C. might Merit his Glory, tho he moſt evidently knew the true good; becauſe having a great love for his Father, he intirely ſubmitted himſelf to his orders, without being carried thereto by preventing Pleaſures: Becauſe altogether complying with his Knowledge, he ſuffered very great Afflictions, and ſacrificed all the moſt lively and ſenſible Pleaſures to the love of God. For he took a Body, as we have, that he might have a * victim to offer unto God, and by his Body, as the occaſional or natural cauſe, receiving a great number of divers ſentiments, he might ſacrifice himſelf as an Holocauſt, in Honour of the true good, by ſuffering afflictions, * Heb. 8. 3.

ons, and the privation of ſenſible Pleaſures.

XXXIV.

That I may not leave in ſome Perſons an imperfect Idea of the Grace of J. C. I think I ought further to ſay, that it doth not conſiſt in delectation alone, for all Grace of ſentiment is the Grace of J. C. Now of this ſort of Grace there are ſeveral kinds, and of each kind infinite degrees. God ſometimes gives diſguſt and bitterneſs to the objects of our paſſions; he weakens their ſenſible perſwaſives, or cauſes us to have an horror of them, and this kind of grace of ſentiment has the ſame effect as delectation. It re-eſtabliſhes and fortifies our Liberty, it puts us almoſt in *Equilibrio*, ſo that by this means we are in a condition of following our Knowledge in the motion of our love. For to put a Ballance in a perfect *Equilibrio*, or to change the inclination, it is not neceſſary to increaſe the Weights which are too weak; it is ſufficient to take ſomething from thoſe which weigh too much. Thus there are Graces of Sentiment of ſeveral kinds, and each kind is capable of infinite degrees; for there are Pleaſures, Horrors, and Diſguſts, greater and leſſer to infinity. That which I have hitherto ſaid of delectation, may be eaſily applyed to other kinds of Graces of Sentiment: I only took pleaſure or delectation as a particular example that I might explain my ſelf more clearly, and without equivocation. If there be any other principle of our determinations to good, beſides the Grace of Sentiment and that of Knowledge, I confeſs to me they are altogether unknown; and it is upon this account that I have explained the

effects

effects which are neceſſary to the converſion of the heart, only by theſe two Principles, leſt I ſhould have been accuſed, of having ſpoken in general terms and ſuch as only excite confuſed Ideas, which I have avoided with all poſſible care. But tho I have explained my ſelf only in ſuch terms as all Men underſtand, ſince there is no perſon who knows not, that Knowledge and Sentiment of good are the principles of our determinations; nevertheleſs I don't pretend to oppoſe thoſe, who not making uſe of theſe clear Ideas ſay in general, that God works in the ſouls of Men their Converſion by a particular action, different perhaps from all that I have ſaid here * and elſewhere, that God doth in us. Since I experience nothing in my ſelf but Motion towards good in general, and Knowledge or Sentiment which determines this Motion; I ought to ſuppoſe nothing elſe, if by this alone, I can give a reaſon of all that which the Scripture and the Councils have defined, concerning the ſubjects of which I treat. In a word, I am ſure, that Knowledge and Sentiment, are the Principles of our determinations, but I declare, that I know not whether there may be ſomething elſe, of which I have no knowledge.

* Firſt Explicat. of the *Search after Truth.*

XXXV.

Beſide Grace, efficacious in it ſelf, and the Grace the effect of which depends intirely upon the good diſpoſitions of the Mind, beſides the Grace of Sentiment and the Grace of Knowledge; the Juſt alſo have Habitual Grace, which makes them agreeable to God, and puts them in a condition of doing actions Meritorious of Salvation.

This

This Grace is Charity, the Love of God, the Love of Order; Love which is not properly Charity, if it be not ſtronger and greater than all other Loves. As it is Pleaſure which ordinarily produces the love of the object which cauſe it or ſeems to cauſe it; ſo it is the delectation of Grace which produces the love of God: It is the enjoyment of ſenſible pleaſures, which encreaſes Concupiſcence: It is alſo the Grace of Sentiment which augments Charity. Concupiſcence diminiſhes by the privation of ſenſible Pleaſures, and then Charity is eaſily preſerved and encreaſed. Charity alſo diminiſhes by the privation of the actual Grace of J. C. and Concupiſcence is eaſily encreaſed and fortified: For theſe two loves of Charity and Concupiſcence, continually engage one another, and ſtrengthen themſelves by the weakneſs of their Enemy.

XXXVI.

All that proceeds from Charity, is agreeable to God, but Charity does not always act in the juſt themſelves. To the end it may act, it ought, at leaſt, to be enlightned; for Knowledge is neceſſary to determine the motion of Love. Thus the Grace neceſſary for every good work relating to Salvation, is the Grace of Sentiment in thoſe who begin their Converſion; it is the Grace of Knowledge, it is ſome motion of Faith and Hope in thoſe who are animated by Charity. For the Juſt may do good works without the Grace of delectation, yet they have always need of ſome actual ſuccours to determine the motion of their Charity. But tho Charity without Delectation is ſufficient to vanquiſh many temptations, never-

theleſs, the Grace of Sentiment is neceſſary in many occaſions. For Men cannot, without the continual aſſiſtance of the ſecond *Adam*, reſiſt the continual action of the firſt: They cannot perſevere in righteouſneſs, if they be not often aſſiſted by the particular Grace of J. C. which produces, augments, and ſuſtains Charity, againſt the continual efforts of Concupiſcence.

XXXVII.

The effects of Pleaſure, and all the ſentiments of the Soul, depend a thouſand ways, upon the actual diſpoſitions of the Mind. The ſame weight has not always the ſame effects: Its action depends upon the machine by which it is applyed with reſpect to the contrary weights. If a ballance be unequally hung, the force of the weights being unequally apply'd, the weaker may turn the ſtronger. It is the ſame of the weights of pleaſure, they act one upon another, and determine the motion of the Soul, as they are differently applyed. Pleaſure muſt have more effect in one who has already a love to the Object which cauſes the pleaſure, than in him who has an averſion to it, or who loves the oppoſite goods. Pleaſure forcibly determines him who clearly ſees, or lively imagines the advantages of the good which ſeems to produce it; and it acts weakly upon the mind of him who knows this good only confuſedly, or contemns it.

In concluſion, pleaſure acts with all its force in him who blindly follows that which flatters Concupiſcence; and may perhaps have no effect in him who has attain'd to ſome habit of ſuſpending the Judgment of his love.

XXXVIII.

XXXVIII.

Now the different degrees of Knowledge, Charity, Concupiſcence, and the degrees of Liberty being every moment combin'd after infinite ways, with the different degrees of actual pleaſures; and theſe pleaſures not having their effect, but according to the relation which they have to the diſpoſitions of the mind and heart: It is plain, that no finite mind can judge, with any aſſurance, what effect any particular Grace will produce in us: For beſides the Combination of all that which concurs to make it efficacious, or to produce its effect, contains ſomething infinite. This Combination is not like the ſprings and machines, whoſe effects are always infallible and neceſſary. Thus, no ſpirit can diſcover what paſſes in the heart of man; but God being infinitely wiſe, it is plain that he clearly knows all the effects which may reſult from the mixture and combination of all things, and that diving into the heart of man, he infallibly diſcovers, even the effects which depends upon the free act, or rather conſent of our wills. Nevertheleſs, I confeſs that I cannot conceive how God can diſcover the Conſequences of thoſe Actions which have not their infallibility from his abſolute degrees. But I cannot prevail with my ſelf, to engage in Metaphyſicks at the expence of morality, and to maintain Opinions contrary to my inward ſentiment, as undeniable Truths; or to ſpeak to the ear a certain Language, which in my Opinion, ſays nothing clearly to the mind. I know very well that Objections may be made, which I may not be able clearly and evidently to Anſwer; but this perhaps may

may be, because even these Objections themselves may be full of obscurity and darkness: Because they are grounded upon our ignorance of the properties of the Soul; because, as I have * elsewhere proved, we have not a clear Idæa of what we are; and because that which is in us which suffers its self to be overcome by those determinations which are not invincible, is altogether unknown to us. To Conclude, if I cannot clearly Answer these Objections, * I can Answer them by other which yet seem more difficult to resolve. I can from the principles opposite to mine, draw more hard and invidious Consequences than those which are pretended to follow from that Liberty which I suppose to be in us. But I will not enter particularly upon this, because I take no pleasure in walking in the dark, and leading others into precipices.

* Expli. of the 7. Ch. lib. 2. part. 3.

* First Explicat.

The

The First Explication OF THE TREATISE OF Nature and Grace.

What it is to Act by General Wills, and what by Particular.

I.

I Say that God acts by *General Wills*, when he acts in consequence of the General Laws he has established: For Example, I say that God acts in me by General Wills, when he makes me feel pain by the prick of a pin; because in consequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the Union of Soul and Body, which he hath established, he makes me feel grief or pain when my body is indisposed. In like manner, when one bowl strikes upon a second; I say, God moves this last by a General Will, because he

he moves it in conſequence of the general and efficacious Laws of the communication of motions; God having in general appointed, that whenſoever two bodies ſtrike upon one another, the motion ſhould be divided betwixt them in certain proportions, and 'tis by the efficacy of this General Will, that bodies ſhould move one another.

II.

On the contrary, I ſay that God acts by particular wills, when the efficacy of his will is not determined by any general law to produce the effect. Thus, ſuppoſing that God makes me feel the pain of the pricking of a pin, tho there happens not in my body, or in any other Creature, any change which determines him to act in me according to general Laws; I ſay, that then God acts by *particular wills*.

Likewiſe, ſuppoſing that a body begins to move without being ſtruck upon by another, or without any change happening in the will of any Spirits, or any other Creature which determines the efficacy of any general Laws; I ſay then, that God moves this body by a *particular will*.

III.

According to theſe definitions, it appears that I am ſo far from denying providence, that on the contrary, I ſuppoſe that it is God who acts all in all; that the nature of the Pagan Philoſophers is a *Chimæra*, and that properly ſpeaking, that which is called Nature, is nothing elſe but the general Laws which God has eſtabliſh'd for the making or preſerving his Work after the moſt ſimple ways, by an action always uniform, conſtant, perfectly worthy of infinite wiſdom, and the univerſal cauſe.

That which I here ſuppoſe, tho certain, for reaſons which I have elſewhere given, is not abſolutely neceſſary to prove what I intend: For if it be ſuppos'd that God has communicated his power to Creatures, and that bodies which are about us, have a real and true force, by which they may act upon our ſoul, and render it happy or miſerable by pleaſure or grief; and that bodies in motion have in themſelves a certain entity, which is called a *Quality imprinted*, which they give to thoſe they meet, and give it with that readineſs and uniformity which they ſuppoſe, it will be equally eaſie for me to prove that which I deſign; for then the efficacy of the action of the Concourſe of the general cauſe will be neceſſarily determined by the action of the particular cauſe. God, for example, will be oblig'd according to theſe principles, to afford his concourſe to a body at the moment wherein it ſtrikes upon others: But this body may communicate motion to them, and this is certainly to act by vertue of a general Law. Nevertheleſs, I don't reaſon according to this ſuppoſition, becauſe I believe it altogether falſe; as I have ſhewed in the Third Chapter of the Second Part of the Sixth Book of *The Search after Truth*, in the Explication of the ſame Chapter, and elſewhere. Theſe Truths ſuppoſed, I here ſubjoyn the Marks by which it may be known, whether an effect be produc'd by a general will, or by a particular.

Marks, by which it may be judged, whether an effect is produced by a General, or by a Particular Will.

IV. When

IV.

When we ſee an effect immediately follow the action of an occaſional cauſe, we ought to judge that this effect is produced by the efficacy of a general will. A Body is immediately moved after it is ſtruck; the ſtriking of bodies upon one another is the occaſional cauſe: therefore this body is mov'd by a general will. A Stone falls upon the head of a Man and kills him; and this ſtone falls as others do, I mean, that its motion is continued almoſt according to Arithmetical Proportion, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, *&c.* This ſuppoſed, I ſay that it is moved by the efficacy of a general will, or according to the Laws of the communication of motion, as it is eaſie to demonſtrate.

V.

When we ſee an effect produc'd, and yet the occaſional cauſe which is known to us, is not concern'd therein, we have reaſon to think that this effect is produc'd by a paticular will, ſuppoſing that this effect be not viſibly unworthy of its cauſe, as I ſhall ſhew hereafter. For example, when a body is mov'd without being ſtruck upon by another, it is very probable that this body is moved by a particular will; nevertheleſs we are not altogether aſſur'd thereof: For ſuppoſing there ſhould be a general Law, that bodies ſhould be moved according to the different wills of Angels, or any other ſuch like, it is plain that this body might be moved tho it was not ſtruck; ſince the particular will of any Angel, according to this ſuppoſition, might determine the will of the general cauſe to move it.

Thus we may be often assured that God acts by general wills; but we can never be assur'd, that he acts by particular wills, even in the best attested miracles.

VI.

Since we don't sufficiently know the divers combinations of occasionalc auses, to discover whether such and such effects happen in consequence of their actions; since we are not, for example, knowing enough to discern, whether such a shower of rain be produc'd by the necessary consequence of the communication of motions, or by a particular will; we ought to judge that an effect is produced by a general will, when it is plain that the cause is not designed for a particular end: For the wills of intelligent beings have necessarily some end; general wills, one general end; and particular, a particular end: Nothing is more evident.

For example, tho I can't discover, whether the rain which falls in a meadow, falls there in consequence of general laws, or by the particular will of God: I have reason to think, that it falls therein by a general will; if I see that it falls as well upon the neighbouring Lands, or into the River which runs by this Meadow, as upon the Meadow its self. For if GOD caused it to rain upon this Meadow, by a particular good will which he has for the owner thereof, this rain would not fall into the River where it is useless; since it could not fall therein without a cause, or a will in God, which necessarily has some end.

VII.

But it is still much more reasonable to think, that

that an effect is produced by a general will, when the effect is contrary, or else useless to the design which faith or reason teaches us the cause proposes to himself.

For Example, the end which God proposes in the divers sensations which he gives to the soul, when we taste different fruits, is that we should eat those which are proper to nourish the body, and reject others; I suppose this to be so. Therefore, when God gives us a grateful sentiment at the time when we eat poison, or fruits that are poisoned, he does not act in us by particular wills. We ought to judge thus; for this grateful sentiment is the cause of our death, and God does give us our sentiments, that he may preserve our life by a suitable Nourishment. I say again, I suppose it thus; for I onely speak in relation to Grace, which God gives us doubtless for our Conversion; so that it is plain, that God does not dispence it to men by particular wills, since it often renders us more culpable, and more criminal, and God cannot have such a fatal Design. God therefore does not give us a grateful sentiment by particular wills, when we eat poison'd fruit. But since poison'd fruits excite in our brain motions like unto those which good fruits produce there, God gives us the same sentiments, by the general Laws which unite the soul to the body, to the end that she may take care of its preservation.

In like manner God does not give to those who have lost an arm, sentiments of grief relating to this arm, but by a general will; for it is useless to the body of this man for his soul to suffer grief

in relation to an arm which he has not. The ſame may be ſaid of the motions which are produced in the body of a Man which commits any crime: In ſhort, ſuppoſing we are obliged to think that God ſends rain upon the Earth to make it Fruitful, we cannot think that he diſtributes it by particular wills, ſince it rains upon the Sands and the Sea, as well as upon Cultivated ground; and it often rains ſo much upon ſound Land that the Corn thereby is ſpoiled, and Mens labours made uſeleſs.

Thus it is certain, that the rain which is uſeleſs and hurtful to the Fruits of the Earth, are the neceſſary conſequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions, which God hath eſtabliſhed to produce in the World the beſt effects; ſuppoſing that which I here repeat, that God intended not that the rain ſhould make the Earth to become barren.

VIII.

In ſhort, when any thing happens which is very ſingular, there's reaſon to think that it is not produced by a general will; nevertheleſs it is impoſſible to be aſſur'd thereof: For Example, * In a Proceſſion of the H. Sacrament, it rains upon the Company, but not upon the Altar-Cloath, or thoſe that carry it; there is reaſon to think that this happens by a particular will of the univerſal cauſe. Nevertheleſs we cannot be certain thereof, ſince an occaſional intelligent cauſe may have this particular deſign, and thus determine the efficacy of the general Law to execute it.

* Suppoſing there was any Reaſon for the Author's high Eſteem of that Ceremony, the Example ſerves his Purpoſe well enough.

IX.

IX

When the marks which preceed are not ſufficient ground for judging whether any effect be, or be not produced by a general will, yet we ought to think that it is produced by a general will, if it be evident that an occaſional cauſe is eſtabliſhed for ſuch like effects.

For example, it rains to very good purpoſe in a Field; we don't inquire whether it rains upon the High-ways: We know not whether it be hurtful to the neighbouring grounds, or no; we alſo ſuppoſe, that it does nothing but good, and that the circumſtances which accompany it are altogether agreeable to the deſign for which God would have it rain. Nevertheleſs, I ſay, that we ought to ſuppoſe this rain produced by a general will, if we know that God has eſtabliſhed an occaſional cauſe for ſuch like effects: For we ought not without neceſſity to have recourſe unto Miracles. We ſhould ſuppoſe that God acts by the moſt ſimple ways; and tho the owner of the Field ought to give thanks to God for this favour, yet it ought not to be imagined that God has vouchſafed it to him after a Miraculous manner, by a particular will.

The Maſter of the Field is bound to give thanks to God for the good which he has received; ſince God foreſaw and intended the good effect of this rain, when he eſtabliſhed the general Laws whereof it is a neceſſary conſequence. On the contrary, if rain be ſometimes hurtful to our Lands, ſince God did not eſtabliſh the Laws which make it rain to render them unfruitful, (a great drought being enough to make them barren) it is plain

that we ought to thank God and adore the wiſdom of his providence, even then when we do not feel the effects of the Laws which he hath appointed for our benefit.

X.

In ſhort, tho we ſhould not be aſſured by the circumſtances which accompany certain effects, that there is an occaſional cauſe eſtabliſhed to produce them; it is ſufficient to know that they are very common, and relate to the principal deſign of the general cauſe, to judge that they are not produced by a particular will.

For example, the Rivers which water the Earth relate to the principle of Gods deſigns, which is, that men ſhould not want neceſſaries for life; This I ſuppoſe. Moreover, Rivers are very common, therefore we ought to think that they are formed by ſome general Laws. For as there is more wiſdom required in executing deſigns by ſimple and general ways, than by ways compounded and particular, (as I think I have ſufficiently proved elſewhere) we ought to give this Honour to God, as to believe that his manner of acting is general, uniform, conſtant, agreeable to the Idea which we have of his infinite wiſdom.

Theſe are the marks by which it may be judged, whether an effect be or be not produced by a general will. I ſhall now prove that God diſpences Grace to Men by general Laws, and that J. C. was the occaſional cauſe of determining their efficacy. I begin with the Proofs drawn from H. Scripture.

XI.

Col. 2. 19. St. *Paul* teaches us, that J. C. is the Head of the

the Church, that he continually diſpences to her the Spirit which quickens her, that he forms the Members thereof, and animates them as the Soul does the Body; or, to ſpeak yet more clearly, the H. Scriptures teaches us two things.

Firſt, That J. C. Prays continually for his Members. Heb. 7. 25. 9. 24

Second, That his Prayers and Deſires are always heard. John 11. 42.

Whence I conclude, that he is appointed by God the occaſional cauſe of Grace, and alſo that Grace is never given unto Sinners but by his means.

Occaſional cauſes, do always and very readily produce their Effect. The Prayers or divers Deſires of J. C. relating to the formation of his Body, do always readily obtain their Effect. God refuſes nothing to his Son, as J. C. himſelf has taught us.

The occaſional cauſes don't produce their effect by their own efficacy, but by the efficacy of the general cauſe.

It is alſo by the efficacy of the power of God, that the ſoul of J. C. operates in us; it is not by the efficacy of the humane will: For this reaſon 'tis that St. *Paul* repreſents J. C. as Praying continually to his Father; for he is obliged to Pray, that he may obtain.

The occaſional cauſes are eſtabliſhed by God to determine the efficacy of his general wills; and J. C. according to the Scripture was appointed by God after his Reſurrection to Govern the Church which he had purchaſed with his own blood. For J. C. was the Meritorious cauſe of all Graces, by his

his ſacrifice; but after his Reſurrection he enter'd into the H. of Holies, a Sovereign Prieſt of good things to come, that he might appear in the preſence of God, and ſhed upon us the Graces which he had merited for us. Thus he himſelf applyes and diſtributes his gifts as the occaſional cauſe. He diſpoſes of all things in God's Houſe, as a well beloved Son in the Houſe of his Father.

I think I have demonſtrated, *in the Search after Truth*, that God only is the true cauſe, or acts by his own proper efficacy, and that he doth not communicate his Power unto Creatures, but by making them the occaſional cauſes of producing certain effects. I have proved, for example, that Men have no power to produce any motion in their bodies, but becauſe God hath made their wills the occaſional cauſes of theſe motions; and that fire has no power to cauſe pain in me, but becauſe God hath made the ſtriking of one body upon another the occaſional cauſe of the communication of motions, and the violent ſhaking of the nerves of my Fleſh the occaſional cauſe of my Pain. I may here ſuppoſe a Truth which I have largely proved, in *Chap.* III. *Part* 2. of *Book* IV. *of the Search*, &c. And in the Explication of the ſame Chapter, and which they, for whom I chiefly write, do not deny.

Now 'tis certain by Faith, that Power is given to J. C. for forming his Church; *Data eſt mihi omnis poteſtas in Cœlo & in terra:* This cannot be underſtood of J. C. according to his Divinity, for in this reſpect he never received any thing. 'Tis certain therefore, that J. C. according to his humanity, is the occaſional cauſe

Mat. 28. 18.

of

of Grace; ſuppoſing it proved, that God only can act upon Minds, and that ſecond cauſes have no efficacy of their own; which they who would underſtand my Sentiments, and judge of them, ought firſt to examine.

XII.

I ſay moreover, that no Perſon is ſanctified but by the efficacy of the Power which God has communicated to J. C. by eſtabliſhing him the occaſional cauſe of Grace: For if any ſinner was Converted by Grace, of which J. C. was not the occaſional cauſe, but only the meritorious; the ſinner having not received his new Life by the influence of J. C. he would not be a Member of the Body of which J. C. is the Head, after that manner in which St. *Paul* expreſſes it, in theſe words of the Epiſtle to the *Epheſians*. —— *That we may grow up into him in all things who is the Head, Chriſt; from whom the whole Body fitly joyned together, and compacted by that which which every joynt ſupplieth, according to the effectual working in the meaſure of every part, maketh encreaſe of the body unto the edifying it ſelf in love.* Which words do not meerly ſay that J. C. is the Meritorious cauſe of all Graces, but do more diſtinctly expreſs that Chriſtians are the Members of the Body of which J. C. is the Head; and that it is in him we encreaſe and live a life altogether new, and that it is by his inward operation, κατ' ἐνέργειαν, that his Church is form'd, that he was appointed by God, the only occaſional cauſe, who by his divers deſires and applications diſtributes thoſe Graces which God as the true cauſe ſends down upon men. Chap. 4. 16. See Col. 11. 19.

'Tis

'Tis for this reaſon St. *Paul* ſays, that Chriſtians are united to J. C. as to their root: *Radicati & ſuper ædificati in ipſo.* 'Tis for this reaſon likewiſe, that J. C. compares himſelf to a Vine, and his Diſciples to the Branches, who receive their life in him: *Ego ſum vitis, vos palmites.* 'Tis for this reaſon that St. *Paul* aſſures, that J. C. lives in us, and we in him; that we are riſen in our Head; that our Life is hid with God in J. C. In a word, that we already have eternal life in J. C.

Coloſſ. 2. 7.

Theſe and ſeveral other Expreſſions clearly ſhew, that J. C. is not only the meritorious, but alſo the occaſional, phyſical or natural cauſe of Grace; and that as the Soul informs, animates, and perfects the Body, ſo J. C. as the occaſional Cauſe, diſtributes to his Members thoſe Graces, which, by his ſacrifice, he hath merited for his Church.

For my part, I cannot comprehend, how any one can doubt of theſe Reaſons, nor upon what foundation a Truth ſo very edifying, and as ancient as the Religion of J. C. can be treated as a dangerous Novelty. I grant my Expreſſions may be new, but this is becauſe they appear'd to me very proper, diſtinctly to explain a truth, which I could only have confuſedly demonſtrated by too general terms. The words, *Occaſional Cauſes*, and *General Laws*, appear to me neceſſary, to make thoſe Philoſophers, for whom I wrote the Treatiſe of *Nature and Grace*, diſtinctly comprehend that which the generality of Men are content to know only confuſedly. Since new Expreſſions are not dangerous, but when they cover ſomething which is equivocal, or may occaſion ſome thought, con-

contrary to Religion, to ariſe in the mind, I do not think that any candid perſons, and who are skill'd in St. *Paul*'s Divinity, will be offended, becauſe I explain my ſelf after a particular manner, ſince it tends only to make us adore the Wiſdom of God, and to unite us ſtrictly unto J. C.

Objection I.

XIII.

It is objected againſt what I have ſaid, That neither Angels nor Saints of the Old Teſtament received Grace in conſequence of the deſires of the Soul of Jeſus, ſince this Holy Soul was not as yet: and thus, tho J. C. be the meritorious cauſe of all Graces, he is not the occaſional which diſtributes them to Men.

Anſwer.

In reſpect of Angels, I anſwer, That there is ſome probability that Grace was given to them once only. So that if we conſider things in this reſpect, I confeſs, that nothing oblig'd the Wiſdom of God, to eſtabliſh an occaſional cauſe for the ſanctification of Angels. But if theſe bleſſed Spirits be conſidered as Members of the Body whereof J. C. is Head, or if it be ſuppoſed, that they were unequally aſſiſted, I believe there is reaſon to think, that the diverſity of their Graces came from him who is Head of Angels as well as Men, and that in this capacity, he, by his ſacrifice, not only merited all Graces which God gave to his Creatures, but alſo diverſly applied theſe ſame Graces to them by his different deſires.

Since it cannot be denied, that J. C. along time before he was born or could merit, was the meritorious cauſe of Graces which were given to the

An-

Angels and Saints of the Old Teſtament, it muſt, in my opinion, be granted, that, by his Prayers, he might have been the occaſional cauſe of the ſame Graces a long time before they were ask'd. For there is no neceſſary relation between occaſional cauſes and the time of their producing their effects; and tho ordinarily theſe ſorts of cauſes do produce their effects at the very time of their action, nevertheleſs, ſince their action is not efficacious in its ſelf, ſeeing its efficacy depends upon the will of the univerſal cauſe, it is not neceſſary that it ſhould actually exiſt, that they may produce their effects.

Suppoſe, for example, That J. C. to day asks of his Father, that ſuch an one may receive ſuch an aſſiſtance at certain times of his life, the Prayer of J. C. will infallibly determine the efficacy of the general Will of God, which is to ſave all Men in his Son. This perſon ſhall receive theſe aſſiſtances, tho the Soul of J. C. actually thinks of quite another thing, and tho it ſhould never more think of that which it deſired for him. Now, the Prayer of J. C. which is already paſs'd, is not more preſent to his Father than the future; for whatſoever happens in all times is equally preſent to God. Thus, ſince God loves his Son, and knows, that his Son will have ſuch deſires, in reſpect of his Anceſtors, and the People of his own Nation, and alſo in reſpect of Angels, who were to enter into the Spiritual Edifice of his Church, and compoſe the Body of which he is the Head; he ſeems to have been obliged to accompliſh the deſires of his Son before they were made, to the end that the Elect, who were before his birth, and whom

whom he purchaſed by the merit of his ſacrifice, ſhould as particularly belong to him as others, and he ſhould be their Head as truly as he is ours.

I confeſs, it is convenient, that meritorious and occaſional cauſes ſhould go before their effects, rather than follow them; and even order its ſelf requires, that theſe cauſes and their effects do exiſt at the ſame time. For 'tis clear, that all merit ſhould be preſently rewarded, and that every occaſional cauſe ſhould actually produce its effect, provided that nothing hinder but that this may and ought to be ſo. But ſince Grace was abſolutely neceſſary to the Angels and to the Patriarchs, it could not be differ'd. As for the Glory and Reward of the Saints of the Old Teſtament, ſeeing it might be delay'd, it was expedient, that God ſhould ſuſpend its accompliſhment till J. C. was aſcended into Heaven and made an High-Prieſt over the Houſe of God, and began to uſe the ſoveraign power of an occaſional cauſe of all Graces, which he had merited by his Labours upon Earth. Thus we believe, that the Patriarchs did not enter into Heaven, till J. C. himſelf, their Head, their Mediator, and their Fore-runner, was therein entred. Nevertheleſs, tho it ſhould be granted, that God ſhould not have appointed an occaſional cauſe for all Graces given to the Angels and the Patriarchs, I do not ſee how it can be concluded, that at preſent J. C. does not diſpenſe to the Body of the Church that Spirit which gives it increaſe and nouriſhment; that he prays not for it, or that his Deſires or Prayers do not infallibly obtain their effect; or, in a word, that he is not the

the occaſional cauſe which applies thoſe Graces to to Men which he has merited for them.

Before J. C. God gave Grace by particular Wills. This I grant, if it be deſired; the neceſſity of Order requires it; the occaſional Cauſe could not regularly be ſo ſoon eſtabliſh'd; the Elect were but very few: But at preſent, when the rain of Grace is generally ſent upon all the World; when it falls not as heretofore upon a very few Men of one choſen Nation; when J. C. may or ought to be eſtabliſh'd the occaſional cauſe of the goods which he has merited for his Church, what reaſon is there to believe, that God ſhould ſtill work Miracles as often as he gives good Sentiments? For, certainly, all that God does by particular Wills is a Miracle, ſince it happens not by the general Laws which he has eſtabliſhed, and whoſe efficacy is determin'd by occaſional cauſes. But how can we think, that, to ſave Men, he ſhould work all thoſe Miracles which are uſeleſs to their ſalvation; I mean, that he ſhould give all thoſe Graces which they reſiſt, becauſe they are not proportioned to the actual ſtrength of their concupiſcence?

John 1. 17. St. *John* teaches us, that Chriſtians receive of J. C. abundant Graces, *becauſe*, ſays he, *the Law was given by* Moſes, *but true Grace by Jeſus Chriſt.* For, in truth, the Graces which were before J. C. ought not to be compared to thoſe which he diſtributed after his triumph. If they were miraculous, it muſt be thought they were very rare: Even the Grace of the Apoſtles, before the Holy Spirit was given to them, was not to be compared with thoſe which they received, when the Soveraign Prieſt of good things to come, being entred by

by his Blood into the Holy of Holies, by the ſtrength of his Prayers obtain'd, and by the dignity of his Perſon, ſent the Holy Spirit to animate and ſanctifie his Church. The ſtrange Blindneſs of the Jews, their groſs and carnal Sentiments, their frequent relapſes into Idolatry after ſo many Miracles, do ſufficiently ſhew, they had ſcarce any love for true goods; and the fearfulneſs of the Apoſtles, before they received the Holy Spirit, is a ſenſible mark of their weakneſs. Thus Grace, in this time, was very rare; becauſe, as yet, our Nature was not made in J. C. the occaſional cauſe of our Graces: as yet J. C. was not fully conſecrated a Prieſt, according to the Order of *Melchiſedech*, and his Father had not yet given him that immortal and glorious Life, which is the particular character of his Prieſthood. For it was neceſſary that J. C. ſhould enter into the Heavens, and receive the glory and power of being the occaſional cauſe of all goods, before he ſent the Spirit, according to the words of St. *John*, *The Spirit was not yet given, becauſe J. C. was not yet glorified:* And according to theſe words of Chriſt himſelf, *It is expedient for you, that I go: For if I go not, the Comforter will not come: But if I go, I will ſend him unto you.* Now, it is not to be imagined, that J. C. conſidered as God, is the Head of the Church. He has obtain'd this honour as Man: the Head and the Members ought to be of the ſame nature. It is as Man, that J. C. interceeds for Men: it is as Man, that he has received of God ſoveraign power over his Church. For ſince God does not interceed at all, he, as God, has not received that Name which is above every Name: he is equal to

Heb. 5. 5, 10. Heb. 7. 16, 17. John 7. 39. John 16. 7.

the Father, and absolute Master of all things by right of his birth.

These Truths are evident, and J. C. himself assures us of them, since he says, that his Father gave him power to judge Men, because he was the Son of Man. Thus we must not think, that those Expressions of Scripture, which teach us, that J. C. is the Author of Grace, ought to be understood of J. C. considered according to his Divine Person. For if this was so, I confess I should not have demonstrated, that he is the occasional cause of it; he would have been only the true cause thereof. But since it is certain, that the three Persons of the Trinity are equally the true causes of Grace, (seeing all the outward Operations of God are common to the three Persons) my Arguments cannot be denied, since the Holy Scripture says of the Son, and not of the Father, nor of the Spirit, that he is the Head of the Church, and that under this character he communicates Life to all the Members which compose it.

John 5. 22, 10 27.

Object. II.

XIV.

It is God who gives to the Soul of J. C. all Thoughts and Motions which it has in the formation of his Mystical Body. So that if on one hand the Wills of J. C. as natural and occasional Causes, determine the efficacy of God's general Will; on the other hand, it is God himself who determines the divers Wills of J. C. Thus it comes to the same thing; for assuredly the Wills of J. C. are always conformable to those of his Father.

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Answer.

I confeſs that the particular wills of J. C. are always conformable to thoſe of the Father, but this is not becauſe the Father has particular wills which anſwer to thoſe of the Son, and determine them: This is only becauſe the wills of the Son are always conformable to Order in general, which is neceſſarily the rule of the divine wills, and of thoſe which love God. For to love Order, is is to love God, it is to will what God wills; it is to be Juſt, Wiſe, Regular, in his love. The Soul of J. C. would form to the Glory of his Father the moſt Sacred, Magnificent and Perfect Temple that can be: Order requires this, for nothing can be made too great for God. All the divers deſires of this Soul, ever intent upon the Execution of its deſign, come alſo to it from God or the Word to which it is united. But the occaſional cauſes of all theſe thoughts, moſt certainly are its divers deſires, for it thinks on what it will.

Now theſe divers deſires are ſometimes altogether free; probably the thoughts which excite theſe deſires, do not always invincibly determine the Soul of J. C. to form and reſolve to execute them. It is equally advantagious to the deſign of Jeſus Chriſt, whether it be *Peter* or *John* who does that which the regularity of his work requires: It is true, that the ſoul of Jeſus Chriſt is not indifferent, as to what reſpects the glory of his Father, or that which Order neceſſarily requires; but it is altogether free in every thing elſe, nothing out of God invincibly determines its love. Thus it ought not to be wonder'd if it

have particular wills, tho there are no ſuch wills in God which determine thoſe of the ſoul of Jeſus Chriſt.

But I grant that the wills of Jeſus Chriſt are not free, I grant that his knowledge determines him to will, and always to will after a certain manner, in the conſtruction of his Church. But it muſt be Eternal Wiſdom to which his ſoul is united, which determines theſe wills; if it is not neceſſary for this end, to ſuppoſe particular wills in God. It muſt be obſerv'd, that the wills of the ſoul of J. C. are particular, or have not any occaſional cauſe which determines their efficacy, no, not the will of God. For the ſoul of J. C. not having an infinite capacity of thinking, his knowledge, and conſequently his wills, are limited. Thus 'tis neceſſary that his wills be particular, ſince they change according to his divers thoughts and applications: For it ſeems to me that the ſoul of J. C. otherwiſe employ'd in contemplating the beauties, and taſting the infinite ſweetneſs of the true good, ought not according to the rule of Order, to think at the ſame time upon all the Ornaments which it deſigns to beſtow upon his Church, and the different means of executing each of his intentions. J. C. deſiring to render the Church worthy of the infinite Majeſty of his Father, he deſires alſo to adorn it with infinite beauties, and that by ſuch means as are moſt conformable to Order. It is therefore neceſſary that he continually change deſires; infinite wiſdom is only able to preſcribe general Laws for executing his deſigns. Now ſeeing the future world muſt ſubſiſt eternally, and be infinite-

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ly more perfect than the present World, it was expedient that God should establish an intelligent occasional cause, and enlightned with divine wisdom, to the end that it might correct the defects which necessarily happen in works formed by general Laws. The striking of Bodies upon one another, which determines the efficacy of the general Laws of Nature, is an occasional cause without Understanding and without Liberty. Thus, it cannot be, but there must be Defects and Monsters in the World; which Defects it would be unworthy of the Wisdom of God to correct by particular wills.

But J. C. being an intelligent occasional cause, enlightned by Divine Wisdom, and capable of particular wills, as the particular necessities of his work require; it is plain that the future World will be infinitely more Perfect than the present; that the Church shall be without deformity, as Scripture teaches us, and that this work will be altogether worthy of the esteem of GOD himself.

After this manner it is, that the Eternal Wisdom renders, as I may say, to the Father that which it had taken from him; for not permitting him to act by particular wills, it seems as if it rendred him impotent. But being incarnate, it left God to act as became him, by the more simple and general ways, and yet produced a work in which the most enlightned understanding shall never be able to observe the least defect.

Ut ianotescat principalitatibus & potestatibus in cœlestibus per Ecclesiam multiformis Sapientia Dei. — πολυποικιλος σοφια.

XV.

After having proved by the Authority of Scripture, that the divers motions of the Soul of J. C. are the occasional causes, which determine the general efficacy of the Law of Grace, by which God would save all Men in his Son; 'tis necessary further in general to prove by reason, that we ought not to believe that God in the Order of Grace acts by particular wills. For tho by Reason without Faith it cannot be demonstrated, that God has established the wills of a God man, as the occasional cause of his gifts, it may nevertheless be known that he does not distribute them to Men by particular wills, and that by two ways, *a Priori* and *a Posteriori*, that is to say by the Idea which we have of God, and by the effects of Grace; for there is nothing but proves this Truth. See the proof *a Priori*.

A wise Being must act wisely; God cannot falsifie himself: His actions must bear the Character of his Attributes. Now God knows every thing, and foresees every thing; his understanding has no bounds: Therefore his manner of acting must bear the character of an infinite understanding. Now to chuse occasional causes, and establish general Laws for executing any work, denotes a knowledge infinitely more extended than to change wills every moment, or to act by particular wills: God therefore executes his designs by general Laws, the efficacy of which is determined by the occasional causes. Certainly it requires a more comprehensive understanding, to make a Watch, which according to the Laws of Mechanism shall go always and regularly, whether

ther a Man carries it about with him, or hangs it up, or gives it what ſhake he will; than to make one which cannot go truly, if he who made it does not every moment change ſomething in it according to the different poſtures in which he puts it: For ſurely, when there are a great many relations to compare and combine with one another, there needs a greater underſtanding. To ſee all the conſequences which may happen from a general Law, an infinite underſtanding is requiſite; but nothing of all this is to be foreſeen when one changes his wills every moment.

Therefore to eſtabliſh general Laws, and chuſe the moſt ſimple, and at the ſame time the moſt fruitful, is a way of acting worthy of him, whoſe Wiſdom has no bounds. On the contrary, to act by particular wills, ſhews a limited underſtanding, and which cannot compare the conſequences, or effects of cauſes leſs fruitful. The ſame truth may further be demonſtrated *a Priori* by ſome Attributes of God, as his immutibility, by which Mr. *de Cartes* proves, that every thing in motion deſcribes a right line, and that there is always an equal quantity of motion in the World, and other Truths. But theſe proofs *a Priori* are too abſtract to convince the generality of Men of the truth which I propoſe. It is expedient to prove it by the ſigns which I have heretofore given for diſcerning the effects which are produced by particular wills, from thoſe which are the conſequences of ſome general Law.

XVI.

God being infinitely wiſe, neither wills nor does any thing without end. Now Grace often falls

upon hearts ſo diſpoſed that it is unfruitful. Therefore it does not fall upon hearts by a particular will, but only by a neceſſary conſequence of general Laws, for the ſame reaſon that rain falls upon the Sand and on the Sea, as well as on Sown ground.

Tho God may puniſh ſinners, or make them more miſerable than they are, he cannot deſign to make them more culpable or more criminal. Now Grace ſometimes renders Perſons more culpable and more criminal, and God certainly knows that according to their actual diſpoſitions, the Grace which he gives them will have this ſad effect. Therefore theſe Graces do not fall upon corrupted hearts by the particular will of God, but by a neceſſary conſequence of general Laws which he has eſtabliſhed to produce better effects; for the ſame reaſon, that too much rain ſometimes ſpoils and putrifies the Fruits of the earth, tho God by his general will, cauſes it to rain to make them grow and encreaſe.

XVII.

If God intended that certain Lands ſhould be barren, he need only to ceaſe to will that the rain ſhould water them. In like manner, if God would that the hearts of ſome ſinners ſhould be hardned, it would ſuffice that the rain of grace did not water them, he needed only to leave them to themſelves, they would ſoon be corrupted.

Why ſhould we attribute to God a particular will, to make ſo ſevere a uſe thereof, and ſo irreconcileable with the price of the Blood of his Son? But ſome may ſay, God never had this deſign when he gave his Grace to ſinners. This doubt.

doubtleſs will appear more reaſonable, but if God gives his Grace by a particular will, he has a particular deſign. Now ſeeing his Grace has this ſad effect, God is fruſtrated in his intention, ſince he gave it with a particular deſign to do good to this ſinner. For I ſpeak not here of the Graces, or rather of the Gifts, which St. *Paul* explains in 1 *Cor.* Chap. 12. Ver. 9. I ſpeak of the Grace which God gives for the Converſion of him, to whom it is given; and not of thoſe Graces which God vouchſafes for the profit of others, ſuch as the gift of Prophecy, the diſcerning of Spirits, that of ſpeaking with divers Tongues, of Healing diſeaſes, and ſuch like.

When rain falls in ſuch abundance that the floods waſh away the root of the Fruits, it ought to be judged that this rain comes by the neceſſary conſequence of the general Laws which God has eſtabliſhed for better effects. In the mean time it is certain, that God might have ordained it by a particular will. For God to puniſh Men might will, that rains deſigned to make the Earth Fruitful, might render them barren upon ſome account. But it is not the ſame of the rain of Grace, ſince God could not diſpence it, with a deſign of puniſhing Men, much leſs of rendring them more culpable and more criminal. Thus 'tis ſtill much more certain, that the rain of Grace is diſpenſed by general wills than the ordinary rain. Nevertheleſs, moſt Men eaſily believe, that rains are the neceſſary conſequences of the general Laws of the communication of motions; and there are few who do not feel ſome difficulty in believing that God by general wills, gives us all thoſe

thoſe motions of Grace, the effects of which we hinder.

'Tis very probable that this difficulty comes, becauſe we naturally think that God acts much after the ſame manner that we do; and that he has every moment particular wills towards men, ſomething like thoſe which we have in reſpect of our Friends. For tho we confeſs with the mouth, that there are infinite differences betwixt Gods manner of acting, and ours; nevertheleſs, ſince we uſually judge others in reſpect to our ſelves, without reflecting thereon, few perſons when they would ſpeak of God, ſeriouſly conſult the Idea of a Being infinitely perfect.

And becauſe there is ſome appearance of novelty in that which I ſay, this cauſes ſome difficulty to the underſtanding, which reaſonably ſuſpects all that is not ordinary.

I particularly eſteem and honour all thoſe, who in matter of Religion, have a ſecret averſion for all novelties. They do not offend me at all, when they oppoſe my Sentiments, when this is the motive; and ſince their prejudices are very reaſonable, tho they ſhould even revile me, I ſhould not ceaſe to have a reſpect for them. For the diſpoſition of their mind is infinitely more reaſonable, than that of certain People, who readily embrace all that which carries in it the character of Novelty. Nevertheleſs, ſeeing I believe that Man ought to love and ſearch after the Truth with all his ſtrength, and communicate it to others, when he believes he has found it; I think having ſuppoſed all that Faith teaches us, I may or ought to diſcover that which may confirm it,

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or cauſe it to be embraced by all men. I might juſtifie this Sentiment by the Practice of the Fathers and the Authority of St. *Auguſtine* himſelf, who often exhorts Men to underſtand the truth which they already believe in the obſcurity of Faith. But I don't think there are any Perſons ſo unreaſonable, as to blame my conduct, how much prejudiced ſoever they may be againſt my Sentiments. Therefore I beg of thoſe who will give themſelves the trouble of reading what I have written, not to ſuppoſe that I am deceived, to ſuſpend their judgment, till they ſhall well comprehend my meaning; not to condemn me in general terms, nor raſhly to draw untoward conſequences from my meaning.

In matters ſo obſcure as thoſe of Grace, the advantage is always on his ſide who makes the on-ſet; and it is not juſt to make uſe of it. Men ought to act with equity, and without prejudice compare all the conſequences which may be drawn from different Sentiments, that at laſt they may embrace that which ſhall ſeem moſt conformable to the Goodneſs and Wiſdom of God. For he is not equitable, who without Examination condemns an Opinion, by reaſon of ſome invidious conſequences, which are always drawn from it, when the imagination is affrighted and prevented by contrary Sentiments.

XVIII.

I know, for example, that ſome perſons have ſaid that I make all Prayers uſeleſs, and that I take from Men that confidence which they ought to have in God; becauſe God acting by general wills, we ought not according to them to hope for Hea-

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ven by particular aſſiſtances. I own, that if this conſequence was contain'd in my Principles, they would be Falſe, Heretical, and Impious. For he that takes away the Hope and Truſt we ought to have in God, overturns Religion; and it is partly upon this account that I cannot be of their mind, who do the moſt oppoſe my way of reconciling Grace with Liberty. But my Principles are ſo far from leading Men to deſpair, that they ſhew to the Juſt, and even to Sinners (after a way which to me ſeems moſt comforting) the means of obtaining from God the things of which they ſtand in need.

For if we are Juſt, our Prayers are Meritorious, and if they be Meritorious, Order requires they ſhould be heard. And becauſe Order in reſpect of God himſelf, is a Law infinitely more inviolable than the Laws which he hath eſtabliſhed for the conſtruction of his work, he never fails to do that which Order preſcribes unto him. Thus the prayers of the Juſt are never uſeleſs: This I have ſhewn in the 19. *Article* of the ſecond Diſcourſe. But if we be ſinners, it is certain that our Prayers in themſelves are uſeleſs. Nevertheleſs we ought not to deſpair: *We have an advocate with the Father, Jeſus Chriſt the righteous. He came to ſave Sinners.* His Prayers are always and readily heard; let us Pray in his Name, or addreſs to him himſelf. Our Prayers will ſolicite him to form ſome deſires in our behalf; and his deſires are the occaſional cauſes which infallibly determine the efficacy of the general Law of Grace, by which God would ſave all Men in his Son.

1 John 2. 1. Mat. 9. 13. John 11. 42.

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This is what I have very largely proved in the ſecond diſcourſe. Thus I am ſo far from take-ing away the confidence which we ought to have in God, that I do by the Authority of the Scrip-ture, particularly ſhew what way we ought to take to obtain of God, the Graces which are neceſſa-ry for us. I therefore beg of the Readers, that they will do me the juſtice, as to examine my Sentiments without prejudice; and I am willing they ſhould afterwards judge of them according to their evidence. For I ſubmit all my thoughts, not only to the cenſures of the Church, (which, by an Authority to which I am always ready to refer my ſelf, has a right to make me quit them) but alſo to the judgement of particular perſons, by whoſe Advice I ſhall endeavour to profit.

The Second Explication,

Where 'tis proved that J. C. is figured every where in the Scriptures, and that even by the Events which were before the Sin of the First Man; to teach us that the Principle of God's designs, is the Incarnation of His Son.

MOſes, in the ſecond Chapter of *Geneſis*, thus relates the Marriage of the firſt Man: *The great Lord God cauſed a deep ſleep to fall upon* Adam, *and he ſlept, and he took one of his ribs, and cloſed up the fleſh inſtead thereof. And the rib which the Lord God had taken from Man, made he a Woman, and brought her unto the Man. And* Adam *ſaid, This is now bone of my bones, and fleſh of my fleſh: ſhe ſhall be called Woman, becauſe ſhe was taken out of Man. Therefore ſhall a Man leave his Father and his Mother, and cleave unto his Wife, and they ſhall be one fleſh.* St. *Paul* aſſures us, that this Carnal Marriage is a great Myſtery, that it is the Figure of the Spiritual Marriage of J. C. with his Church, and alſo that married perſons ought to conform themſelves to J. C. and his Church in the Duties which they are to pay to one another: See his words in the Epiſtle to the *Epheſians*, Chap. V. *Wives, ſubmit your ſelves unto your own Husbands, as*

as unto the Lord. For the Husband is the Head of the Wife, even as Christ is the Head of the Church: and he is the Saviour of the Body. Therefore as the Church is subject unto Christ, so let the Wives be to their own Husbands in every thing. Husbands, love your Wives, even as Christ also loved the Church, and gave himself for it, that he might sanctifie and cleanse it with the washing of Water by the Word. That he might present it to himself a glorious Church, not having spot or wrinkle, or any such thing: but that it should be holy and without blemish. So ought Men to love their Wives, as their own Bodies: he that loveth his Wife, loveth himself. For no Man ever yet hated his own flesh, but nourisheth and cherisheth it, even as the Lord the Church: For we are Members of his Body, of his Flesh, and of his Bones. For this cause shall a Man leave his Father and Mother, and shall be joyned unto his Wife, and they two shall be one flesh. This is a great Mystery; but I speak concerning Christ and the Church. We are the Members of the Body of J. C. formed of his Flesh and of his Bone, as *Eve* was of *Adam*. The Man shall leave Father and Mother and be joyned to his Wife, and with her shall make but one Body. This is a great Mystery, and I explain it of J. C. and his Church. * *Sacramentum hoc magnum est: ego autem dico in Christo & in Ecclesia.* * μυστήριον.

The Letter, which kills, because it does not raise the Mind up towards him who only gives Life, applies that solely to the first *Adam*, which is said chiefly to figure the second. But St. *Paul*, inspired with the same Spirit that *Moses* was, clearly explain'd the Mystery, which the other had only darkly proposed. He assures us, that what seems

ſeems to have been written of the firſt Man, and the firſt Woman, ought to be underſtood of J. C. and his Church. The firſt Marriage is a great Secret, for it figures the greateſt of our Myſteries, the Eternal Covenant betwixt J. C. and his Church: a Secret hid in God from all eternity, and revealed to Men in the fulneſs of times. *This is the Myſtery which hath been hid from Ages and Generations, but is now made manifeſt to his Saints: To whom God would make known what is the Riches of the Glory of this Myſtery among the Gentiles, which is Chriſt, in you the hope of glory*, Col. I. 26, 27. I confeſs, that ordinary Marriages are indiſſoluble: that married perſons leave their Father and Mother, and make together one ſtrict Society, and one Body: but theſe words of the firſt Man, *Wherefore Man ſhall leave Father and Mother*, may be applied to them; for J. C. proves, by the ſame words, that the Husband ought not to forſake his Wife, becauſe it is God who has joyned them together. But I maintain, that God has joyned them, to figure the greateſt of our Myſteries; that Marriages cannot be broken, becauſe J. C. will never forſake his Church of which he is the Spouſe; that the Marriage of Chriſtians is a * Sacrament, which diſpenſes Grace to thoſe who are contracted, becauſe it figures J.C. who communicates Spirit and Fruitfulneſs to his Church: In a word, that the firſt Marriage, and all which have been ſince, are tranſient figures of the eternal and indiſſoluble Marriage of J. C. with Men.

*Becauſe it figures Jeſus C. it may be called a SACRAMENT in the large & unreſtrain'd Senſe, but not according to the ſtrict and limited Senſe of the Word; as it ſignifies an Outward, Viſible ſign, which not only ſignifies but diſpences Grace.

Now

Now, the firſt Marriage was celebrated before Sin: God caſt *Adam* into an ecſtatical and myſterious ſleep; he formed out of one of his ſides, or (to ſpeak as the Scripture) he *built up* his Wife, which he deſigned to give him; he inſpired into him words prophetical of J. C. and, as yet, *Adam* had not ſinned: for, doubtleſs, all that the Scripture relates concerning the firſt Man, before his ſin, doth much more ſenſibly and expreſly repreſent J. C. than that which is written of him after his fall. Doth not this ſhew, that J. C. and his Church, is the firſt and chief of God's deſigns, ſince 'tis evident, that the Figure muſt be for the ſake of the Reality, and not the Reality for the Figure?

When God created the firſt Man, he made him according to his Image, becauſe he thought of him who is the Image of the inviſible God; he animated him with his Breath, * becauſe he then had the deſign of uniting his Word to our Nature, which he foreſaw would become altogether earthly and carnal by ſin; he made him Lord of all Animals, becauſe he intended to ſubject all things to J. C. God, by the ſleep, into which he caſt the firſt Man, expreſs'd the death, or ſleep of his Son upon the Croſs; and by the Woman, whom he drew out of his Fleſh and his Bones, the Spouſe which J. C. received after he awoke, (or was riſen) and which he purchaſed by his Blood. If *Adam* ſinned, it was not according to St. *Paul*, becauſe he was tempted, but through his fondneſs to his Wife, 1 *Tim.* II. 14. J. C. likewiſe was not ſubject to ſin, and if he was made ſin, as the Scripture ſpeaks, it was in love to his Church. If *Adam* ſinned, and

* Tertul. de Reſurrect. Carnis. Cyril. Alex. Theſ. p. 153. Athanaſ. Orat. 3. in Arianos.

2 Cor. 5. 21.

communicated his sin to all his Posterity, he is, even in this (tho in a contrary sence) the figure of J. C. who only dispences Grace to Men. *Wherefore, as by one Man, Sin entered into the World, and Death by Sin; and Death passed upon all Men.*

Rom. 5. 12. 14. —— *Death reigned from* Adam *to* Moses, *even over them who had not sinned after* Adam's *transgression; who is the* * *figure of him who was to come.*

* τύπος.

These words, *who is the figure of him, who was to come*, in the place where they are, put it out of doubt, that the first *Adam* represented the second, even by Concupiscence it self; and the Death which he communicated to all Men, together with his Son. Hence it is, that St *Paul* makes so many Antitheses betwixt the Earthly Man, and the Man from Heaven. *The first Man,*

1 Cor. 15. 45. 47. *was made a living Soul; the second* Adam, *a quickning Spirit. The first Man, is of the Earth, Earthly; the second Man, is the Lord from Heaven.*

God, by the first Man and Woman, did not only represent J. C. and his Church; but also by the place into which he put them, by their posterity, especially those of them whose actions the Scripture doth largely recite. The Earthly Paradise, represented the Church; J. C. keeps and Cultivates it. The River divided into Four Streams to water this very Delightful and Fruitful place, is the Eternal wisdom, which enlightens, and animates the Church. *I also came out as a Brook from a River, and as a Conduit* * *into a Garden. I said, I will water my best Garden, and will water abundantly my Garden-bed.* It is written of the true *Solomon*, that his wisdom ran down abundantly, as the Rivers at the beginning

* Vulg. Lat. de Paradiso. Eccl. 24. 30. 31.

of

of Harveſt. *Who filleth all things with wiſdom, as Phyſon, and as Tygris in the time of the new fruits.* Eccl 24. 25,26,27 *He maketh the underſtanding to abound like* Euphrates. —— *He maketh the doctrine of Knowledge, appear as the Light, and as Geon in the time of Vintage.* The Tree planted in the middle of the Garden, which brought forth a Fruit able to make Men Immortal, is alſo the Eternal Wiſdom, according to the words of the *Proverbs* of *Solomon, She is a Tree of Life, to them that lay hold upon her, and happy is every one that retaineth her.* Prov. 3. 18. He who ſhall overcome the World, ſhall be nouriſhed with this Fruit; for certainly, theſe words of St. *John, To him that overcomes, it ſhall be given to eat of the Tree of Life, which is in the midſt of the Paradiſe of God,* Apoc. 11. 7. are to be underſtood of no other Trees but this. As for the other Tree, which teaches good and evil, and whoſe Fruits *Eve* found ſo Beautiful to the Eye, and Pleaſant to the Taſte; it repreſents ſenſible objects, which at preſent, excite in us ſuch a ſtrong Concupiſcence, and give Death to thoſe, who ſuffer themſelves to be ſurprized by their Charms: 'Tis plain, that all theſe relations would not be ſo exact, if they were no more than imaginary.

EVE had two Sons, *Cain* and *Abel*; they both offered their Sacrifice: God rejected that of *Cain*'s, and received that of *Abel*'s. Gen. 4. *Cain* was troubled hereat, and ſlew his Brother; the blood of *Abel* which was ſpilt cryed for Vengeance. God declared, that *Cain* ſhould be a Fugitive all his Life, and that he would hinder him from being ſlain. Doth not this ſufficiently repreſent the Synagogue, who being the Elder, yet offer-

ed not unto God a Sacrifice acceptable unto him: That the Sacrifice of Jesus Christ was only Worthy of GOD: That Jesus Christ was slain in *Abel*, by the *Jews* who were his Brethren, according to the Flesh: That for their Punishment, the *Jews* should be Vagabonds and Fugitives upon the Earth, as *Cain* was; and that God will not quite Destroy them, tho their Crime was such, that they might say, more truely than *Cain*, *All they who meet me will slay me.*

If we examine after matters of Fact, and those especially, whose Circumstances the Scripture more particularly recites, we shall see Jesus C. expected and figured every where; Expected, because of the promise which God had made, that the seed of the Woman, should break the Serpents Head, *Gen.* III. 15. And Figured, because the Spirit of God, takes pleasure in representing unto Men, him who was to be their Mediator, and render all the Work of God perfectly worthy of its Author.

I confess, that in these things we may be easily deceived, and that none but the Spirit of God can make us distinctly and without fear of error, see the *reality* of these Figures. But these Figures are so lively, and so express, that he must be strangely Stupid, who is not Affected with them; and very rash, who looks upon those as Ridiculous Persons and Visionaries, who according to the Example of the Apostles and Holy Doctors, seek Jesus Christ in the Scriptures, as he himself has Commanded us in these words,

words, *Search the Scriptures, for they are they, which Teſtify of me.* For, in ſhort, all that is in the Old Teſtament, relates to Jeſus Chriſt and his Church. —— *All theſe things happened to them in Figures.* John. 5. 39. 1 Cor. 10 11.

The Third Explication,

Where 'tis prov'd, that the chief of Gods deſign is J. C. and his Church; that God truely loves Men; that he ſincerely deſires to ſave all; that his Conduct is worthy of his Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Immutability, and other Attributes: What is the order of the decrees which contain the Predeſtination of the Saints.

I. BY this Term, [God,] I underſtand a Being infinitely Perfect.

II. A Being infinitely Perfect, Perfectly knows himſelf.

III. By the knowledge which he has of his Being, he ſees the Eſſences of all things; he ſees all poſſible Creatures, or all that which he is able to Produce: He is Wiſe by Himſelf alone.

IV. The Being infinitely Perfect, neceſſarily loves Himſelf; He can will nothing but by his will; I mean the love which he bears to himſelf: Therefore he can do nothing but for himſelf.

V. The Being infinitely Perfect, is Almighty; He can do all that he knows, ſuppoſing he can will it with a practical will.

VI. By a practical will, I mean a decree, or will executive of a deſign concluded upon; which ſuppoſes in God the knowledge and choice of the ways of acting which are moſt worthy of himſelf. For there are Simple, Fruitful, General, Uniform, and Conſtant; and there are Compounded, Barren, Particular, Irregular, and Unconſtant Ways of Actions. The firſt are to be preferred before the latter; for they ſhew Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Conſtancy, Immutability, in him that makes uſe of them: The other denotes the want of Underſtanding, Malignancy, Inconſtancy, Lightneſs of Mind.

VII. It is viſible, that there is ſomething uſeleſs in his action, who does that by compounded ways, which may be brought to paſs by ſimple; and he wants knowledge, who hath more Practical wills, when one ſufficeth.

VIII. The Conduct of a Good, Wiſe, Conſtant and Immutable Being, muſt carry in it, Wiſdom, Goodneſs, Conſtancy and immutability; Order requires this.

IX. The Wiſdom of God renders him Impotent in this ſence, that it permits him not to will certain things, nor to act after certain ways. It permits him not to will certain things; for if God had made but one animal, he could not have made it monſtrous, or given it uſeleſs or ill proportioned members, that being contrary to his wiſdom which he loves invincibly. It would not permit him alſo to act after certain ways; for,

ſup-

ſuppoſing that a work equally Perfect, might be produced by ways unequally Simple, Uniform, Conſtant, *&c.* God is impotent in this ſence, that he cannot chuſe the ways of acting which are leſs worthy of his Wiſdom, or which leſs reſemble his Goodneſs, his Immutability, or his other Attributes.

X. Thus God is Almighty, becauſe he does every thing that he undertakes to do; and becauſe there is nothing without him which can reſiſt him, or hinder him from executing his deſign.

'Tis not becauſe there is nothing, how irregular ſoever, which he cannot do; or, no ways of acting which he cannot obſerve: But let us ſuppoſe God to act.

XI. God cannot act but for himſelf; if he will act, 'tis becauſe he reſolves to do ſomething worthy of himſelf; but no Creature can give unto God an Honour worthy of him: All the Honour that meer Creatures can give, cannot be worth the action by which he produces them.

It is unworthy of God, to maintain that there is any thing in the Creature which can determine him to act; God therefore will do nothing, for he acts only for himſelf.

XII. God cannot receive any Honour worthy of himſelf, but from himſelf. No Perſon can Honour himſelf. God therefore can never be Honoured with an Honour worthy of him.

XIII. Nevertheleſs, I am ſenſible that I do actually exiſt. Therefore I can give unto God an Honour worthy of him: Therefore I am

Eternal, Uncreated, Divine, I am not made, and God can make nothing.

XIV. Further, I know that I offend God, and that I cannot satisfie him for my offences. Now God would not be offended, and would be fully satisfied. Therefore I am not the work of God; for if I was, God only acting for his glory, he would have been deceived in his designs.

XV. Nothing can satisfie God but God himself. Now one and the same Person cannot make satisfaction to himself. God therefore can never be satisfied for our offences.

The wicked therefore are not the work of God, they subsist whether he will or no; they cannot be annihilated. Behold consequences altogether false! But see them cleared up in two words, by my Principles, or rather the Principles of Christian Religion.

XVI. God cannot be Honoured with an Honour worthy of himself. He cannot be fully satisfied for our offences, if he himself does not undertake for them. Now no person Honours himself, or satisfies himself: Therefore there is in God a plurality of Persons. This is also that which Faith teaches us.

XVII. I am Created, therefore I can render to God an Honour worthy of himself. God is offended, therefore he may be fully satisfied. A Divine Person united to my nature, may sanctifie my devotions, and render them worthy of God. A Divine Person united to a criminal-nature may justifie and satisfie for it. This is the solution wherewith Faith supplies Reason when she is Non-plus'd; for Faith and Reason mutually sustain one another. XVIII.

XVIII. It is clear therefore, that tho Man had not ſinned, a Divine Perſon would have been united to the work of God, to ſanctifie it, and render it worthy of its Author; ſince it is neceſſary it ſhould ſubſiſt as I may ſay, in a Divine Perſon, to the end it might be worthy of him.

XIX. Men offend God, they cannot ſatisfie him for their offences; God foreſaw and permitted this: Therefore he had in view the ſatisfaction of his Son, which is full and entire; therefore the work of God repair'd is more worthy of God, and Honours him more than the ſame work before its corruption. God therefore, who acts for his glory, muſt neceſſarily have permitted ſin, which he foreſaw would come to paſs. All this is clear, and I have proved it elſwhere, but I ſpeak too much of it; for, at preſent, 'tis ſufficient, that the firſt and chief deſign of God was J. C. and his Church; that the preſent World was for the future, that the natural order was for the ſupernatural: And I prove it thus.

XX. God made all things for his glory, He loves that the moſt, which moſt Honours him: Now Jeſus Chriſt Honours him more than all Creatures put together, ſince J. C. is a Victim, and a Sovereign Prieſt, who infinitely Honours God. Therefore the chief of Gods deſigns, is J. C. and the Church, which is his Body, which, with J. C. offers but one Victim, and one Worſhip. For all Creatures have acceſs unto God, and pay their Obligations unto him, only in J. C. Therefore the Preſent World is for the Future; the Natural Order, for the Supernatural: this Succeſſion of Generations, to ſupply the living Temple, which

J C.

J. C. raiſes to the glory of his Father, with Materials. Every thing paſſes away, every thing tends to deſtruction, every thing vaniſhes; but Gods chief deſign (the Object in which he is well pleaſed) ſhall remain for ever.

XXI. The great deſign therefore of God, is, to build to his own Honour a Spiritual Temple, of which J. C. is the chief Corner-ſtone, the Architect, the Sovereign Prieſt, and Victim. His deſign is, that this Temple ſhould be as Large and Perfect as it can be, as far as its greatneſs and Perfection can conſiſt with one another. Thus God wills, that all Men ſhould enter into this Spiritual Building; for thereby it would become more ample. *God would that all Men ſhould be ſaved*, 1 *Tim.* II. 4. He hath alſo ſworn by his Prophet, that he wills not the Death, but the Converſion of the Wicked God alſo deſires, that Men ſhou'd merit the higheſt degrees of glory, *His will is our Sanctification*, 1 *Theſſ.* IV. 3. His Temple would thus be more Perfect. Certainly, if God loves Men, and the beauty of his work, theſe Truths cannot be denyed. Now all Men are not ſaved; there either are none at all, or very few Saints, but are capable of the higheſt Rewards, and of a more Illuſtrious Glory, than that which they poſſeſs; and no Creature, even Man himſelf, cannot hinder God from Converting and Sanctifying him, if God undertakes his Converſion and Sanctification; for God is the abſolute Maſter of Hearts. Therefore there muſt neceſſarily be ſomething in God himſelf, which hinders him from executing his wills, or rather from forming certain deſigns, or decrees.

XXII.

XXII. God in his infinite Wiſdom, ſaw all poſſible works, and all poſſible ways of executing them. He doth not blindly reſolve upon any deſign, but always compares the means with the end; He loves his Wiſdom, and he conſults it always. Now there are ſome ways of acting, more Simple, more Uniform, more Regular than others; and the Conduct of a Wiſe, and Immutable Being muſt carry in it the Character of Wiſdom, and immutability. Therefore the Wiſdom of God reſiſts his wills, in this ſenſe, that all his wills are not Practical wills. I do thus further explain my ſelf.

XXIII. God loves all Men. He would ſave all; he would ſanctifie all; he would make a beautiful work; he would make his Church as large and perfect as it can be: But God loves his Wiſdom infinitely more; he loves it invincibly; he loves it with a natural and neceſſary love. He cannot therefore diſpenſe with himſelf from acting after the wiſeſt manner, and which is moſt worthy of himſelf; or from following that Conduct which ſuits beſt with his Attributes. Now, God acting by the moſt ſimple ways, and moſt worthy of his wiſdom, his work cannot be more beautiful and more ample than it is. For if God, by ways equally ſimple, could have made his Church more ample and more perfect than it is, he would not, acting as he hath done, have made a work moſt worthy of himſelf; he would alſo have hated Men before he had eſtabliſhed his Decrees, and conſequently before their ſin, or even their exiſtence was known. Therefore the Wiſdom of God forbidding him to compound his ways, not permitting

him

him to work Miracles every moment, and obliging him to act after the most general, constant and uniform manner; he doth not save all Men, tho he truly desires to save all. For, to conclude, tho he loves all his Creatures, he doth nothing for them, but that which his wisdom permits him to do; and tho he would have the most large and most perfect Church that can be, yet he doth not make it absolutely the most large and perfect; but only the most simple and most perfect that can be, with respect to the ways which are most worthy of himself. For, once more, God doth not resolve upon his designs, but by comparing his ways with the work which they are to effect For when he sees a greater relation of wisdom and fruitfulness betwixt certain ways and their work, than all others and their work, then (I speak after the manner of Men) he takes up his Design, he chuses his Ways, he establishes his Decrees.

XXIV. Thus the Order of the Divine Decrees, which include the Predestination of the Saints, is not, that God first wills to save such and such, and afterwards consults his wisdom to find out the ways which may put his designs into execution: This is to make God act like Men, who often repent of their undertakings, because they do not compare all the means with the end. God consults his wisdom for all things; he wills and designs nothing without his knowledge; he wills not, that such and such shall be saved rather than others, if he did not see *in himself* some reasons for this; *in himself*, I say, not in them. So that the Principle of Predestination, is the Wisdom and Knowledge of God. *O Altitudo divitiarum sapientiæ & scientiæ*

D.i

Dei! 'Tis not his will ſeparated from his wiſdom: for he neither doth nor wills any thing without it; that is, without his Son. Much leſs is it the Elect, which determine him to predeſtinate them, or to form deſigns, which include their predeſtination. This is altogether impertinent; and 'tis needleſs for me to ſpend time in demonſtrating it.

XXV. 'Tis evident, by the Truths which I have laid down, that Reaſon furniſhes us with no other means of reconciling Scripture with it ſelf; or this Propoſition, *God would ſave all Men*; with this, *All Men are not ſaved.* For aſſuredly, God would ſave all Men, even the wicked: This he ſwears by the mouth of the Prophet *Ezekiel.* Now, God is the Maſter of Hearts; he can give ſuch Grace to the wicked as will certainly convert him, ſince he knows what degree of Grace, and when it ought to be given, that it may work the converſion of the ſinner. Who can hinder him from doing what he will? What Creature can reſiſt him? Is't not evident, that it is his wiſdom which obliges him to act after ſo ſimple and ſo general a manner, that Grace is not always given to the ſinner, ſo ſtrong, and at ſuch ſeaſonable moments, as throughly to convert, or to contribute to the converſion of him who receives it?

For, if God acts by particular wills, ſince he is wiſe, and wills the converſion of a ſinner, certainly 'tis impoſſible, but that all Grace ſhould be efficacious, and have all the effect for which God gave it: it could never be reſiſted, never render'd uſeleſs: For an intelligent Being proportions always the

the means to the end, the action to the work, or effect which he undertakes to produce.

XXVI. In ſhort, 'tis plain, that Predeſtination, as I have explained it, has nothing harſh in it: For no perſon can take it ill, that God ſhould love his wiſdom infinitely more than his work; for it is altogether his gracious gift, ſeeing it is the greater relation of wiſdom and fruitfulneſs, which God ſees betwixt his ways and his future Church, which determines him to form the decrees, which include the Predeſtination of the Saints, and not our natural merits which engage him to predeſtinate us to Grace and Glory. It doth not ſuppoſe in God *any reſpect of Perſons*; for tho Gods choice proceeds not from our merits, yet it is not the effect of an indifferent or raſh will of God, but of the depth of his Wiſdom and Knowledge which governs all his wills. Laſtly, Predeſtination, thus underſtood, doth not lead to deſpair; for God often ſends the ſhowers of Grace in ſuch abundance, that we frequently render it uſeleſs: And it will condemn our negligence, for it depends on us to avoid many things which reſiſt the efficacy of grace; God not giving us his grace by particular wills, to the end, that it ſhould have ſuch an effect in us, and nothing more.

Objection.

The Predeſtination of the Saints is a Myſtery: The Judgments of God are hidden, even to the moſt enlightned underſtandings, and 'tis an inſufferable raſhneſs to endeavour to give a reaſon of them. The Fathers upon this ſubject of God's choice

choice of the Elect, always cryed out with St. *Paul*, *O the Height!* We ought to imitate them, and hold our peace.

Anſwer.

I Anſwer, that we are permitted to Explain, even the Myſteries, provided we do it according to the Analogy of Faith; and ſuppoſe the Doctrines received by the Church as unqueſtionable. The Fathers have done ſo: There is no greater Myſtery than of the Trinity; and yet St. *Auguſtine* has Compoſed 15. Books upon this ſubject, St. *Hilary* 12. St. *Thomas*, and all the School Divines, were not afraid to ſpeak and write thereof. But it is certain, that Predeſtination is not a Myſtery in this ſence, as if the mind of Man can diſcover nothing thereof: for all the Divine Decrees, do neceſſarily agree with Order, Reaſon, the Eternal Law, of which all Men have ſome knowledge. There's no underſtanding all the particulars of the Predeſtination of the Saints: I confeſs it. Yet all they who know how to enter into themſelves and conſult univerſal Reaſon, which enlightens all attentive minds, clearly ſee, that God acts not by Caprice, that his deſigns don't prevent his knowledge, that the Predeſtination and choice of the Elect ſuppoſes the preſcience of all good works, which they ought to do by the aſſiſtance of Grace; that it

Prædeſtinatio ſine præſcientia eſſe non poteſt, Proſp. reſp. ad Cap. XV. Gall. Non tamen Electio præcedit juſtificationem, ſed electionem juſtificatio; nemo enim elegitur, niſi jam diſtans ab illo qui rejicitur. Unde quod dictum eſt quia elegit nos ante mundi conſtitutionem, non video quomodo ſit dictum niſi præſcientiâ, *Aug.* l. 1. ad Simp. quæſt. 2.

it is the depth of the riches of the wiſdom and knowledge of God, which cauſes one to be choſen and another rejected. This is that which St. *Paul* ſays; this is that which the Fathers ſay; and this is alſo that which I Aſſert. I don't ſay that one is choſen and another rejected, ſimply and meerly becauſe God wills it; for I am afraid of making God like unto Man, who guides himſelf by Humour, and hath no regard to his own work. It is not enough to ſhew that God is powerful, and that he doth what he will with his Creatures. We ought, if poſſible, to juſtifie his wiſdom and his goodneſs: We ought to repreſent him as amiable and adorable, as much at leaſt as we make him terrible. You cry out with St. *Paul*, *O the Height!* but let us go on, and add of *the riches of the Wiſdom and Knowledge of God*; for it is the depth of the Wiſdom and Knowledge of God, which is the principle of the Predeſtination of Saints; it is not a blind, raſh, and imperious will, ſuch as is often obſerved in the great ones of the Earth.

But Men will make God ſuch an one as they would be themſelves; becauſe they prefer Power to Wiſdom, God ſhall always be juſt and wiſe enough for them, provided he be Powerful and Sovereign. Men love Independance; it is a ſort of Servitude to them to ſubmit to Reaſon; to them it is a kind of impotence not to be able to do that which ſhe forbids. They fear therefore to make God Impotent inſtead of making him Wiſe. They place God above all Reaſon; according to them he obſerves none, he abſolutely does all that which he pleaſes; and for this reaſon meerly

ly and ſolely becauſe any thing pleaſes him; it is juſt, wiſe, and good to be done; Principles which certainly overturn the very Foundation of Religion, as I have * elſewhere explained.

Will Men never reflect that the Word of God is Sovereign and Univerſal Reaſon; that this Reaſon is Co-eternal and Subſtantial with God; that he neceſſarily, invincibly, inviolably, loves it: that tho he be obliged to follow it, he nevertheleſs continues independent: And that thus all that God wills, is Juſt, Wiſe, Regular; becauſe God cannot act but according to his knowledge, becauſe he cannot love but according to Order, becauſe he cannot deſpiſe his Wiſdom, and falſifie himſelf?

* In the Explicat. of the nature of Ideas, To. 3. of the *Search.*

But what! muſt it be permitted to reaſon upon Gods way of proceeding? Yes doubtleſs, provided we reaſon upon clear Ideas, and always have regard for the Truths which Faith teaches us. 'Tis this infinitely wiſe Conduct which we cannot too much examine, and too much admire, nothing is more comforting and inſtructing both together; but we loſe our time when we examine Mens ways of proceeding, for they almoſt always follow the motions of their paſſions: He who loves Order, cannot make it his paſs-time to ſee them do ſo, he cannot be inſtructed in his duty, by hearing their diſcourſes.

Let it ſuffice that the Hiſtorians make Heroes of their Benefactors, & great Men of their Friends; let all their characters flatter, but Chriſtians ought to propoſe to themſelves other Models. Let them be perfect, as their Heavenly Father is perfect;

let them imitate his Conduct, but I muſt Anſwer the principal Objection.

The Fathers, 'tis ſaid, and St. *Auguſtine* chiefly, permit us not to ſeek after the reaſon of the choice which God makes of the Elect. I maintain that this is not true, and that the only thing which St. *Auguſtine* requires, is, that Gods choice ſhould not be founded upon natural Merits; ſo far he is from deſiring that we ſhould not have recourſe to the Wiſdom and Knowledge of God to give an account of his choice. But to make this well underſtood, we muſt know that the enemies of Grace, and free Predeſtination, always uſed this argument which enters naturally into the mind, and which *in* my opinion cannot e anſwered by reaſon, but by the principles which I have laid down. Thus they reaſon.

There is no choice to be made, where is no inequality or difference: Now God in the diſtribution of his Graces, chuſes ſome rather than others.

Therefore there are ſome Perſons whom God judges more worthy of Grace, and more fit to receive it than others. God wills that all Men ſhould be ſaved; he wills that all ſhould come to the knowledge of the Faith: Now all are not ſaved, even the Goſpel has not been preached to all. Therefore there is ſome inequality, or ſome difference among Men; for if there was a perfect equality among them, ſince God would enlighten them all, all would, at leaſt, have the gift of Faith. Now this difference can only come from the good or ill uſe of Liberty: Therefore 'tis Man who makes himſelf in this ſenſe to differ from

from another *, and in some sort merits Grace. For surely tis just, or at least more reasonable, that God should give his Grace to those who are better disposed to receive it, and more likely to make a good use of it than others; to those who actually use their Liberty better, who make some essays towards acquiring Virtue, and who have more love for Order, the Truth and Justice, than to those who make no use of their Liberty, and blindly follow the motions of their passions. Therefore Grace does not prevent our wills, for God acts always with the most wisdom and reason that can be: Before he assists us, he expects that we should make that use of our Liberty, which we ought and may. 'Tis upon this account that he made us free, our Salvation is in our own hands; * the necessity of a preventing Grace ruins free will, and renders the exhortations and councils of J. C. useless. 'Tis Grace must make us act, but 'tis in our power to will, to pray, and to begin.

* Vid. Prosp. adversus Col. c. 6.

* See St. *Augustine* lib. 1. ad. Bonif. c. 19. & lib. 2. c. 8. & elsewhere

These Reasonings are so plausible, and so easily enter into the mind, that Men are naturally Pelagians. A Man speaks the Language of the Church, when he is upon his guard, when he actually feels his own weakness, and remembers that Grace is not given according to his merits. But when nature speaks, he scarce ever fails to speak those things which favour and exalt it. The Greek Fathers, who lived before *Pelagius*'s Heresy, or who were not cautious enough against this error, have often spoke so as to seem to maintain it; this is a thing sufficiently known. St. *Augustine* himself, before he throughly understood

the matter of Grace, thought it was in our power to believe and will, but in Gods only to give ſtrength to perform †. And * St. *Jerome* himſelf writing againſt the Palagians, ſays, *Ubi autem miſericordia & gratia eſt, liberum ex parte ceſſat arbitrium, quod in eo tantum eſt ut velimus atq; cupiamus, & placitis tribuamus aſſenſum. Jam in Domini poteſtate eſt, ut id quod cupimus, quod laboramus ac nitimur, illius ope & auxillio implere valeamus.* Since we always feel that we are free, and do not always actually think upon the proofs which Scripture gives us of the neceſſity of Grace, 'tis difficult to keep our ſelves from ſaying nothing in behalf of Liberty againſt Grace; ſince we know and are aſſured, that God always acts with Reaſon and Wiſdom, we deſire to find even in the Elect themſelves, ſome reaſon of their Election.

† Noſtrum eſt enim credere, illius autem dare credentibus & volentibus facultatem bene operandi. Lib. Retractat. Cap. 23.

* Lib. 3.

Since it can't be ſaid, that the councils and exhortations of God are uſeleſs, we think without reflecting that it altogether depends upon us to follow them. In ſhort, on what ſide ſoever we look upon the ſentiments of the Pelagians and Semi-pelagians, we find them agreeable enough to Reaſon; and becauſe they pleaſantly court our Pride and Self-love, 'tis difficult not to let fall ſome words in their favour. Hence it is that we find many paſſages in the Fathers which may be uſed as a foundation for the errors concerning Grace; inſomuch, that there are thoſe who without ceremony reckon ſome of the Greek Fathers among the Hereticks: For there are Men who judge of the Sentiments of Authors, when they ſeem to contradict one another, only by reporting

ing the paſſages in them. They do not conſider that all that is ſaid thro prejudice, according to the opinion of thoſe to whom a man ſpeaks, and without having ſeriouſly examined what is ſaid, ſignifies nothing; but on the contrary, it is ſufficient once to ſay a truth againſt common prejudice to diſcover his opinion. For my part, I believe that the Greeks and Latines do not much differ one from the other, and that if they often ſpeak very differently, 'tis becauſe they were not equally cautious againſt the ſame errors, and had not equally examined them.

Therefore the enemies of Grace believing themſelves ſo ſtrong in reaſons, accus'd St. *Auguſtine* as denying Liberty, making all depend upon fate, attributing unto God reſpect of perſons, and rendring all Preaching and Councils uſeleſs. They continually demanded of him a reaſon of God's choice, ſince he would not grant the reaſon of it to be an inequality or difference of wills, ſince it could not be an inequality of natures: But St. *Auguſtine* on his part, ſtuck to the Scriptures. He anſwered that Grace was not given according to Merits, that Man could not make himſelf differ from another, that he was unable not only to do good without the aſſiſtance of Grace, but that he could not will it; that the heart of Man is in the hands of God, that he diſpoſes of it as he pleaſes, and that of our ſelves we are not able to think a good thought. In ſhort, that he was not obliged to give an account of the reaſon of the choice of the Elect, becauſe the Judgments of God are unſearchable.

But tho St. *Auguſtine* ſays in an hundred pla-

ces, that the Judgments of God are unſearchable, to ſilence the enemies of Grace, who would have the reaſon of our being choſen in our ſelves; he no where ſays, that theſe Judgments are not agreeable to the reaſon and wiſdom which all Men conſult, when their ſenſes and their paſſions keep ſilence. The judgments of God are impenitrable, becauſe 'tis impoſſible to know them in particular; but we ought not to be afraid of aſſerting that they are Juſt, Wiſe, Reaſonable, full of Goodneſs & Equity; St *Auguſtine* himſelf ſometimes ſeeks and gives Reaſons of them: He was always diſpoſed to receive thoſe which could be reconciled with Faith, and he rejects not thoſe of his adverſaries, but becauſe they ſuppoſed, that Grace was given according to Merits; that which Religion and Chriſtian morality can by no means grant. See how St. *Auguſtine* ſpeaks, * *Ex duobus itaq; parvulis originali peccato obſtrictis, cur iſte aſſumatur, ille relinquatur, & ex duobus ætate jam grandibus impiis, cur iſte ita vocetur, ut vocantem ſequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vocetur; inſcrutabilia ſunt judicia Dei: Ex duobus autem piis, cur huic donetur perſeverantia uſque in finem, illi autem non donetur, inſcrutabiliora ſunt judicia Dei.* According to St. *Auguſtine*, the moſt unſearchable judgments of God are thoſe by which perſeverance is granted to ſome juſt Perſons, and not to all. In the mean time St. *Auguſtine* himſelf gives a reaſon of them in his letter to *Vitalis* and elſewhere; and is ſo far from blaming them who examine Gods way of proceeding with humility, and according to the Analogy of Faith, that on the contrary he is very ready

* De bono perſever. c. 9.

dy to receive the reaſons of others upon this ſubject, provided they agree with the Scripture. *Propter hujus timoris utilitatem, ne regenerati & pie vivere incipientes, tanquam ſecuri alta ſapiamus, quidem non perſeveraturi perſeveraturis Dei permiſſione vel praviſiones ac diſpoſitione miſcentur, quibus cadentibus territi, cum timore & tremore gradiamur viam juſtam. Sed de hac re, id eſt, cur quidem non permanſuri in fide, & ſanctitate chriſtiana, tamen accipiant ad tempus hanc gratiam, & dimittantur hic vivere donec cadant, cum poſſint rapi de hac vita, ne malitia mutet intellectum eorum, quod de ſancto immatura ætate defuncto Scriptum eſt in Libro Sapientiæ; quærat quisquis ut potuerit, & ſi invenerit præter hanc quæ a me reddita eſt & aliam probabilem rationem, a rècta fidei non recedens, teneat eam, & ego cum illo, ſi me non latuerit* †. † Epiſt. 107. de Cor. & Grat. c. 23.

"'Tis to make us fear, leaſt being regenerated "and beginning to live piouſly, we become ſecure "and high-minded, that by Gods permiſſion and "preſcience, ſome who will not perſevere, are "mix't with thoſe who will; that thus we being "afrighted by their fall, may walk in the way "of righteouſneſs with fear and trembling. But "it will be ſaid, why do they who will not per-"ſiſt in the Faith, receive it, and continue there-"in till they fall? Why doth not God take away "their Lives, before the wickedneſs of their hearts "corrupts their minds, as 'tis written in the book "of wiſdom, of a Saint dying in his Infancy? "Let every one ſeek after the beſt reaſons of "this, and if he ſhall find any other beſides this "which I have given, which renders a reaſon, "that is probable, and according to the Analo-

"gy of Faith, let him embrace it, and if it ſhall "be imparted to me, I ſhall embrace it with "him.

Lib. 1. c. 13. & ſeq. The Author of *the calling of the Gentiles*, obſerves the ſame way of proceeding, that St. *Auguſtine* doth. He every where ſays that the Judgments of God are unſearchable, becauſe he oppoſes the ſame errors; and that Faith doth not ſuffer us to give a reaſon of Gods choice of Men, from the difference of their natural Merits*. If, for example, he asks himſelf whence it is, that all Children are not Baptized? He is not afraid to ſay, that if this came from any ill uſe of the general Grace given to the Parents, that, * if all received Baptiſm, the Parents were too negligent, not fearing leſt their Children ſhould be ſurprized with Death: He ſays, that ſuch anſwers would give ſome ground to believe, that the grace of Baptiſm was due to the innocence of age, and to deny original ſin. When the queſtion is about excluding natural merits, he cries out, that the Judgments of God are unſearchable; but yet, he nevertheleſs doth not fail to give ſome general Reaſons thereof, upon other occaſions. * His principle is, that a Reaſon of all the Deſigns and Works of God cannot be given. *Tertia Definitio temperanter, & ſobrie proteſtatur, non omnem voluntatis Dei comprehendi poſſe rationem, & multas divinorum operum cauſas ab humana intelligentia eſſe ſubductas.* An undeniable principle! But neither he, nor St. *Auguſtine*, nor, I believe, any of the Fathers, ever maintain'd that the Judgments of God were ſo unſearchable, as that it ſhould be a crime to ſeek, and give ſome general Reaſons of

* Lib. 2. c. 23.

* C. 24.

* Lib. 2. c. 30.

of them. They never forbad Men, to repreſent God Amiable, and Adorable, by juſtifying his Conduct, by that Idea which we have of a Being infinitely Perfect, and by the Truths Faith teach us; That which I have endeavoured, in *The Treatiſe of Nature and Grace.*

The Laſt Explication,

The frequent Miracles of the Old Law, do by no means ſhew, That God often acted by particular Wills.

I Do not well underſtand, how Perſons, who grant that God does all, and that therefore he communicates not his power to Creatures, but by making them the occaſional cauſes of producing certain effects, can Imagine that the Conduct which he obſerved in reſpect of the *Jews*, ſhould be contrary to that, which I think I have demonſtrated ſeveral ways, *viz. That God acts not by particular wills, but when the neceſſity of Order requires him.*

They are always ſaying, as a thing extraordinary, that the Old Teſtament is full of Miracles, that God had promiſed to the *Jews*, Plenty and Proſperity, proportionably to their fidelity and obedience; and that it was not poſſible, that nature and morality ſhould be ſo exactly combin'd together, that the *Holy-Land* ſhould abound in fruits, proportionably as its Inhabitants did in virtue and good works. For my part, I willingly

willingly grant all this: But I do not yet ſee how this oppoſes my ſentiments; if it be not ſuppoſed, that I acknowledge no other general Laws by which God executes his deſigns, but thoſe of the communication of motions. How troubleſome is it for a Man not to be able to explain his thoughts but by words, which popular uſe has introduced, and which every one interprets according to his prejucices and temper; and above all, to have for ones judges ſuch Perſons, who, tho they are nimble and quick, yet often want equity and penetration of mind!

Certainly they do not do me juſtice, who ſay that I think Manna fell every day of the Week among the *Iſraelites* except *Saturday*, by a neceſſary conſequence of the Laws of the communication of motions. He who is of this opinion, muſt needs be very fooliſh and impious; I am perſwaded that the greateſt part of the miraculous effects of the Ancient Law, was done in conſequence of ſome general Laws, ſince the general cauſe ought not to execute his purpoſe by particular wills, and for many more Reaſons which I might add to thoſe already mentioned.

But I am far from believing, that theſe extraordinary effects were only the conſequences of the natural Laws of the communication of motions. I grant that they may be looked upon as Miracles, and that there are more ſuch in the World than we imagine: But I muſt explain my ſelf after what manner, that I may not be thought to have changed.

J. C. as Man, received all Power in Heaven and in Earth, becauſe God executes all the deſires

ſires of his holy Soul by the general Law of Grace, by which he would ſave all Men in his Son. The Father has given to the Son, after this manner, all the Nations of the World, as Materials which he is to employ in the Building of his Church, as I have ſaid elſewhere. Suppoſing then that J. C. for the executing of his deſigns, deſires a certain degree of Grace for one of his Members, or rather that he deſired that the fire which ſacrificed St. *Lawrance* ſhould loſe its heat; it is certain this would be what we call a Miracle; nevertheleſs God would not work this Miracle by a particular will, but in conſequence of the general Law, the efficacy of which is determined by the actual deſires of the Soul of J. C.

According to the general Laws of the communications of motions, heavy bodys fall towards the Earth; my arm is heavy, yet nevertheleſs I lift it up to Heaven whenſoever I deſire it. Certainly God who determines the motion of the Animal ſpirits, for the lifting up my arm according to my deſires, does not then act but in conſequence of the general Law of the union of the Soul and Body, by which Law I have power to move my arm; nevertheleſs, this motion wou'd be accounted miraculous, if we did not own ſome other natural Laws, than thoſe of the communication of motions.

Now I think I am able to demonſtrate by the Authority of the Holy Scripture, that the Angels have received from God Power over the preſent World, and that thus God executes their deſires, and by them his own deſigns, according to certain general Laws; ſo that all which appears

pears miraculous in the Old Teſtament, does no wiſe prove that God may often act by particular wills.

St. *Paul* in the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews* intending to exalt J. C. above Angels, ſays, that God had not ſubjected the World to come to them, as he had to J. C. He believed then, as a thing whereof thoſe to whom he wrote had no doubt, that God had ſubjected the preſent World to Angels. If the Angels had had power over nothing, it would have been much more eaſy for St. *Paul* to have exalted J. C. above them.

Writing to the *Epheſians*, he aſſures us, that even the Devils exerciſe their power over *Infi-*
Eph. 2.2. *dels*, he calls them as J. C. had done, the Princes of this World; that is to ſay, of thoſe who live in the darkneſs of Idolatry, *tenebrarum harum*. If the Devils themſelves exerciſe power over Idolaters, if they are Princes of this World, ſhall the Angels have no power over it?

The Arch-Angel *Michael* is called in *Daniel*, the Prince of the *Jews*, becauſe he fought for them againſt the Prince of the *Perſians*. Can any one fight without Strength and Power?

The Angels are ſent as the Miniſters of God to Miniſter to thoſe who are to be the Heirs of Salvation. A weak Miniſtry! if God had not communicated to them his Power. A uſeleſs miſſion! if God had not eſtabliſhed the general Law, whoſe efficacy is determined by their deſires.

There are in the Old Teſtament a great many Paſſages which clearly prove that the Angels had care of the *Iſraelites*, they rewarded the obſervers of the Law and puniſhed others; it is not neceſ-

ſary

ſary that I ſhould relate them. But it is more to the purpoſe, to ſhew, that even from thoſe paſſages which attribute to God certain effects, without making any mention of Angels, it cannot be concluded, that God produced theſe effects by himſelf without the Miniſtry of Angels; becauſe the Angels acting only by the power of God, and doing nothing but what was good, the Holy Scripture attributes to God himſelf, that which he did by their means.

The greateſt example of this may be drawn from the manner after which the Law was given to the *Jews*. To read only the Old Teaſtament, it ſeems as if God had by himſelf ſpoken to *Moſes* in the *Burning-Buſh*, and that he gave him the Law upon *Mount Sinai*, without the Miniſtry of Angels. 'Tis God always who ſpeaks, even JEHOVAH, that Name which is not given to Creatures. And yet St. *Stephen* aſſures us, that God ſent *Moſes* to deliver his People, under the conduct and power of the Angel which had appeared unto him in the *Burning-Buſh*; and that he converſed alſo with the ſame Angel upon *Mount Sinai*.

St. *Paul* delivers the ſame thing in two of his Epiſtles; and 'tis upon this account, that intending in his Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*, to exalt the New Law above the Old, he begins this Epiſtle with a continual compariſon of J. C. the Miniſter of Grace, with the Angels, the Miniſters of the *Jewiſh* Law.

It is evident if the Law had not been given by Angels, that which St. *Stephen* and St. *Paul* aſſures us of, would be abſolutely falſe. But the Angels having

having given it, that which *Moſes* ſays, doth not ever the leſs ceaſe to be true. For God always, as the true cauſe, executes that which his Creatures do as the occaſional cauſes, to whom God communicates his Power acccording to certain Laws. And becauſe 'tis God only who enlightens Spirits by the manifeſtation of neceſſary and immutable order, (which is the inviolable rule of his own will) it is truly he who ſpeaks to us, and commands us, when he who ſpeaks to us from him, does not do it till he has conſulted the Eternal Laws which his wiſdom contains, that which the Bleſſed Angels never fail to do.

J. C. as Man, is Head of the Church, & diſpences to his Members Grace which Sanctifies them. But becauſe he has not this Power, but in conſequence of a general Law which God has eſtabliſhed in him, to execute by him his great deſign, the Eternal Temple; 'tis very truly ſaid that God alone gives inward Grace, tho he does not in truth give it but by the Miniſtry of J. C. who, as Man, determines by his prayers, or his deſires, the efficacy of the Divine will: And 'tis upon this account that Scripture often attributes to God alone the converſion of hearts.

In like manner, the Angels had power to lead, to conduct, and puniſh the *Iſraelites*; they may at preſent give us the outward preparations of Grace, they may remove out of our way occaſions of Sin and Scandal; yet all that they do, may in general be attributed to God, as the true cauſe, for they act only by the Power which God has given them.

Thus

Thus, I believe, that the defeat of *Senacharib*, the Plague which *David* brought upon the People for numbring them, the rain of Manna which fell ſo regularly in the *Wilderneſs*; and a thouſand ſuch like effects, were miraculous. But I believe then, ſince Scripture aſſures us thereof in ſeveral places, that God did not do the greateſt part of theſe Miracles but by the action; that is to ſay, the deſires of the Angels which God choſe to conduct his People, after he had informed himſelf by his wiſdom, that this way would be better than any other, in relation to his principal work: And that it would ſpare, as I may ſay, a great number of particular wills. I believe alſo that theſe deſires were govern'd (as well as the Divine wills) by the neceſſary and immutable order, the inviolable rule of all underſtandings; by the light of the Word, the fountain of all Wiſdom, and of all Laws both Temporal and Eternal, according to theſe words: *Fons ſapientiæ* Verbum in excelſis, & ingreſſus illius Manada Æterna.

To be convinced of that which I have ſaid, ſuppoſing that God does all, it is enough to endeavour clearly to underſtand the ſence of any one of thoſe paſſages which attribute to the Angels, the Power of defending or puniſhing the *Iſraelites*. See one of theſe paſſages: God, or rather the Angel, or Prince of the Angels, St. *Michael*, ſays in Gods ſtead to *Moſes*, after he had given him the Law; *Behold I ſend an Angel before thee to keep thee in the way, and to bring thee to the place which I have prepared. Beware of him, and obey his voice, provoke him not; for he will not* Exod. 23. 20.

not pardon your transgressions: for my name is in him. By this passage 'tis evident, that an Angel conducted the People, and had power to punish them if they did not obey him; now 'tis supposed that God does all. The Angel, their Conducter, had not his Power, but because God made it, as I may say, a Law to himself to obey him; like as I have not the power to remove mine Arm, but because God has established the Laws of union betwixt the Soul and Body. And the Angel does nothing actually, but because God actually executes his desires, and thereby his Eternal purposes; as I do not actually move mine Arm, but because God only does what I actually desire, and what I think to do.

Thus the Miracles of the Old Testament are only consequences of the general Laws which God made to communicate his Power to the Arch-Angel *Michael*, or the Angel that guided them. *Senacharib*'s Army was defeated by the Angel, the revenger of Gods glory: Manna was bread made by the hands of Angels, nevertheless God did these Miracles, but by general wills; for if they had been performed by particular wills, the Angels could not have wrought them by a power which God gave them of conducting his people.

Thus St. *Michael* and his Angels were to the *Jews*, that which J. C. is to the Christians. The Angels gave the old Law, J. C. is the Angel of the new Law, as the Prophet *Malachy* calls him, *Chap.* III. 1. The new Covenant promises true goods; therefore the Mediator of this Covenant must be the occasional or distributive cause of that

that Grace, which gives a right to the poſſeſſion of theſe goods. But the Old Covenant promiſed only Temporal goods, becauſe the Angel, the Miniſter of the Law, could only beſtow theſe goods: All that relates to Eternity, both goods and evils, ought to be reſerved to J. C. The Angels who are pure Spirits, ought according to Order to have power over Bodies, inferiour ſubſtances, and by them, upon the minds of Men: For ſince ſin, the Soul depends upon the Body, they may prepare for Grace, as in St. *John*, and remove the occaſions of falling.

Laſtly, the Angel, or rather the Arch-Angel St. *Michael* repreſented J. C. as the Old Law repreſents the New; the Synagogue, the Church; Temporal goods, Eternal: Thus it appears, that to prove the New Covenant more excellent than the Old, St. *Paul* was obliged to prove (as he has done in the beginning of the Epiſtle to the *Hebrews*) that J. C. who is the Miniſter thereof, is infinitely exalted above the Angels.

It muſt therefore be granted from the arguments which I have drawn from the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, & from a thouſand & a thouſand experiences that God executes his deſigns by general Laws. But it is not eaſie to demonſtrate, that God acts upon ſuch and ſuch occaſions by particular wills, tho the H. Scripture, which accommodates its ſelf to our weakneſs, repreſents God ſometimes as a Man, and often makes him act like Men. For tho all that which I have ſaid of Angels, ſhould be abſolutely falſe, I might nevertheleſs ſuppoſe, and ſhould even have all reaſon to believe, that God wrought the Miracles of the

Old Law, by certain general Laws, tho I had no knowledge of them; for we ought not to reject a truth clearly known, becauſe of ſome objections which may be drawn from our ignorance of many things.

Thus God forms and preſerves the purely material World, by the Laws of the communication of motions, and makes the Bodies themſelves the occaſional cauſes, which determine theſe Laws; for 'tis the ſtriking of bodies upon one another, which determine their efficacy: A Body is never moved, but when another ſtrikes upon it, and a Body is always moved when it is ſtruck upon.

God preſerves the life of Men, and likewiſe Civil Society, by the general Laws of the Union of Soul and Body; and makes ſomething in theſe two ſubſtances, the occaſional cauſes, which determine the efficacy of theſe Laws. Mine Arm is moved according to my deſires: my Soul ſuffers pain, when a Thorn pricks me.

God builds up his great Work by the general Laws of Grace, according to which he would ſave all Men in his Son; and becauſe all Men are born ſinners, God draws the occaſional cauſes, which determine the efficacy of his general Laws only from J. C. who is the Head, which influences his Members, the Mediator betwixt God and Men, the Sovereign Prieſt of good things, the true *Solomon*, who has received Wiſdom without meaſure, to make a Work, whereof the *Jewiſh* Temple was but the figure, how Magnificent ſoever it was.

To Conclude. God governed the *Jews* by general Laws, the efficacy of which was determined

ned by the Action of St. *Michael*, and his Angels. In truth, intelligent Beings are neceſſary to conduct Men, to reward and puniſh them, that by the Laws of the communication of motions, the Hail knocks down the Fruit, which the Rain had made to grow; this is not properly a diſorder: Bodies are not capable of good or evil, of happineſs, or miſery: But to adjuſt Rewards and Merits one with another, intelligent Beings are neceſſary. In a word, God has eſtabliſhed all Powers, ſecond Cauſes, viſible and inviſible Hierarchies, immediately by himſelf, or by the mediation of other powers, that he may execute his deſigns by general Laws, whoſe efficacy is determined by the action of theſe ſame Powers. For he acts not like the Kings of the Earth, who give out their Orders, and do nothing elſe. God, in general, doth all that which ſecond cauſes do, Matter has not in it ſelf any moving virtue, upon which depends its efficacy; and there is no neceſſary connexion betwixt the wills of ſpirits, and the effects which they produce. God doth all, but he acts by Creatures, becauſe he was pleaſed to communicate his power to them, that he might accompliſh his work, by ways moſt worthy of himſelf.

Thus has God done all things with Wiſdom: I ſay with Wiſdom; for an infinite Wiſdom is requiſite to underſtand all the conſequences of general Laws, to rank and combine them one with another after the exacteſt manner, and foreſee, that from thence would proceed a work worthy of himſelf. 'Tis an evidence of limited underſtandings, to be able to do nothing but by com-

pounded ways. But a God who knows all things, ought not to disturb the simplicity of his ways; an immutable Being must always be uniform in his conduct; a General Cause ought to act by particular wills. God's Conduct must carry in it the Character of his Attributes, if the immutable and necessary order of Justice do not oblige him to change: For Order is an inviolable Law, in respect of God himself; He invincibly loves it, and will always prefer it to the Arbitrary Laws, by which he executes his Designs.

THE END.

THE
Author's Idea of Providence.

SEcond causes, of what nature soever, have no proper efficacy of their own. But,

All their power is communicated unto them by God, in consequence of those general Laws which he has establish't. Now,

All Philosophers and Divines agree, that God governs the World and takes care of all things by second causes. Therefore,

The Providence of God is Executed by general Laws.

Nevertheless his Providence is not blind and subject to chance.

For,

For, by his infinite Wiſdom he knows the conſequences of all poſſible general Laws. And,

As Searcher of Hearts, He foreſees all the future determinations of free cauſes. Therefore,

He proportions the means with the end; free Cauſes, as well as neceſſary, with the effects, which he intends they ſhall produce. Therefore.

He combines Nature with Morality, and with Divinity, after the wiſeſt manner that can be: So that the effects of the combination and connection of cauſes may be moſt worthy of his Wiſdom, Goodneſs, and other Attributes; for God wills in particular all the good effects which he produces by general ways. Nevertheleſs, the immutable Order of Juſtice, which God owes to himſelf, and his own attributes, requires or permits, that he ſhould ſometimes act by particular wills. But ordinarily, it is then only, and in thoſe circumſtances, when one only Miracle (*i. e.* an effect which cannot be the conſequence of natural Laws) doth happily adjuſt a great many events and the moſt that can be: For his preſcience being infinite, he doth not work two Miracles, when one will ſuffice.

So that in the Divine Providence, there is nothing that is not Divine, or which doth not bear the character of the Divine Attributes; for God acts according to what he is.

He is wiſe, his foreknowledge is infinite: Now, to eſtabliſh general Laws, and to foreſee that from thence a work will ariſe worthy of theſe Laws, is a mark of ſuch a Wiſdom, as hath no bounds; and to act by particular wills, is to act

as Men, who can foreſee nothing: Therefore God acts by general Laws.

God is the Searcher of Hearts: Now to make uſe of free Cauſes for the execution of his deſigns, without determining theſe Cauſes after an invincible manner, is to be the Searcher of Hearts; and it is not neceſſary to have this quality for the execution of his deſigns, if he did determine cauſes after an invincible manner: Therefore God ordinarily leaves J. C. Angels, and Men, to act according to their natures. He doth not communicate to them his power that he may deſtroy their liberty.

He gives them part in the glory of his work, and thereby augments his own. For leaving them to act according to their natures, and nevertheleſs, executing by them deſigns worthy of himſelf, he makes it admirably appear that he is Searcher of Hearts. Nevertheleſs, the limitation of Angels, the malice of Devils, and both theſe qualities in good and evil Men, and many other reaſons, may oblige God to act ſometimes by particular wills. For a limited ſpirit, tho perfectly united to Order, cannot foreſee the connection of free cauſes, which is neceſſary to bring the work of God to its perfection. So that, where Order permits, God muſt determine Angels by particular wills, and make even the ſins of Men, and the malice of Devils, to enter into the order of his Providence: And proportionably the ſame muſt be ſaid of Jeſus Chriſt conſidered as Man, and Head of the Church, and as Architect of the Eternal Temple.

God

God is immutable; now immutability in his Conduct, imports immutability in his nature; to change Conduct every moment, is a mark of inconstancy. So that God must follow general Laws with respect to this attribute, if none of his other attributes do otherwise require that he cease to observe it. For God acts not but for himself, but for that love which he bears unto himself, but to Honour his attributes, both by the Divinity of his ways, and the Perfecton of his work. In a word, the immutable Order of Justice, which he owes to himself, and his own perfections, is a Law with which he never can dispence.

Thus experience teaches us, that God governs the purely Corporeal World, by the general Laws of the communications of motions. By these it is, that he makes the admirable Vicissitude of Night and Day, Summer and Winter, Rain and Fair weather. By them also it is, that he covers the Earth with Fruits and Flowers, that he gives to Animals and Plants their growth and nourishment.

Experience also teaches us, that God governs Men by the general Laws of Union of Soul and Body. For by these Laws, he doth not only unite the Soul to the Body, for the conservation of Life, but thereby he also diffuses it (as I may say) over all his works, and so makes it admire the beauties thereof. It is by these that he forms Societies, and makes, as I may say, but one body of all People. It is by them that he teaches Men the truths of Religion and Morality. And Lastly, by them it is that he makes

Christians, absolves Penitents, Sanctifies the Elect, and makes them merit all those degrees of glory, which makes up the beauty of the Heavenly *Jerusalem*. When I say, that it is by them, he doth all this; it is easily perceived that I mean they are subservient thereunto, in the Order of Divine Providence: For it is chiefly by the general Laws, which give power to J. C. and the Angels, that GOD doth build his Church.

Further, Faith teaches us, that it is by general Laws that God punishes and rewards men, since Angels, who are the distributers of Temporal goods, have no efficacy of their own. It is by them that God provides for the necessities of his Elect, and resists the pernicious use which Wicked Men and Devils make of that Power, which they have to tempt, and afflict us in consequence also of certain general Laws. But all Powers are submitted to that which J. C. has in consequence of the general Laws of the Order of Grace; for at present, the Angels themselves who command others (for there is a certain subordination among them according to the most probable and received opinion) are submitted to J. C. their Head and Lord. It is under him, that they labour in the building of his Temple. They do not now, as under the Law, proportion Rewards to Merits. For the treasures of Grace are opened by the entrance of J. C. into the Sanctuary For it is true, that by afflictions the Saints are purified. So that it is better, that J. C. give unto Men true goods, than that Angels should deliver them from their miseries; for

for if good Men were not afflicted in this World, J. C. could not give them the form they muſt neceſſarily have to be placed in his building.

Laſtly, further yet, it is by general Laws that God exerciſes his Providence over his Church, that is to ſay by the Laws which make the Order of Grace. Laws which give unto J. C. as Man, Sovereign power in Heaven and in Earth. It is by J. C, that God hath eſtabliſhed the different orders which do externally govern his Church. 'Tis by him that he ſpreads abroad inward Grace in Souls. It is by him that he ſanctifies his choſen people; that he will govern them in Heaven, and recompence them according to their deſerts. It is by him, that he will judge the Devils and the Damned, and condemn them to that fire, whoſe eternal efficacy, ſhall only be the effect of general Laws, which ſhall be obſerved for ever more: By him, I ſay, enlightned to this end by eternal wiſdom, and alſo ſubſiſting in this wiſdom; by him being advertiſed by a revelation (whoſe Laws are unknown) of all that which Order requires that he ſhould know, and of all that he deſires to know of what paſſes in the World, to bring his work to its perfection; by him laſtly acting, by practical deſires, by prayers, by endeavours, or actions of an infinite merit, but of a limited virtue, and proportionable to a finite and a ſtinted work; but by him perfectly free, abſolutely Maſter of his deſires and actions, ſubmitted only to immutable Orders, the inviolable rule of his will, as well as of his Fathers; and, if I be not deceived, very rarely determined after an invincible manner, by particular and practi-

practical wills; to the end that he may leave to him more of the glory of his work, and make the infinite Wiſdom of his Father ſhine more brightly, as he is the Searcher of Hearts; that glorious attribute which no ſpirit can comprehend.

Now if God acts by general Laws, it is viſible, that we ought to aſcribe unto occaſional cauſes, to the limitation, the diſpoſitions, and ſometimes the malice of Creatures, all thoſe miſchievous effects, which Piety, and the Idea we have of a good, wiſe, and juſt God, oblige us to ſay, that he rather permits, than has any deſign to effect.

For example, if a Woman brings forth a Monſter, or a dead Child, or if ſhe lets her Child fall, and kills it, carrying it to the Church to make it a Chriſtian; it is becauſe God obſerves the general Laws, which he hath preſcribed. We ought to aſcribe this diſmal effect to natural or occaſional cauſes. —— *Super defectum cauſarum ſecundarum*, ſays St. *Thomas*. God hath permitted this evil; ſince there is none but he can be the true cauſe of it, it may be ſaid in ſome ſence that he hath not done it; becauſe it is not for ſuch like effects, but for better, that he hath eſtabliſhed natural Laws; and, if he follow theſe Laws, it is becauſe he owes this to himſelf, that his Conduct may be uniform and carry the character of his Attributes. This is not, in the leaſt, to blaſpheme againſt the Divine Power (as ſome ignorantly object) but it is rather to blaſpheme againſt the Divine Wiſdom and Goodneſs of

of God, to maintain, that he wills directly and positively these dismal effects.

A Man whose Arm is cut off, feels grief in his Arm: We all of us, sleeping, have a thousand thoughts in relation to objects, which are not at all before us. This is because God always acts in consequence of his Laws, and gives to the Soul, the same thoughts and the same sentiments, when there are the same motions in the brain; whether we have an Arm or no, whether objects are present, or absent. The DEVIL tempts just Men, the wicked solicite good Men to evil; Thieves and Soldiers Pillage and Massacre the innocent, as well as the guilty: God permits this, this therefore ought to be attributed to the malignity of occasional causes. For tho God doth often from thence draw great advantages by the Grace of J. C. since injustice it self enters into the order of his providence; *Ordinat peccata*, says St. *Augustine*, yet these sad effects, considered in themselves, are unworthy of his goodness: There is nothing but good which he wills positively and directly.

And if he makes use of the injustice of Men, to speak as Scripture doth, it is, because it becomes him to obey his own Laws, which were not at first established for such effects.

In short, the greatest number of Men are damned, and yet God would save all; for he would and can hinder them from offending him.

God wills the conversion of sinners, and certainly he can give them such grace, that they shall infallibly be converted, Whence is it then that sinners dye in their sin, Infants without Baptism,

Baptiſm, whole nations in the ignorance of truths neceſſary to their Salvation? ſhould we rather maintain, that God would not ſave all, meerly becauſe of theſe things? Or rather, ſhould we not in general ſeek out the reaſon in that which he owes to himſelf, to his wiſdom, and his other attributes? Is it not viſible, or at leaſt, is it not a ſentiment agreeable with Piety, that thoſe ruful effects ought to be attributed to the ſimplicity; in a word, to the divinity of his ways, and limitation of occaſional cauſes? For ſeeing that God acts by general Laws, ſince he makes uſe of his Creatures in bringing about his purpoſes, and that he doth not communicate to them his Power, but by the eſtabliſhment of his Laws, it is clear, that all this proceeds from the nature and action of occaſional cauſes.

But why has not God eſtabliſhed other general Laws, or given to the finite action of J. C. an infinite Virtue?

The Reaſon is, he ought not; becauſe his Wiſdom exacts from him, that he do great works by the moſt ſimple ways, and that he proportion the action of cauſes to the beauty of the works.

And I fear not to ſay, that the Eternal Temple, which is the great deſign of God, and the end of all his works, is the moſt beautiful that can be produced by ways ſo ſimple, and ſo wiſe, as thoſe are which God makes uſe of to effect it. For I am certain, that God loves Men, that he would ſave all; and therefore if he doth not ſo, it is becauſe he loves all things in proportion to their amiableneſs; it is becauſe he loves his Wiſdom more than his Work: 'Tis becauſe he

he does more honour to his attributes by the divinity of his ways, than the Perfection of his Creatures. In a word, 'tis becauſe he has the Reaſon of his Conduct in himſelf; for there is nothing out of God which can hinder him from executing his will. And if he ſhould have a will abſolutely to ſave all Men, without having reſpect to the ſimplicity of his ways; 'tis certain that he would ſave all, becauſe it is certain, that there is an infinite number of means to execute all his deſigns, and that likewiſe, he can execute them by the abſolute efficacy of his will, without the help of his Creatures.

I thought my ſelf obliged to repreſent in few words, the Idea which I have of the Divine Providence, to the end, that it may be eaſily judged, whether it is not more worthy of the Wiſdom of God, more agreeable to all that experience teaches more uſeful to anſwer the Objections of the Libertines, better fitted to make us love God, and unite us to J. C. our Head; and Laſtly, more according to the Scripture, taking it in its full meaning, than that humane providence which ſuppoſes, that God acts always by particular wills, and would only ſave the leſſer part of mankind, and this ſimply and preciſely becauſe his will is ſo.

Ob-

Objections againſt the foregoing Diſcourſe: With the Author's Anſwers.

Objection I.

THat cannot evidently be ſeen in the Idea of GOD, which has no neceſſary relation to him. Now there is onely an Arbitrary, and not any neceſſary relation betwixt God, and the obſervation of the general Rules of nature. This is one of the Author's Principles: Therefore it is not evident, that the general cauſe ought not to produce its effect by particular Wills. Now, according to this Author, we ought not to believe any thing that he ſays, if evidence doth not oblige us thereunto: Therefore we may ſtop here. This overturns his new Syſtem.

Anſwer.

'Tis true, I have ſaid, that the general Laws by which God executes his deſigns, are *Arbitrary*; and this is true in two ſenſes. Firſt, Becauſe God might have produc't nothing: For the World is not a neceſſary Emanation of the Divinity. Secondly, Becauſe God might have diſpenſed with himſelf, from obſerving the Laws which he hath eſtabliſhed for its preſervation, provided that Order would permit. But ſuppoſing that God reſolved to act, I maintain that he will do it, after the wiſeſt manner he can; or after ſuch a manner as beſt comports with his Attri-

Attributes: I hold, that this is not arbitrary, or indifferent to him. For God neceſſarily loves himſelf: he cannot belye himſelf. The immutable Order, which conſiſts in the neceſſary relation, which is betwixt his Divine Perfections, is his inviolable Law and the Rule of all his wills, becauſe God cannot will or act, but by the love which he bears unto himſelf. Love in God is not, as in us, an impreſſion which comes from without, or carries him to any thing without himſelf. He is (as I may ſay) the Eternal and Neceſſary Principle of it; he is alſo the end thereof, by the neceſſity of his Being. This is clearly ſeen in the Idea of a Being infinitely Perfect, which I have conſulted, and which I think ought to be Conſulted, leaſt we ſhould ſpeak of the Divine providence, too much after the manner of men.

Thus, in this Idea, we clearly ſee, that God can neither will nor act, but according to order; but by the love which he bears to himſelf and his eternal attributes; but according to what he is; but after ſuch a manner as beſt ſuits with his Wiſdom, his Immutability, his Prerogative of being the ſearcher of hearts, and his other attributes, as I have elſewhere explained. It is indeed indifferent to him to act, or not; but by no means to act well, or ill. He may indifferently chuſe his ways of acting, when order permits it; that is to ſay, when the ways of acting equally agree with his attributes; the different relations of which make that order, which is his inviolable Law, becauſe he neceſſarily loves himſelf: but he cannot chuſe thoſe ways of acting which are leſs wiſe, or leſs worthy of his attri-

attributes, there being an equality in other things; becauſe he cannot falſifie himſelf, becauſe he infinitely loves his Wiſdom, and after ſuch a manner, that it renders him happily impotent; that is, uncapable of making an ill choice which it may blame, a choice which may not be worthy thereof, which ſhall not be infinitely wiſe, nor perfectly worthy of his divine attributes.

See the 50, 51, 52, 53, and 54 Article of the Second Diſcourſe of this Treatiſe, the 3d Explication, the 11th Chriſtian Meditation, the 1ſt Chapter of the Treatiſe of Morality. See alſo the 19, 20, and 21 of this Treatiſe with the Additions.

It would be to no purpoſe to ſend the Reader to other places of my Books to make it appear, that they who make this Objection, do not take my Sentiments aright.

It muſt be obſerved, that God is not free, or indifferent, as Men are. He is free in a quite oppoſite ſenſe. Men are free in the choice of the means of their Happineſs. They may take the worſe. This argues a want of underſtanding. And they are not free, as to the end. They invincibly ſeek after their Happineſs from without. This is becauſe they are not ſelf-ſufficient. But God is fully ſufficient to himſelf, it is indifferent to him to act, or not outwardly. And ſeeing his Underſtanding has no bounds, and he ſees his own Law in himſelf, ſuppoſing that he reſolves to act, he cannot but reſolve alſo to act like himſelf, becauſe he invincibly loves his Wiſdom, and his other Attributes, againſt which he cannot offend. He is not indifferent in his choice, but when there is, on all ſides, a perfect

fect equality in the relations of the different ways with their different works.

When I ſaid, *That ſometimes, tho very rarely, the general Laws of Motions ought not to produce their effect*, I gave this reaſon thereof; --- *Becauſe the Order of Grace, to which that of Nature ought to be ſubſervient, requires, that Miracles ſhould be wrought upon ſome occaſions.* And I only add, by way (as it were) of Subſcription, --- *Beſides that, it is expedient Men ſhould know, that God is ſo much Maſter of Nature, that, if he ſubmits to the Laws which he hath eſtabliſhed, 'tis rather becauſe he willingly doth ſo, than by any abſolute neceſſity.*

I did not mean by theſe laſt words, that the obſervation of the Natural Laws, was *arbitrary* in God, in this ſenſe, that he could without reaſon neglect them, that he might work Miracles: but that it was expedient God ſhould make Nature ſerviceable to Grace, and let Men know, that he is ſuperiour to that which they call Nature. For Men look upon Nature and its Laws as ſomething neceſſary and independent. The Mind of Man is naturally diſpoſed towards *Manichiſm*. The reaſon of which is, becauſe natural or occaſional Cauſes are viſible, whereas the continual Operation of God in them, has nothing in it which ſtrikes the Senſes. Thus when God works Miracles, which aſtoniſh the World, one reaſon amongſt others is, to vindicate himſelf, and hinder Men from being deceived, and from having a mean Idea of his power; as I have ſaid in the Addition to *Art.* 21. This he doth alſo, to teach them who know, that the nature of things is nothing but the will of their *Author*; that God is not abſolutely neceſſitated to

do what he doth, and that if he follows his Laws, 'tis becauſe he chuſes to do ſo. For the only Law, which is not arbitrary to God, is immutable Order; and whether he follows his Laws, or diſpenſes with them, it is becauſe Order requires it: It is becauſe God always acts after ſuch a manner, as moſt honours his Perfections; the intelligible Relations of which make that which I call *immutable Order*, as I have explain'd it in ſeveral places.

Object. II.

God acts not as Men. He doth not well conſult the Idea of God, who judges of his Conduct by theirs. Men indeed are to govern their Deſigns according to their Strength; they muſt compare the Means with the End, the Ways with the Works: but this is becauſe they are weak. It is enough for God to will, that things may be. The Ways of God are his own Wills. So that he doth not compare the Ways with the Works, that he may determine his choice, after he has compared the ſimplicity of the Ways with the perfection of the Work. But he reſolved to give to the World what Perfection he pleaſed, without troubling himſelf about the Ways; becauſe his Ways are nothing but his Wills, and all his Wills are efficacious. To underſtand this Objection well, I deſire the Reader to conſult the 13th Article of the firſt Diſcourſe, againſt which it is made.

Anſwer.

I grant, that God doth not form his deſigns as Men do. He doth not, as they do, compare the means with the end, through weakneſs. He is not like unto an Architect, who has not Money enough to

to finiſh his Edifice. He compares the deſigns with the ways, in wiſdom, with reſpect to his attributes, and in that love which he bears to himſelf. All the ways of executing his deſigns are equally eaſie to him; but they are not equally wiſe, equally ſimple, equally divine. A wiſe Man will never undertake a deſign which diſhonours him, how eaſily ſoever it may be executed. And of two deſigns, the execution of which will unequally honour him, he will always chuſe that which will honour him the moſt; becauſe his ſelf-love is always inlightened by his Wiſdom. Thus, tho God be Almighty, he neither doth, nor can act, but by the love which he bears to himſelf, and his own attributes, he always chuſes both the work and the ways, which all together do moſt honour him.

But, 'tis ſaid, the ways of God are his wills. It is enough for him to will, that what he wills may be done. I confeſs it. The ways of God are nothing but his practical wills. 'Tis ſufficient for him to will the doing of any thing, to the end it may be done. But God cannot have two practical wills, when one is enough. God cannot will, when 'tis not wiſe to will. And upon this account it is, that the practical wills of God are not ordinarily any other than general wills, whoſe efficacy is determined by the action of occaſional cauſes. God loves Men. He would ſave them all. He deſires, that all ſhould know and love him: For order requires this, and order is his law. This will is agreeable to his attributes: But God will not do all that is neceſſary, to the end, that all may infallibly be brought to know and love him; becauſe order permits him not to have ſuch practical wills, as are proper to this end. It

is becauſe he ought not to diſturb the ſimplicity of his ways; 'tis becauſe he muſt fit his ways to the work, and chuſe the work and the ways which honour him the moſt.

Altho God need only to will, that the Church ſhould be formed, to the end it might be ſo; tho he needed only to will, that Men ſhould receive grace, to the end they might receive it; yet nothing is more certain, than that 'tis by J. C. he ſanctifies Men, and forms his Church: as it is alſo, that he governs the Nations by Angels, and produces Animals and Plants by other ſecond Cauſes. At preſent, God acts no more, as he did at the Creation, immediately by himſelf. This is undeniable. He acts by Creatures, in conſequence of that power which he has communicated unto them, by the eſtabliſhment of his general Laws. Thus his Laws, or his general, practical Wills, are his Ways; and his Ways are ſimple, uniform, and conſtant; they are perfectly worthy of him, becauſe they are perfectly agreeable with his Attributes, as I have often repeated. When God created the World, Men, Animals, Plants, organized Bodies, which contain in their Seeds, wherewithal to furniſh all Ages with their kind, he did this by particular wills. This was convenient for ſeveral reaſons; and indeed this could not be otherwiſe: For particular wills were neceſſary to begin the determination of motions. But ſeeing this way of acting was, as I may ſay, mean and ſervile, becauſe, in one ſenſe, it reſembled that of a limited underſtanding, God quitted it as ſoon as he could diſpenſe with himſelf from following it, as ſoon as he could pitch upon another more ſimple and divine

Divine way for the goverment of the World. At preſent, *he reſts:* not that he ceaſes to act; but becauſe he doth no more act after a ſervile manner, ſomething like unto that of his Miniſters: Becauſe he acts moſt agreeably to his Divine attributes.

Thus, tho God be Almighty, and all his wills efficacious; it doth not follow, that he ought not to compare the ſimplicity of the ways, with the perfection of the works; for 'tis not to Honour his Power, but to Honour his Wiſdom and his other Attributes, that he doth all things immediately by himſelf. In truth, what wiſdom wou'd it be even to ſave all Men, and to make a World infinitely more Beautiful than that which we inhabit, if he had made and govern'd it by particular wills? What ſhould we think of his Goodneſs, and other Attributes, there being in it ſo many Miſerable Perſons, ſo many Sinners, ſo many Monſters, ſo many Diſorders, ſo many Damned? In a word, things being as we ſee they are, he ſaith, that he has no need of the Wicked, and yet the World is full of them: He hath not made Death, and yet all Men are ſubject thereunto.

'Tis the ſin, it may be ſaid, of the firſt Man by which it entred into the World: Very well. But why did not he hinder his Fall? Why did he not prevent it? Why did he eſtabliſh thoſe natural relations betwixt *Eve* and her Children, which communicate ſin unto them? Why did he make all deſcend from corrupted Parents? In a word, why did he not form our bodies by particular wills, or by ſuch wills did not ſuſpend the general Laws, by which the brain of the Mother acts upon the

* See the Explicat. of Original Sin, in the *Search after Truth.*

of her Child, and thereby * corrupts its mind, and makes its heart irregular? Why, I ſay, did he not do this, if it be indifferent to God to act, or not to act by particular wills? This is that which the Libertines demand, and this is what Chriſtian Philoſophers ſhould explain to them, to ſtop their Mouths. Reaſon, as much as may be, ſhould be reconciled with Religion. Hence it is that I Maintain it to be more worthy, not of the Power, but of the Wiſdom and other Divine Attributes; that the World ſhould be governed, and the future Church formed by the general Laws which God hath eſtabliſhed for this end, than by an infinite number of particular wills. Hence it is, that I aſſert, that God has not made the World, abſolutely as perfect as it might have been; but as perfect as he could, with relation to the ways moſt worthy of his Attributes; but has choſen the work and the ways which do moſt Honour him: For God cannot, and ought not to act but to Honour his Perfections, both by the ſimplicity of his ways, and the excellency of his work.

Object. III.

Whence is it then, that a thing ſo evident was never perceived by any of the Fathers, or the moſt ſubtil Divines? Whence is it, that St. *Auguſtine*, who has written ſo much againſt the *Manichees*, made no uſe of this Reaſon, that God acts not by particular wills; that thereby he might have proved that there is no neceſſity of attributing the deſtruction of his works one by another, the generation of Monſters, or other effects, which are thought to diſfigure his Work, to an evil principle? On the contrary, it is certain that never

any

any perſon, did more than this Father, own that nothing was done in all this, but by Gods particular orders, *&c.*

Anſwer.

'Tis not juſt to urge the Fathers and the Divines againſt me, when neither the one, nor the other are againſt me. If St. *Auguſtine*, or any other Father had conſidered my opinion, and afterwards refuted it, then he would truely have been againſt me, and his authority might have been urged againſt my ſentiment. But where can it be found that St. *Auguſtine* and St. *Thomas* have oppoſed that which I lay down; probably neither the one, nor the other, ever thought of it: And therefore neither the one, nor the other, could approve, or diſapprove it. They anſwered the objections of HERETICKS and LIBERTINES, after another manner than I do: I grant it. But are we forbidden to prove Religion by all ways poſſible? St. *Auguſtine* anſwered the *Manichees* according to the principles which theſe Hereticks received; and I anſwer the Hereticks of theſe times, according to thoſe principles which they receive. Ought we not to ſpeak unto Men according to their Ideas? The Treatiſe of *Nature* and *Grace*, I have often ſaid, was not made for all Men; I pretend only to juſtifie the Wiſdom, and Goodneſs of God, in the Conſtruction of his Work to the minds of ſome certain Philoſophers; notwithſtanding all the Diſorders which may be obſerved therein, and the Damnation of the greateſt number of Men. Neither St. *Auguſtine* nor St. *Thomas*, have written any thing, either for, or againſt the *Carteſians*, of whom they had no know-

ledge. How then ſhould we find any thing in their works, either condemning, or approving the Reaſons, which I have drawn from the principles of theſe Philoſophers, to convince them, that God ſincerely wills the Salvation of all Men, and that if he doth not ſave all, it is becauſe he loves his Wiſdom more than his Work? Aſſuredly it is to abuſe the ſimplicity of the Readers, and the reſpect which they have for the Fathers, to raiſe prejudices in them by a many citations out of great men; and endeavour by their ſuffrages, to condemn thoſe principles, which probably were not known to them, ſo far were they from rejecting them, as untrue. For at the bottom, all ſuch paſſages, tho different from what I ſay, tend to prove the ſame truths of Faith which I maintain; for I have not, and never ſhall, I hope, quit this Maxim of the *Search after Truth*, That novelty, in matter of Divinity is a *ſign* of Error. I diſtinguiſh the Truths of Faith, from thoſe of Reaſon; and ſhall always ſeek for Theological Doctrines in Tradition. But I ſhall endeavour to prove theſe Doctrines to others by thoſe Philoſophical principles which they receive; or however thoſe whereby I may hope to be able to convince them.

St. *Auguſtine* has not anſwered the ſame objectiojections, as I do; What follows from hence, That they did not come into his mind? Not at all. That he did not approve them? By no means. That he has condemned them, as contrary to the Faith? Still leſs. 'Tis becauſe he did not, perhaps, think them proper to perſwade thoſe, againſt whom he wrote. For had I lived in St. *Auguſtine's*

guſtine's time, and had written for all men, and not for ſome particular Men, who are accuſtomto certain Principles; I ſhould not have ſpoken as I have done in the *Treatiſe of Nature and Grace*, becauſe common ſenſe requires, that we ſhould ſpeak to Men according to their Ideas, in a Language which they well underſtand, and willingly hearken unto. No perſon can think that the Principles which I ſuppoſe in the Treatiſe, were known to the *Manichees*; ſo that it would have been an odd undertaking to have perſwaded them of the truth thereof, that afterwards they might be convinc't by theſe Principles, that they were in Error.

Moreover, all Men are not capable to underſtand theſe principles; to this end a great deal of time, and application is neceſſary, without mentioning ſeveral other requiſite qualifications, which all Men have not. In truth, the greateſt part of publick Diſputes, ſuch as thoſe were which St. *Auguſtine* had with the *Manichees*, will not permit Men to make uſe of abſtracted notions, to give light to the Truth. It was therefore better done, to deny, for example, That Monſters made the Work of God leſs Perfect, by comparing them to the Diſſonances in Muſick, and the Shades in Painting, which give more Body and Life to the Figures. It was much the ſhorter way for the *Manichees*, to ſhew them, that the mind of Man is too weak to judge of the Deſigns of God, and compare all the parts of the World together, thereby to diſcover the juſt relations of them; than to explain to them thoſe principles, which are neceſſary to make Men comprehend that certain

tain diſmal effects are the neceſſary conſequences of the ſimplicity of the ways, by which God executes his deſigns. Theſe Hereticks would perhaps have learnt nothing by theſe principles, and their rebellious imagination was to be humbled by ſenſible Reaſons, and ſuitable to their capacity. And if this was not enough to content the underſtanding, and convince by light and evidence; it was however ſufficient to oblige them to ſilence, reſtrain their Pride, and to give ſatisfaction to the *Catholicks*, who aſſiſted at St. *Auguſtine*'s Conferences, or read his works with a pious diſpoſition of mind. I ſhould my ſelf fear that I ſhould be wanting to Religion, if I ſhould uſe ſuch like Reaſons to ſatisfie thoſe who ſhould make ſuch objections to me; if I ſaw that they could not attend unto Truths much abſtracted, and yet that it was neceſſary to ſatisfie them, with reſpect to their doubts, wherewithal they were intangled. And aſſuredly it would be unjuſt for any man thence to conclude, either that I contradict my ſelf in my works, or that I have not thoſe ſentiments, of which I am convinc't. For we ought to ſatisfie all Men, the Simple, as well as the Philoſophers, and keep both the one and other in that ſubmiſſion which they owe to the Truths of Faith. This certainly was St. *Auguſtine*'s deſign in his writings againſt the *Manichees*; and 'tis alſo of all the Fathers, and of all Divines: They all laboured only to maintain the Faith, by reaſons fitted to the capacity of thoſe they had to deal with, and according to ſuch Principles as they received.

But

But if ſome Philoſophers, full of ſublime Metaphiſicks, come and tell me, that God as poſitively and directly wills evil, as he doth the good; that he doth not truely will the Beauty of the Univerſe, and by no means, the particular perfection of any of his Creatures: That the World is an Harmony, whereof Monſters are the neceſſary diſſonances: That God wills there ſhould be Sinners as well as juſt Perſons, and that as the Shades in Painting, make the Face to appear, and gives (as it were) body to the Picture; So the the wicked are abſolutely neceſſary in the work of God, that the virtue of good Men may be more remarkable: And that thus God himſelf is the Author of Sin, who wills it, and works it in us, and by us, as truely as our good works; and that Free-will is no more than a vain title of Honour, wherewithal Men generally flatter themſelves. What ſhall I anſwer to theſe Philoſophers, according to their principles —— *That God doth all that is real in the Creatures, and that he permits nothing according to vulgar Ideas?* Principles, which in my opinion, it is impoſſible to overthrow, and which I ſhould be ſorry to ſee overthrown, becauſe they are infinitely advantageous to Religion. May I not make it appear, that the word *Permit* bears a ſenſe worthy of God, which is not contrary to their Principles, and yet deſtroys their Errors? I cannot do it, without taking another Method than St. *Auguſtine* has done. May I not, ought I not to quit the Reaſons which he gives to ſilence the *Manichees*, ſeeing that they are made uſe of by ſome Perſons in defence of their Errors, and inſinuate them into the minds of Men; provided that otherwiſe

therwiſe I uſe clear Principles, and which, at one blow, overturns the Hereſie of the *Manichees*, as well as Libertiniſm? For this, I appeal to all equitable perſons as Judges, what eſteem ſoever they have for St. *Auguſtin*; I alſo appeal to * St. *Auguſtin* himſelf, when he directs his Readers how they ought to judge of his Writings.

* *Epiſt.* 143, & 148. *De Trin. Lib.* 3. c. 1.

Now 'tis evident, by my Principles, that nothing is more ridiculous than the *Manichees* way of reaſoning, who pretended to prove the neceſſity of an Evil Principle, by all thoſe diſmal effects which a beneficent and a wiſe God cannot directly and poſitively will, and which he is ſaid to *permit*, rather than to have deſignedly brought them to paſs; tho ordinarily Men do not too well underſtand what they ſay, when they aſſure us, that God *permits*, and doth not do them. But if my Principles overturn the very Foundation of *Manichiſm*, they alſo undeniably confute, if I am not deceived, the moſt dangerous Errours, which the World is at preſent much more ready to embrace.

I ſay then, without fear of *blaſpheming againſt the Power of God*, and in honour of his Wiſdom, that he doth not directly and poſitively will Monſters, and that he doth not produce them, but in conſequence of his Laws, the ſimplicity, uniformity, generality of which he ought not to diſturb. I boldly affirm, with the Scripture, that *God hath no need of the wicked*; and that, if he ſuffered the firſt Man to fall, and to communicate to us his ſin, it is becauſe * Order required, that he ſhould not prevent it by the grace of ſentiment, ſeeing *Adam*

* *Treat. of Nature and Grace*, Art. 29, 30.--34. of the 2d Diſcourſe Explicat. of the 5th Chapter of the *Search*, &c. and of Original Sin.

had

had no concupiſcence to overcome. It is becauſe God was obliged to cauſe Men to be born by the moſt ſimple ways of ordinary Generation, that ſo his Conduct might agree with his Attributes, and all his Works might have admirable relations to one another; but, by no means, that Sin might be communicated, and Monſters produced. 'Tis true, it may be ſaid againſt the *Manichees*, that Monſters give a kind of Beauty to the World, and that God makes uſe of the wicked, and even Devils themſelves, for the execution of his purpoſes. For all things, even Diſorder it ſelf, ſet forth the Order of Providence: But Diſorder always continues what it is. God *permits* it, becauſe he can make it ſerve divers uſes. But he wills it not, becauſe he hath not eſtabliſhed his Laws, that it ſhould happen, and becauſe he hath not made Man free, that he ſhould not love him.

Shadows are neceſſary in Painting, and Diſſonances in Muſick. Therefore Women ought to be abortive, and bring forth Monſters. What a Conſequence is this! I can confidently anſwer the Philoſopers, That theſe Monſters ordinarily come from modeſt Women, and ſubſiſt but a few days: So neceſſary are they to the beauty of the *Univerſe!* There are many more wicked, than good Men; reprobate, than elect: So many Conſonances are there in the Harmony of the Creatures! Shall there be any Monſters in the future Church, and wicked Men in the holy City? Doubtleſs not. Behold then the Painter's Cloth without Shades, and an Harmony without Diſſonances. Thus all thoſe diſmal Effects which God permits in the World, are not at all neceſſary to it.

it. And if there be Black with White, Diſſonances with Conſonances, this doth not give more
* Force. * Boldneſs to the Picture, or Sweetneſs to the Muſick: I mean, this doth not, at the bottom, render the Work of God more perfect. This, on the contrary, diſfigures it, and makes it diſagreeable to all thoſe who love Order. For tho it may be ſaid, that Monſters give a kind of beauty to the World, nothing is more evident, than that this is only a beauty in appearance, and that, in truth, the World is leſs perfect. The weak ſighted, or the blind, make the moſt ſtupid obſerve, that they have two good eyes. Thus blind Men ſerve to illuſtrate the perfection of Man: But they do not, I hope, render Mankind more perfect. Vice, in reſpect of us, makes Vertue more conſpicuous; but ſurely it neither adds to its perfection, nor its merit. God makes uſe of wicked Men, for the tryal of the good: but 'tis becauſe, as I may ſay, he finds them already made ſo to his hands; for they are no ways neceſſary to him. God did never poſitively and directly will ſuch Shadows and ſuch Diſſonances, tho he poſitively and directly wills, that they ſhall be ſubſervient to his Glory. Theſe are pretty Compariſons, which pleaſe the Imagination, but do not enlighten the Mind; they are proper enough to inculcate that which is already believed; but aſſuredly they cannot be uſed, as a Principle whereby Libertiniſm may be deſtroyed, with what Eloquence ſoever they may be laid forth.

This is what I ſhould anſwer, not to St. *Auguſtin*, whoſe meaning was right, and who deſerves to be reſpected for his edifying Anſwers, and ſuch as were fitted to the capacity of thoſe he deſired

to

to undeceive. But this is what I would anſwer to thoſe who abuſe his Authority, and draw from his Writings ſuch Conſequences, as are fitted to overturn the very Foundations of Religion. I grant, with this holy Doctor, that there is no *Evil Principle*, which (notwithſtanding all the endeavours of a gracious God to the contrary) produces all the irregularities of the Univerſe, whether he will or no; which was that which he deſigned to prove againſt the Hereticks of his time. But I am not afraid to give new Proofs, to convince the Hereticks of this Age, that God ſincerely wills, that all Men ſhould be ſaved; that he is not the Author of Sin; in a word, that Monſters, whether in Nature, or Morality, leſſen the perfection of his Work; that he wills them not, and that if he permits them, 'tis becauſe he wills, that his Conduct ſhould bear the Character of his Attributes. I will never ſay, that God had a direct and poſitive will to produce all thoſe diſmal effects which Piety and the Idea of a good, wiſe, and juſt God oblige us to ſay, that he *permits*, rather than deſignedly brings to paſs. And in this it ſeems to me, that I follow the ſentiment or inclination of all Divines, and all the Fathers, tho perhaps they did not joyn the ſame Idea to the word *permit*, becauſe they ſpeak to perſons who did not reaſon upon thoſe Principles they do, for whom I have written the Treatiſe of Nature and Grace.

Obj. IV.

It is great raſhneſs, to find faults in the Works of God; 'tis nothing but Mens ignorance which makes them do ſo; 'tis becauſe they know not the

the designs of the Creator, and cannot compare the parts of the Universe with the whole. If any one should be so short sighted, as that he could see but a little part of a piece of *Mosaick* Work, he would be tempted to blame the Workman, for having put the parts of this Work ill together; but the reason is, because he could not apprehend the beauty which they have all together. God makes the Succession of Ages to go on with an admirable order. Every thing has its time, and ought to have such a perfection, and such a duration. In a word, nothing in the World is done, but by the Will of God, Monsters as well as perfect Works, *&c.*

Answer.

All this sounds well out of the mouth of St *Augustin*, speaking of the *Manichees*. I should willingly make such Answers my self, did I speak to these Hereticks, or those to whom they would be satisfactory, or were not capable to comprehend such as are more abstract. But since, in the Treatise of Nature and Grace, I speak to those who have espoused Principles which the *Manichees* knew not, I am bound to give other Answers to them; and this the more, because I see they abuse excellent Principles, and draw from them Consequences injurious to Religion.

Whether Monsters be, or be not *Faults* in the Universe; Whether God wills, or wills them not with a positive will; this is much the same to me. I suppose that they are faults, and that God wills them only indirectly; because this, if I mistake not, is the most common Opinion, and which I think is true. Yet surely it is lawful for me to justi-

juſtifie the Wiſdom of God to the Minds of thoſe who are of this Opinion, tho they nevertheleſs ſhould be deceived. But how far is this from being that, for which I compoſed the Treatiſe of Nature and Grace? If I have laboured to juſtifie the Wiſdom of God in the Works of Nature, notwithſtanding Monſters, it is becauſe * I then intended to juſtifie his Wiſdom and his Goodneſs in the Works of Grace, notwithſtanding the infinite number of wicked Men and Reprobates. It ſufficiently appears, that if I ſpeak firſt of the Diſorders of Nature, in the firſt Diſcourſe of the Treatiſe, and have ſearched after the Reaſons thereof; it was that I might render my Principles more ſenſible, and accuſtom Men to ſearch after, and acknowledge the Cauſe of other Diſorders, more conſiderable than the generation of Monſters.

* See the firſt Diſcourſe of this Treatiſe.

And tho ſome may ſay, they *admire Men do not perceive how much my way of ſpeaking ought to offend Chriſtian ears*, yet I fear not to repeat it: The Univerſe is not as perfect as abſolutely it might be, but only as perfect as it could be, with relation to the ways moſt worthy of the Divine Attributes. There are *viſible Faults* in the Work of God, in his Work, I ſay, but not in his Conduct. It is a viſible fault, that *an Infant ſhould be born with ſuperfluous Members, and which hinders it from living.* I have ſaid this, and this I maintain. I had rather leave this fault in the Body of this unhappy Infant, and conſequently in the Univerſe, than caſt it upon the deſtructive intentions of its Author. I know very well, that this Monſter comes not into the World, *but by the will of God*, as St. *Auguſtin*

ſays, and that there is no need of having recourſe to an evil Principle, with the *Manichees*, that we may explain its Birth. But I think I am bound to maintain, in honour of the Divine Attributes, that it is not the Effect of a particular and direct Will of our God; it is becauſe he is obliged to preſerve the ſimplicity of his Laws, rather than hinder this particular diſorder; it is becauſe he permits it; or that tho he doth it, 'tis not becauſe he directly and poſitively wills the doing of it, as I have explained ſo many ways.

But, it may be ſaid, What need of theſe ſimple Ways, and theſe Metaphyſical Principles, unknown to the Ancients? Is it not the ſhorter way to deny, that there are any Faults in the Work of God? This, I anſwer, is true: This is to cut the knot, inſtead of unlooſing it. But I ſpeak to thoſe who hold, that Monſters do diſfigure the Univerſe, or that Sinners do not. I think I ought not to tell them, that *it is the Ignorance of Men, which make them look upon Monſters as viſible Faults*, leſt I ſhould confirm them in this Error, That Sinners are abſolutely neceſſary to the Beauty of the Univerſe. For 'tis to turn them from this abominable thought, that, from Metaphyſical Principles which they receive, I draw Conſequences which perhaps may diſpleaſe ſome perſons.

But how is it, that Men do not ſee, that this Anſwer, which is ſo much valued, and is founded upon St. *Auguſtin*'s Authority, is only fit to darken the mind, tho well adapted to the underſtanding of the *Manichees*? Suppoſing it be true, that it is, in truth, *the ignorance we are in, of the deſigns of God, which makes us find fault with his Works*; what

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can we find in the World, which deſerves our admiration? Let the World be made how it will, it will be always alike admirable; that is, it will not be admirable at all. Since we know not the deſigns of God, that which appears Monſtrous to us, is not ſo in reſpect of him; it is becauſe we are deceived, and our ignorance makes us find fault where there is none: Very well. But by this Principle, nothing is Perfect, but with relation to the deſigns of the Creator; now theſe deſigns are unknown to us: Therefore we ought to admire nothing in his work. If I judge it an handſome and becoming thing, that God has plac't the Eyes in the uppermoſt part of the Head; I ought by the ſame reaſon, to think it is an uncomely thing, that he has placed them in the Belly of a Monſter; or cauſed one to be born with Eyes which cannot receive the action of the Light. In a word, let the order of the World be what it will, I ought equally to admire it, or rather I ought not to admire it at all, if it be not perfect, but with reſpect to thoſe deſigns which are unknown to me. 'Tis therefore to be wilfully blind to compare the Works of God with his unſearchable Deſigns, inſtead of diſcerning their Beauties, and conſequently their Defects by the Light of that univerſal Reaſon, which inlightens all minds and teaches the moſt Stupid, that the Eyes were made for ſeeing, and plac'd in the uppermoſt part of the Head, that we might ſee further: Is it not plain, that the perfection of a work, depends not upon the deſigns of the workman, if his deſigns themſelves be not agreeable to the Reaſon which enlightens us. If all the parts

of a Watch have ſuch relations and connections with one another, as are neceſſary to meaſure the time exactly; this is a perfect work in its kind, tho it ſhould be ſuppoſed, that the Watch-maker had the extravagant deſign of making a thing good for nothing, and if a Watch ſhould not rightly point to the hours, it would have an Eſſential fault, what deſign ſoever he had, who made it.

Thus a Monſter is an imperfect work, whatſoever the deſign of God was, in making it. Ought we not to find fault rather with the works of God, than with his deſigns? Should we not rather leave in the World thoſe viſible defects, which all Men obſerve, and which we cannot remove, and maintain that all theſe diſorders are conſequences of the ſimplicity of the Natural Laws; then pretend that God directly and poſitively wills them, and attribute to a Being abſolutely Perfect ſuch deſigns as are unworthy of his Wiſdom, his Goodneſs, and his other Attributes? Not that I aſſume to my ſelf a Right of pronouncing concerning all natural effects: For I confeſs there are an infinite number that are Equivocal, of which we cannot determine whether they do, or do not, render the World more Perfect. But there are ſuch Monſters whoſe Deformity is viſible, and which are ſo far from making the World more perfect, that God ſeems to have repented that he brought them to Light, ſeeing he ſtrikes them with Death preſently after their Birth; in this number I put not only thoſe effects which we call Monſters, but all Creatures which want parts neceſſary for their preſervation: I hold that God di-

directly wills the Perfection of the World, and of all the parts that compose it. For a World made up of Creatures, which want nothing which they ought to have, is more Perfect than a World full of Monsters, and a great many Beings which have not that which Reason teaches us they ought to have for their preservation. But it should always be remembred that all this is but accessary to the Question in hand; the Principle is, that wicked Men are not necessary to the perfection of the Universe, and if we meet with a great many of them therein notwithstanding God abhors them, it is because (altho he may hinder them by his Power) his Wisdom permits him not to have practical wills for this end; and because his Justice subjecting them to the Law of Order, they contribute whether they will or no, not to the Sovereign Perfection of the Universe, but rather to the glory of its Author, and do admirably set forth the wisdom of his Conduct.

But, it may be said, you do not consider the the World in all Ages; you look only upon the present time: Cast your Eyes further. And if you have a Soul large enough, admire the Relations which there are betwixt this World, and the future Church; betwixt the different States of the World, in different Ages.

I Answer, I confess that these Relations are admirable: But it is because God wonderfully serves himself, even of those disorders themselves which happen in consequence of the natural Laws; and makes even the ill use which spirits make of their Liberty, subservient to his glory. Once more, it is not because Monsters are necessary to ren-

der the World more perfect: It is not because he positively willed, that the number of the Damned should be the greatest part. Infernal *Babylon* is not properly his work, but the Devils. By the Rigours of his Justice, the Wicked are reduc't to Order: But he wills not their Malice, tho he uses it to brighten, and set forth the virtue of his Saints. He figures Morality by Nature, Sinners by Monsters; but he directly wills neither the one, nor the other: He suffers them because he can reduce both to Order. But if he suffers them, 'tis because the simplicity of his Laws require it, and because he ows this to himself, that his Conduct should bear the Character of his Attributes. That which renders the World admirable in all its Conditions, is not so much the perfection it contains, as the simplicity of the ways which have produced, and do preserve it. If the future Church was more ample, and Hell not so full of Reprobates: If the Elect were still more Holy, and the Devils less Wicked: If all the Creatures did Praise the Lord, and not the greatest part Blaspheme his Holy Name; is it not evident that the World would be more perfect than it is? The Devils therefore and the Damned render it less perfect. And tho God corrects this disorder in his Creatures, yet nevertheless 'tis a disorder, that the greatest part of Men should Blaspheme their Creator. But God is not concern'd that there should be disorders in Hell, provided that there be none in the Heavenly *Jerusalem*; he is willing that there should be faults in his work, but not in his Conduct, and in his designs: The Damned are in disorder, but God's

God's conduct, in reſpect of them, is perfectly agreeable to order: The faults of any work oblige thoſe who would judge of it, to compare it with the ways, that, at the ſame time, they may admire both the work and the ways; but the faults of any deſign directly ſuppoſe either malice or ignorance in the Workman. Hence we are forc'd to ſay, that God has made the World not abſolutely as perfect as he could, but as perfect as it could be, with reſpect to the ways which his Wiſdom and other Attributes did oblige him to obſerve, which is the Foundation of the *Treatiſe of Nature and Grace.* I deſire it may be examined without prejudice, and with that attention which is neceſſary to underſtand it in its utmoſt extent, and with reference to all its conſequences; and then let Men judge of it. Then I hope it will have that effect upon them it has had upon many perſons, tho prevented with the ſentiments which it overthrows, without leaving any other difficulties, if I am not miſtaken, than thoſe which have always been look'd upon as incomprehenſible to the mind of Man. I do aſſure my ſelf, that they will clearly ſee, that there are no ſuch certain Principles to prove by reaſon, that which Faith teaches, and to ſilence both the Libertines and the Hereticks, in a matter wherein they uſe to inſult and pretend to triumph.

Object. V.

What would the Author of the Treatiſe have by his great Principle, That the Ways of God ought to bear the Character of his Immutability? Is it that God cannot do one thing to day, and another to morrow, without being inconſtant? Cannot he will to day, that the Vine ſhould put

forth, and to morrow be blaſted, and will it for very good reaſons? We muſt know the deſigns of Men, to underſtand whether they forſake them, and want conſtancy and firmneſs of mind, or not: For they may have a deſign, to do, at different times, things quite oppoſite to one another. But who knoweth the deſigns of God? This would be a very fit Principle to juſtifie the Reproach which Pagans caſt out againſt Chriſtians, That their God ſhews himſelf to be inconſtant, by aboliſhing the ancient Sacrifices, which he himſelf had appointed. This appears by *Marcellinus*'s Letter to St. *Auguſtin*, where he acquaints this Father, That the Change of the firſt Sacrifices, was one of the things which ſtuck moſt with *Voluſianus*. *Maxime*, ſays he, *quia iſta varietas inconſtantiæ Deum poſſit arguere*. This Objection would have been a convincing Reaſon againſt the Chriſtian Religion, if it be true, that it is always a mark of inconſtancy, to unmake at one time, what is made at another.

Anſwer.

I do not ſay, that, to unmake at one time, what is made at another, is not always a mark of inconſtancy: Nay, in reſpect of God, this, I ſay, is never a mark thereof. The reaſon is, becauſe God doth not ordinarily act by particular wills: For I maintain, that God doth not by ſuch wills make a Straw, for example, turn a 1000 times about; but only by the Wind, in conſequence of the natural Laws, which are his general Wills. I endeavour, by the uniformity of God's Conduct, and the ſimplicity of his Ways, to reconcile infinite Contradictions which we meet with in his Work; and there-

thereby I ſilence the *Manichees* and Philoſophers, who judge of God by themſelves; thoſe attributing to a blind Nature, and theſe to a malevolent God, thoſe natural Effects which contradict one another. The Lions eat the Wolves, and the Wolves the Sheep, and the Sheep the Graſs, which God makes to grow; and all this, becauſe the Laws of Nature, tho ſimple and always exactly obſerved, are fruitful enough to cover the Earth with Flowers and Fruits; and furniſh to the Sheep, and an infinite number of other Animals, their food; to the end, that they themſelves may be nouriſhment to thoſe which are their Superiours, either by ſtrength or cunning. I omit other Reaſons not proper to my Subject. All this, I ſay again, is done in conſequence of general Laws; inſomuch, that all theſe Effects which contradict one another, do not imply any contradiction in the Cauſe which produces them, becauſe this Cauſe doth not act; and ought not to act by particular wills. Nevertheleſs, I have ſaid, and do ſay it again, that to make and unmake, and make again the ſame things a thouſand times in a day, is a ſufficient ſign of inconſtancy; and if otherwiſe we did not know, that there is no defect in God, we ſhould naturally be inclined to think there is. If my Principle ſhould be rejected, --- *That God acts not by particular Wills, but in conſequence of general Laws:* I maintain, that the ways of God ought to bear the Character of his Attributes, and that his practical Wills ſhould be the ſame, till the work for which they were appointed be atchieved: the ſame, I ſay, with reſpect to his immutability, if the juſtice which he owes to his other Attributes doth

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not oblige him to change. But I never ſaid, that God could not undo that to morrow, which he doth to day, without giving Men occaſion to accuſe him of inconſtancy; becauſe the ſame general Laws do produce an infinite number of different Effects in the World: The Night, the Day, the Seaſons of the Year, every thing (ſays St. *Auguſtine*) is ſubject to change; but the Laws which God obſerves in the courſe of his Providence change not: *Hæc omnia mutantur, nec mutatur Divinæ Providentiæ ratio, qua fit, ut iſta mutentur.* The ways of God, that is, his practical wills are always the ſame; there has been no eſſential change in the general Laws, ſince their firſt eſtabliſhment; the Bodies which ſtrike upon one another, are reflected now as they were four thouſand Years ago; the Laws of union of the Soul and Body, and thoſe of the union of the Mind with univerſal Reaſon, are ſtill the ſame now they were in *Adam*'s time; the ſin of the firſt Man, has only deprived us of the power which he had of ſuſpending the action of theſe firſt Laws, by that ſtrict union which he then had with univerſal Reaſon, in conſequence of other Laws which ſtill ſubſiſt, and make our wills the occaſional cauſes of the Ideas which are preſented to our minds. Laſtly, The Laws by which God has given unto good and bad Angels the power to act upon bodies, and by them upon our minds, are ſtill the ſame in the main, tho the bad ones cannot make uſe of this power as they would, by reaſon of the reſiſtance of our tutelary Angels, and for other reaſons little underſtood.

Thus I am of the opinion, that the ways of God always carry in them the character of his immutability,

tability, and that he never changes any thing in them till his work ſhall be finiſhed, if the Law of Order requires not that they ſhould have the Character of ſome other of his Attributes.

Once more, I never ſaid, that what God makes, unmakes, and makes again, implies any change in his Conduct, ſince, according to my opinion, all theſe effects are the conſequences of the ſimplicity and fruitfulneſs of his ways: I only maintain, that if God ſhould act by particular wills, what he doth would ſignifie inconſtancy in his deſigns, ſince there are things which he makes, unmakes, and makes again, an hundred times in a day, without any apparent profit or neceſſity; for ſurely, it is a mark of inconſtancy, to undo that which one has done, to make it again what it was before. And 'tis, in my thoughts, to ſpeak of God very much after the manner of Men, and very unworthily of his Attributes, to aſcribe unto him as many particular Deſigns, or practical Wills, as there are little Straws which are whirl'd about with the Wind, or Leafs and Fruits which the Rain nouriſhes and the Froſt deſtroys; for experience teaches us, that theſe Effects are only the Conſequences of the Natural Laws, which God hath eſtabliſhed, to make the World as perfect as it can be, acting as becomes himſelf.

The Objection which the Pagans made, by asking, Whether the God of the Chriſtians was not the ſame with him of the Old Teſtament; and if ſo, why he had aboliſhed his ancient Sacrifices? This Objection, I ſay, touches me the leaſt of any one; ſo far is it, according to my Principle, from being a convincing Reaſon of the falſeneſs of Religion;

ligion; for tho the ways of God be always the ſame, the effects thereof may, and ought to be different, according to different times. God gave to Angels the power of governing the Nations, eſpecially the Jews, in conſequence of general Laws, which are his ways: So that it is rather the Laws of Angels which are abrogated, than the ways of God that are changed; for thoſe Laws which God had given to the Jews, by the Miniſtry of Angels, were to be abrogated at the coming of J. C. The Figures were to ceaſe in the preſence of the true Meſſias and his Myſteries: But the Power which the Angels have over Men ſhall never be changed; becauſe the general Laws, by which God hath given them this power, ſhall never be aboliſhed, unleſs perhaps when the holy City ſhall be built, and Jeſus Chriſt ſhall have given up his Kingdom to his Father, and brought to nought all Powers, and God ſhall be all in all; till this happy time, the Angels, in dependance upon J. C. their Head, will always work in the Spiritual Building of the Church; and God, acting in them, and by them, according to the ſame Laws, will produce a thouſand and a thouſand different effects; and yet, according to my Principles, cannot be ſuppoſed to be in the leaſt unconſtant: For tho by particular wills, he cures (as I may ſay) the defects which might follow theſe Laws, when order requires it, (I have ſufficiently explained this elſewhere) tho he guides our Conductors, that they may faithfully execute his deſigns; yet, ſince his ways are always the ſame, it ſufficiently appears, that it is not, through inconſtancy, that he ſometimes acts againſt the ordinary courſe of his Providence, but becauſe he is obli-

obliged to have reſpect unto all his Attributes, as well as his Immutability.

Object. VI.

The Author of the Treatiſe ſays, That he is perſwaded, that theſe two natural Laws, which are the moſt ſimple of all, *viz. That all Motion proceeds, or tends to proceed in a right line --- And that when Bodies ſtrike upon one another, their motions are communicated proportionably to the magnitude of the Bodies, which ſtrike upon one another*, are ſufficient to produce ſuch a World as we ſee; I mean, the Heaven, the Stars, the Planets, the Comets, the Earth, the Water, the Air, and the Fire; in a word, the Elements, and all Bodies, except thoſe which are organized and animated. This therefore would have been the moſt ſimple way of producing the World, to have ſtayed till it had formed it ſelf of the matter which God had created and put into motion, according to theſe two Laws, without imploying therein particular wills. This ſuppoſed, I ſee not what the Author could anſwer to a Libertine, who ſhould thus accoſt him: Therefore, according to you, that which is ſaid in *Geneſis*, is not true. For, on the one hand, you maintain, It is evident, that God cannot falſifie himſelf, and being infinitely wiſe, cannot but act wiſely; and that it would not to be to act wiſely, to do that by compounded ways and particular wills, which he may execute by ſimple ways and general wills. And, on the other, you teach me, that the World, ſuch as we ſee it to be, might have been produced by theſe two natural Laws, which are the moſt ſimple of all other: Therefore God has made it after this manner, and not as it is ſaid in *Geneſis*, where the Crea-

Creation is deſcribed, as if it had been made by particular wills, and not by theſe ſimple ways, which yet, you teach us, is unworthy of the wiſdom of God. Would you tell him, that God has his Reaſons for this? But this Libertine will anſwer, That there can be no reaſon, why God ſhould falſifie himſelf; why he, who is infinitely wiſe, ſhould not act wiſely; why, it being in his power to have form'd a work, worthy of himſelf, by an uniform, conſtant, and regular Conduct, he has choſen one, which is unequal, changeable, irregular, and which ſhews inconſtancy, and ignorance, in him, who obſerves it, *&c.*

Anſwer.

I ſhould ſay to this Libertine, that he little underſtands what he ſays, and he who undertakes to overthrow the ſentiments of any Author, ſhould take them aright; for nothing is more eaſie, than to confound things, when the matters treated of are obſcure in themſelves. According to your opinion (ſays this Libertine) that which *Moſes* relates of the Creation of the World in *Geneſis*, is not true. Fairly and ſoftly, I ſhould anſwer, you neither underſtand what the Scripture ſaith, nor what my ſentiments are; as for *Geneſis*, I ſhall not explain it to you: But this is my ſenſe; obſerve it well. I maintain, that God always acts by the moſt ſimple ways, but it muſt be always ſuppoſed, that there is an equality in all things elſe, whether in the ways, or in the works, as I have ſo often explained; it muſt alſo be ſuppoſed, that Order doth not require that he ſhould compound his ways, God never falſifies himſelf: Very well. But to change Conduct, is

is not always to falſifie himſelf. God may, nay, he ought to compound his ways, when that which he owes to his Wiſdom, his Juſtice, to any one of his Attributes is more conſiderable, than that which he owes to his Immutability; God would falſifie himſelf, if upon ſome occaſions he did not change his Conduct; for he would not do that Juſtice which he owes to himſelf and his divine attributes, and thus would not obſerve that immutable Order, which is properly his Law, or the inviolable Rule of his proceedings. He would ceaſe to love himſelf, to act for himſelf, he would ſin. You look upon things only on one ſide: You compare the Conduct of God only with his Immutability. Compare his ways with all his attributes, and you may eaſily comprehend, that tho *there can be no reaſon which obliges God to falſifie himſelf*, there may be many which oblige him to change his Conduct: And do not ask me, in ſuch and ſuch occurrences, what are his reaſons; for neither I, nor any perſon elſe, can be aſſured that we know them. This, in reaſon, is enough to ſilence this Libertine; for tho I do not take upon me, to know the particular reaſons, why God ceaſes to follow his general Laws, or to act by the moſt ſimple ways, I think I know, that he never ceaſes to follow theſe Laws, and that he never compounds his ways, but when Order obliges him thereunto. And this, I think, I have proved ſo many ways, that it is to no purpoſe to do it any more: Nevertheleſs let us examine the difficulty to the bottom.

I maintain that God has made the World by the moſt ſimple ways: For I ſay, that in forming the World, he has obſerved theſe two Laws,

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as far as 'twas poſſible. The form of Bodies proceeds only from the various motions of thoſe Bodies which are about and within them. Now I maintain that this variety of motions which is at preſent obſerved, and that of the Motions which have been made from the beginning of the World, is the effect of the ſame Law of the communications of motions, by which this Libertine would have had the World made ſucceſſively by little and little that God might have ſpared his particular wills. This Libertine doth not obſerve, that he puts into his conſequence, that condition, which renders it impoſſible, *viz.* That God gives to the parts of Matter ſuch a motion, as is fit to form the World, *without acting by particular wills*; for 'tis evident at the firſt, ſuch like wills are neceſſary, to determine the firſt motions, which preſently ought to be very different; ſome towards the right, others to the left, theſe moving upwards, thoſe downwards, to divide matter into an infinite number of parts. It is upon this overſight, his difficulty is grounded: Let us ſuppoſe that the World, as yet, is no more than a rude heap of matter; it is plain, that Heaven, Earth, the Stars, *&c.* may be formed by a little and little, (as this Libertine pretends) God muſt needs, at firſt, put all the parts of matter into motion, or into a tendency to move in a right line, ſome on one ſide, and ſome on another. Thus before bodies could ſtrike upon one another, that is, before there could be any occaſional cauſe of the communication of motions, it was neceſſary that God ſhould move the parts of matter, after infinitely different manners, by particular wills. Now if

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it be clearly conceiv'd, that it is the diversity of motions which make the different forms of Bodies; it will easily be apprehended, that God might form the World all at once, by moving the parts of matter towards different sides, without imploying therein more particular wills than he would have imployed therein, had he moved it after another manner, which might have been more proper to have made it by little and little. Thus it became God to form at once the parts which compose the World; & not to expect till it should have made it self, gradually, by little and little, as this Libertine argues. Moreover, it became him to give it the same form, which it would have had in time, by the necessary consequence of the Laws of the communication of motions; because it is certain, that the World would presently have been destroyed, if God had made it after such a manner as had been contrary to the Laws which might have produced it successively. Distinctly to explain all these things, to those who have not considered the principles upon which the objection is founded, wou'd require a whole Book, but I don't think I ought to stay any longer upon it; because they who clearly conceive the objection will also easily see, that what I have laid, is sufficient for the solution of it: For it is enough to know,

1. That God cannot act by the most simple ways, or which is all one, by general Laws, before there are any occasional causes, and that therefore the first motions of the parts of matter on all sides, ought to be made and determined by particular wills: For Bodies cannot hit upon one another, before they are moved, & 'tis this hitting or striking upon one another which is the occasional cause of motions.

2. That God might have formed the World, such as it is, only by at first determining the motion of the parts of matter, which surround and penetrate Bodies on all sides; and that also it was necessary, that God should move all the parts of matter on all sides, that the World might be formed by little and little in consequence of the natural Laws, and that therefore it comes to the same thing; only there would have been very little signs of wisdom and a great deal of useless action and lost time, if God had formed the World by degrees, in consequence of the natural Laws, after he had moved the parts of matter indifferently, and as it were, at all adventures.

3. That, absolutely speaking, God might have made the Heavens, the Earth, and all things else successively, by observing the same natural Laws, which he still observes at this day; for that which *Moses* says in *Genesis* might perhaps be as well reconciled with the *Cartesian* Principles, as with the Opinions of other Philosophers. Several Persons have already composed Books upon this Subject, and tho they may not perhaps have succeeded therein, I know not but that some others may perform it better.

To conclude, Above all things it ought to be observed, that God doth not establish general Laws, but that his way of acting may be the same, and not to govern the beginning of his action; for as I have said, it is even a contradiction, that God should begin to move matter, by the general Law of the communication of motions, since, before he removes Bodies, it is impossible they should strike upon one another. Thus God was obliged at first to move the

the parts of matter, and consequently to give to the World all at once by particular wills, that form, which it was convenient it should have with respect to his designs. It became him to form it so, as by the natural Laws of motion it would necessarily have been formed, that it might be preserved by the same Laws when he had established them; that is, so, as it would have been formed gradually, by little and little, by removing the parts of matter in a right Line, and afterwards observing the natural Laws of the communication of motions.

Object. VII.

According to the Author, God has formed Organized Bodies, by particular wills: Now the Salvation of one Man, is more worth than all the Insects in the World. Therefore, if God does not save all Men, 'tis not because he ought not to act by particular wills. If it was true, that it becomes not God to act but by general Laws, he would have made a World without Animals and Plants; seeing such a World, might have been produced by general Laws, whereas particular wills must be imployed to produce Plants and Animals.

Answer.

It is certain that God wills, that all men should be saved, and that he doth not give them his Grace, but to save them. But it is yet more certain, that if God gave them his Grace with a particular intent to save them all, they all would be saved: Therefore God doth not dispense his Grace by particular wills. I have elsewhere explained and proved all the propositions of this argument, there must therefore needs be an error in the objection, and tho I could not discover it, I ought not therefore to quit a

Truth, proved by every thing which we know of Gods Conduct; becauſe of an objection grounded upon that which we do not know: Nevertheleſs, it is eaſie to reſolve the difficulty. For the Reaſon why I maintain, that God ought not to act by particular wills, is, that his Conduct may be uniform, and thereby carry in it the Character of his Wiſdom, and Immutability.

Now, tho God when he created the World, did form the Bodies of Animals, by particular wills, it is evident, that this doth not diſturb the ſimplicity of his ways: it cannot be ſaid, that herein, he changed his Conduct. Therefore God might by particular wills, form Plants and Animals; and, in their Seeds, lodge that which might propagate their Species, in conſequence of the general Laws, without doing any thing unworthy of his Attributes. If God, by particular wills, did again form Plants and Animals in the Seas, which the firſt Propoſition of the propoſed Objection imports, the difficulty would be more conſiderable: But I maintain, and always have maintained, that the Germes of Animals increaſe, and Plants are unfolded, in conſequence of the general Laws of Nature. I hold, that all organized Bodies were formed at the beginning of the World, ſo as to draw their nouriſhment and come to perfection by the Laws of the Communication of Motions; and that it is for this reaſon, and the relations which God hath made betwixt the Mother's Brain, and that of the Fruit ſhe bears in her Womb. (It is plain enough, that I here ſpeak only of the primitive parts, for which we have no name, and which are unknown to us) Upon theſe accounts, I ſay,

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it is, that there are to be found ſo many Irregularities and Monſters among Animals. For I never ſaid, or thought, that God, by particular wills, forms every day the Bodies of Animals and Plants.

That which follows, *viz.* That, according to my Principles, God ought to have formed a World, without any other organized Bodies, but thoſe of Men, that he might have made it by the moſt ſimple ways, ſhews, that the Objector doth not comprehend my meaning: For beſides, that God might have great reaſon to form ſuch bodies, by particular wills, I hold, that it being at that time neceſſary to determine the firſt motions of matter by ſuch like wills, the conduct which he then obſerved, became nevertheleſs ſimple, by this way of acting: and doubtleſs his work is thereby made more perfect, for the wiſdom of the Creator is moſt viſible in organized bodies. The Objector doth not obſerve, that the difference of bodies proceeds from the various motion of the neighbouring parts; and that therefore to form all organized Bodies, it was enough for God to give divers motions to the divers parts of matter, from the beginning of the World. But to do this, 'twas neceſſary he ſhould act by particular wills, 'tis true; but it was likewiſe neceſſary for him to imploy ſuch like wills to begin the Chaos, and divide matter into ſuch parts as would have been fit to have form'd a World without Animals. Thus it comes to the ſame thing, as to the ſimplicity of the ways. But, on the other ſide, to have formed all organized bodies at once for all ages, ſhews an infinite wiſdom; whereas to have moved the parts of matter indifferently on all ſides, to have form'd a World

World without Animals ſucceſſively, and by little and little, would have been no ſign of knowledge. In a word, I affirm, and it ought well to be obſerved, that there needs no more particular wills to form Animals, than to divide the parts of matter. But tho infinitely many more were requiſite, beſides, that theſe wills were neceſſary when the World was formed, they could not diſturb the ſimplicity of God's ways, ſince they preceded the general Laws, and the ſtriking of bodies upon one another, which is the occaſional cauſe of them. But the general Laws being once eſtabliſhed, God cannot, without great reaſons, ceaſe to obſerve them. Thus we ſee, that God, in conſequence of his Laws, kills an infinite many Animals, and that he preſerves none of them by particular wills. Laſtly, Tho it ſhould be proved, that God doth yet, at this day, form Inſects by particular wills, this would make nothing againſt the main Principle of the Treatiſe: For St. *Paul* teaches us, that Men do not receive Grace, but by the interceſſion of J. C. in conſequence of the general Law, by which God would ſanctifie and ſave all, in his Son and by his Son, as I think I have proved in ſeveral places, and chiefly in the Second Diſcourſe of this Treatiſe.

Object. VIII.

The Author ſays, that the paſſages of Scripture, which deſtroy the efficacy of Second Cauſes, ſhould be taken literally. Now theſe very paſſages, ſo underſtood, prove, that God doth all by particular wills: Therefore God, for example, clothes the Lillies, and feeds the young Ravens, cauſes it to rain, and preſerves even the leaſt Hair of our Heads

Heads by particular wills. For this is the greateſt contradiction in the World, that the ſame words of the holy Spirit, ſhould be explained ſtrictly, and according to the Letter, where Second Cauſes are to be diſcarded; and that they ſhould not then be taken literally, but look'd upon as Anthropologies, when we would have it believed, that God acts not by particular wills.

Anſwer.

This Objection is ſurely the weakeſt in the World: For why is it the moſt plain contradiction in the World, that the ſame paſſage ought and ought not to be explained ſtrictly, and according to the Letter, in divers reſpects? The Scripture tells us, that God makes the Lillies to grow, and clothes them. Why may not this, and many ſuch like paſſages, be explained literally againſt the ſelf-efficacy of Second Cauſes; and favourably, and not ſo as to exclude the neceſſary condition of theſe ſame Cauſes? God makes the Plants to grow; he forms the Children in the Mother's Womb, ſays the Scripture: The rigour of the Letter therefore ſignifies, that God doth this by his own proper efficacy; but it doth not exclude the Conditions which he hath preſcribed unto himſelf that he may act after an uniform manner. God makes the Plants to increaſe by his own power; but it is in conſequence of his Laws, by the heat of the Sun, and a great deal of Rain. This paſſage, and ſeveral ſuch like, neither ſpeak of natural Laws, nor the Sun, nor the Rain; but if they be rigorouſly interpreted, as if God made the Plants to grow by particular wills, and not in conſequence of his Laws, a Man muſt renounce common ſenſe, and

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the Scripture it ſelf, which in a thouſand places ſpeaks of Second Cauſes, as the ordinary means of Providence. It is objected, That we find no places of Scripture which prove, that God acts ordinarily in conſequence of his Laws: and I am ſeriouſly blamed for producing no ſuch Texts. But, it ſeemed to me, that I ſhould have rendered my ſelf ridiculous, ſhould I have concern'd my ſelf to ſhew that which no perſon doubts of: For ſuppoſing only, that the Philoſopher's Nature is but a Chymera, as I have often proved, there is no truth more confirmed in the Holy Scripture. For all thoſe paſſages which ſeem to favour the efficacy of Second Cauſes, are certain proofs thereof. I have, if I am not deceived, demonſtrated in *the Explication of the Efficacy of Second Cauſes*, that my Opinion perfectly well agrees with the Holy Scripture, and that it agrees much better with Religion, than that which the prejudices of the Senſes, and Pagan Philoſophy, has introduced into the World.

F I N I S.